


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
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STAKES OF THE WAR



**POLITICAL MAP
OF
EUROPE IN 1914**

100 200 300 400 500
ENGLISH STATUTE MILES

STAKES OF THE WAR

*Summary of the various Problems,
Claims and Interests of the Nations
at the Peace Table*

BY

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ILLUSTRATED
WITH MAPS



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**TO
OUR MOTHERS**

PREFACE

Yesterday the detailed facts of European and Asiatic politics, race, trade, industry, and religion were of primary interest to the scholar and foreign trader. To-day they inject themselves into the discussions of every counting-room, throw their shadow across the deliberations of every labor council, and stand as stubborn factors in the personal fortune and future of every American. Foreign affairs have become the personal concern of the man in the street, no less than the professional concern of the scholar and the trader. Not that these facts have not always had profound influence upon American interests; but it remained for the war to force upon us, as a people, a belated recognition of the fact that we are part and parcel of a world of interlaced interests in which no nation can play a lone hand.

This book is an attempt to chart the facts involved in those problems of race and territory which the war has shoved into the foreground of our political and business thinking, which will demand solution at the peace-table, and with the implications of which we shall hereafter be obliged to deal—facts which no business man can in safety overlook if he is to plan wisely for the future; facts which no labor leader can prudently ignore if he is to guard the gains of the past and guarantee the development of the future: facts which no legislator can leave out of his thinking if he is to bring constructive statesmanship to bear upon American policy; facts which the average American must know in order to read his daily paper with full appreciation of the related meanings of the news, filled as it to-day is with new names, new factors, new problems forced upon his attention by necessity and self-interest.

In writing this book we have tried to keep strictly to the

rôle of reporters of facts. We have studiously avoided the expression of personal opinions. It may be thought that we have indulged in opinion at the points where we have dealt with the various solutions proposed for the several problems; but here again we have only set down some of the solutions that statesmen, publicists, and political schools have advanced. We have tried to report, with no admixture of our personal opinions, what ends those who have proposed a given solution think it will serve, and to record as well the objections that have been raised to such solution. We have included these statements of proposed solutions in this book of facts because the points of view and convictions which they represent are as truly *facts* for political engineering to reckon with at the peace-table as any matter of race or trade. But we have not in any instance placed our personal valuation upon a solution.

The reader may get the impression that we have not taken into full account the practical force of the political idealism that has taken such concrete form in the recent state papers of the United States and of our associates in the war; it may be thought that in listing the interests of Russia, let us say, we have overlooked the renunciation of many old interests that has been made by the present revolutionary leaders; or, again, where we state that the possession of a certain territory by a given nation would cut off from the sea certain other nations, it may seem that we have left out of our reckoning the growing determination of statesmanship that the problem of access to the sea for all nations shall be constructively met at the peace conference by adequate international arrangements.

In all such cases, however, it must be remembered that this book is not a propagandist document, but an attempt to list all of the concrete factors that must be dealt with by the new statesmanship or by the revolutionist philosophy in the attempt to work out a new order of economic and political relationships.

Nor in discussing the interests that several nations have in

a given territory have we mixed our opinion with the analysis. We have tried accurately to tabulate the interests claimed by the several nations, as those claims have been expressed in the writings and pronouncements of their respective statesmen, publicists, business men, and other leaders of opinion. If such an arrangement of facts enables the reader to see in turn through English, French, Russian, German, or Italian eyes, the method will be justified; for what a nation *thinks* its interests are may be as real a factor in political calculation as what its interests really are.

We have not been lured into any ambitious attempt to guide American opinion. We have tried simply to bring together the raw materials of fact from which an intelligent public opinion can draw its own conclusions.

There are books beyond number that draw sweeping generalizations regarding international politics and organization. The danger is that generalizations will determine the opinion of America before American opinion has acquired that saving balance of judgment which comes only with a knowledge of facts. A literature of generalization is indeed awakening the American mind to interest in world affairs, but we need a literature of fact before the public mind has been captured by the special pleader.

We have been obliged to set definite limitations to the scope of these studies. We have not dealt with those problems which are essentially matters of international law with its technical considerations; that field is well treated in many existing volumes. We have not considered the problem of China; that problem, as such, may not come up for specific action by the conference that settles this war, although it doubtless holds important possibilities for the future. We have not treated the problem of straits and canals; that problem promises to fall largely in the field of international regulation and control, which has not lacked constructive treatment at many hands.

We have taken as a basis for this volume those racial and territorial problems directly involved in the war at the time the book goes to press, and which are virtually certain to be treated at the peace-table. This delimitation of field has excluded certain problems of race and territory which may be raised if still other nations are drawn into the war. Likewise it has ruled out certain other problems of race and territory, the treatment of which at the hands of the peace conference is highly problematic.

With the international situation daily changing with unprecedented swiftness, it has been clearly out of the question to write a book that would record with scientific accuracy and completeness the statistics of race and industry of the immediate war-governed situation. We have, therefore, used no statistics later than those of December 31, 1913. Later statistics are difficult to obtain, and, when obtainable, are frequently juggled. But even though accurate statistics of the immediate situation were in all instances obtainable, they would be less pertinent to the purpose of these studies than the pre-war statistics. The statistics of the present situation, especially the economic statistics, deal with an abnormal situation, whereas these problems must be settled upon the basis of the normal situation which peace involves. Therefore, choice would prompt, even though necessity did not dictate, the use of the statistics of 1913 in the analysis of the essential factors in each problem.

May we repeat that we have sought to serve American opinion by the simple reporting of facts. In no small measure we have written this book from a sense of duty which recognizes that passionate devotion to ideals on the battle-field must be supplemented by realistic dealing with the facts of race and economics at the peace-table if sacrifice is to be rewarded with security.

Boston, January, 1918.

LOTHROP STODDARD,
GLENN FRANK.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The bibliographies in this book do not pretend to completeness. Our aim has been to cite the noteworthy books on the various subjects dealt with which have been written in English, French, German, and Italian, and which have been published within the last generation. In this way the reader who desires more detailed information on any particular subject is referred to recent and fairly general works. From the bibliographical references in these works he can discover those older or more technical books which will enable him to go still deeper than the limitations of space and the synthetic purpose of this volume have permitted.

In order to aid the reader in his prospective researches, we have endeavored wherever possible to subdivide our bibliographies into three sections: (1) historical, (2) economic, (3) general.

The historical section contains not only technical historical works, but also books of a more popular character, describing contemporary conditions, etc. The economic section contains the leading official or non-official reference-publications in the particular field in question, together with books of a predominantly economic content. The general section contains all books not falling clearly within the two preceding categories, thus including both the lighter books of travel and works on special topics other than economic.

Naturally, it has not been possible always to subdivide with absolute accuracy. Many books fall so on the line that their exact classification is a moot point. Again, in certain chapters, the total bibliography is so scanty that we have thought

it better to place the entire list under the general category at the end of the chapter.

Despite these imperfections, we believe that our classification will serve a useful purpose by enabling the reader to pick out books on particular matters with a minimum of time wasted in consulting volumes not germane to his special enquiry.

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
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WESTERN EUROPE

BELGIUM



STAKES OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

BELGIUM

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Belgium is a sort of geographical half-way house between the marshlands of the North Sea coast and the uplands of west-central Europe. The north and west parts are low plains. The southeastern half is hill-country. Here again geography has played a determining rôle in history. The geographical difference between the two sections of Belgian territory accounts for the racial difference between the two sections of Belgian population; and this racial division is the outstanding problem of the internal history of Belgium.

The low plains of the north and west fell easy prey to the Germanic barbarians when they swept southward at the fall of the Roman Empire. To-day the modern Flemings, the descendants of these invaders, form a solid block of population which is thoroughly Teutonic in blood, language, and basic culture. They are, in fact, blood-brothers of their northern neighbors, the Dutch.

But the more defensible hills of the southeastern half of Belgium enabled the Latinized Celtic population to hold its ground against the Germanic invaders. There was not, therefore, the racial displacement in the southeast that there was in the north and west of Belgium. The modern Walloons occupying this section of Belgium are descendants of the old

4 THE NATIONS AT THE PEACE TABLE

Latinized Celtic folk, and therefore are a French-speaking people closely related to their kinsmen in France.

Belgium's history has been singularly troubled. The natural point of focus for several lines of political pressure, Belgium has for centuries been the cockpit wherein the great powers of Europe have fought for special advantage and supremacy.

For more than two centuries previous to 1870, France aspired to control Belgium. During the Napoleonic era Belgium was actually in French hands. As a barrier to French aggression, the Vienna Congress of 1814 united Belgium and Holland into the Kingdom of the Netherlands. But this union was of short duration, because the French-speaking Walloons, whose racial self-consciousness had been intensified by the preceding generation of French rule, chafed under the rule of Dutchmen and Flemings which the Kingdom of the Netherlands involved. The Walloons, taking advantage of the religious cleavage between the Catholic Flemings and the Protestant Dutch, won sufficient Flemish support to launch the successful revolution of 1830, which resulted in the establishment of Belgium as an independent state.

From 1830 until 1914 Belgium enjoyed unwonted immunity from foreign pressure. The old French menace had almost, if not entirely, ceased to be a factor in Belgium's political calculations, and fear of Germany did not become acute until the very eve of the present war. This long period of peace brought prosperity to Belgium and made her one of the commanding industrial centers of the world.

Her most vexing problem was the growing breach between the Walloons and the Flemings. During the generation after 1830 there was a marked racial and cultural revival among the Flemings, giving momentum to a growing protest against the privileged position that the Walloon leaders of the revolution of 1830 had accorded the French language and culture. The Walloons, jealous of their advantages, feared that the

slightly more numerous Flemish element might ultimately secure political supremacy. In the years immediately preceding the present war Flemish-Walloon antagonism was acute. Flemish extremists threatened secession to Holland, while Walloon extremists hinted at union with France.

Then came the German invasion of 1914, and differences of race and culture were temporarily adjourned in the face of a common disaster. Historically speaking, this German invasion is the last of a long series of attempts from various quarters to acquire, as a strategic right of way or actual dependency, this eminently desirable region, the control of which would go far toward making the possessor master of western Europe.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

At the time of the German invasion of 1914, Belgium was one of the most flourishing economic areas in the world. Fertility of soil, extent of mineral resources, variety of manufactures, and ample trade communications combine to produce a well-balanced prosperity and economic completeness.

Nearly all the soil of Belgium is productive. Of its total area of 7,264,159 acres, 4,287,920 acres are under cultivation, and 1,286,870 acres are in forest, with only 469,300 acres fallow or uncultivated. In 1912 the yield from the cultivated area was as follows, estimated in long tons: Cereal crops (wheat, barley, oats, and rye), 1,535,859 tons; potatoes, 162,653 tons; sugar-beets, 85,126 tons; tobacco, 9,867 tons.

The average yearly value of Belgian forest products is about 21,500,000 francs.

At the end of 1912 the live-stock possessions of Belgium stood as follows: Horses, 262,709; horned cattle, 1,830,747; pigs, 1,348,514.

The most valuable mineral product of Belgium is coal. The extensive coal-deposits near Liège and Mons, in the southeastern part, have long been the basis of Belgium's industrial life, and the opening of a rich new coal-field in the province of Limburg in 1906 promised a fresh accession of industrial power.

Southeastern Belgium also contains valuable iron deposits, although these are showing signs of exhaustion, and therefore Belgium's iron and steel industries depend somewhat upon the importation of iron ore from Luxemburg and French Lorraine.

In 1912 the mineral output of Belgium stood as follows: Pig-iron, 2,301,290 tons; manufactured iron, 334,750 tons; steel ingots, 2,515,040 tons; steel rails, 1,903,270 tons; zinc, 205,940 tons; lead, 102,020 tons; silver 279,965 kilograms.

The total value of the pig-iron, manufactured iron, steel ingots, and steel rails produced in 1912 was 700,000,000 francs. Belgium possesses, in addition to these mineral resources, many valuable quarries of granite, marble, and slate.

The possession of coal and iron, basic factors of modern industrial life, together with an industrious and intelligent working population, has enabled Belgium to erect an imposing industrial structure. The country is dotted with workshops and factories which produce a wide variety of articles. Eastern Belgium is the center of the iron and steel trades, producing particularly railway materials, fire-arms, and machinery. Western Belgium, especially Flanders, is the center of the textile industry, producing both cotton and woolen fabrics. Linens, laces, gloves, and other allied products figure in its output. Other important industries are window glass, paper, oil-cloth, dyes and colors, as well as miscellaneous chemical products.

With these adequate bases of resource and production Belgium has succeeded in building up an extensive commerce. Belgium holds sixth place in the commercial ranking of the nations. In 1912, Belgium's exports amounted to 3,951,000,000 francs; her imports, 4,958,000,000 francs. By virtue of location, Belgium is a natural trade-link between central Europe and the outer world. This means for Belgium an important transit-trade which in 1912 amounted to 2,437,000,000 francs. This is due to the fact that her great port of Antwerp, near the mouth of the Scheldt River, is accessible to the largest ocean-going steamers and connected with the rest of Europe by a network of railways and canals. Through her expanding merchant marine, which in 1912 totaled 181,637 tons, Belgium reaped a further profit from her overseas trade.

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THE FACTS ABOUT BELGIUM

WHERE BELGIUM IS LOCATED

Belgium is located at the point where the marshlands of the North Sea coast merge into the uplands of west-central

Europe. It is bounded by Holland on the north, the English Channel on the west, France on the south, and Germany on the east.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Belgium has an area of 11,373 square miles, about equaling the combined areas of Maryland and Delaware.

(Luxemburg, dealt with in an annex to the Belgian problems, has an area of 999 square miles.)

DIFFERENT RACES IN BELGIUM

The *Walloons* (French-speaking element) number about 2,833,000 and occupy the hilly southern half of Belgium. They are of all social classes. Before the war they enjoyed a slightly higher political and cultural status than the Flemings. They appear to have slightly less economic efficiency than the Flemings.

The *Flemings* (Flemish-speaking element) number about 3,220,000 and are found in the flat northern half of Belgium. They are of all social classes. As part of a Teutonist policy, the German government, since its occupation of Belgium, has seemed to favor the Flemings at the expense of the Walloons.

Besides the figures above quoted, which represent those persons who speak only French or Flemish, there were in 1910 (the census from which all these figures are drawn) 871,000 persons speaking both French and Flemish. The majority of these should be classed as Flemish in blood.

WHO CONTROLLED BELGIUM BEFORE THE WAR

Belgium.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED BELGIUM SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Germany has occupied and controlled all of Belgium except a small tract in the extreme west on the sea-coast adjacent to

the French frontier. This tract has been held by the remnant of the Belgian army, aided by Allied troops.

BELGIUM'S INTERESTS

The interest of Belgians in the restoration of Belgium as an independent state is so patent and vital that it needs no topical consideration.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN BELGIUM

Political. German retention of Belgium would shift the political balance of power in western Europe to the decided favor of Germany. It would reduce France to a position of precarious dependence, turn Holland into a mere enclave of the German Empire, and menace England with subjection to German dominance. On the other hand, Germany would regard a restored Belgium, frankly hostile to Germany and allied with France and England, as shifting the balance of power in western Europe considerably against Germany.

Economic. The great accession of economic strength that would accrue to Germany from the retention of Belgium is clear from a consideration of the economic resources of Belgium. The Belgian port of Antwerp would be invaluable to Germany as a part of her machinery of trade distribution.

Strategic. German retention of Belgium would envelop France both to the north and east, making a German drive on Paris possible at any time. It would render Holland defenseless against Germany. It would menace England's seapower through German control of Antwerp and render reasonably practicable a German invasion of England by virtue of a solid German foothold on the English Channel. On the other hand, a hostile Belgium, supported by France and England, would be in an advantageous position for an offensive against Germany's industrial heart, Westphalia and Rhineland. Germany's principal arsenal, the Krupp works at Essen, lies within striking distance of the Belgian frontier.

Racial. In the extreme east of Belgium, near the German border, is the small district of Verviers, inhabited by about 30,000 German-speaking peasants. There are, of course, considerable colonies of Germans (business men and others) in the Belgian cities, notably Antwerp. Many Germans, however, particularly those of the Pan-Germanist school of thought, assert that since the Flemish population of Belgium belongs to the Teutonic race, it might ultimately be assimilated by the German nationality. This is one of the arguments adduced in Germany for the annexation of Belgium to the German Empire.

Cultural. The Teutonic cast of the language and culture of the Flemings and their close historic affiliations with Germany are emphasized by the Pan-Germans.

Religious. The great majority of the population of Belgium is Roman Catholic. There are only 28,000 Protestants and 13,000 Jews in Belgium. Although the tendency of the Flemings to be devout Roman Catholics and of the Walloons to be free-thinking laicists undoubtedly is a factor in complicating the relations of these two nationalities within Belgium, religion has virtually no bearing upon the international aspect of the Belgian problem.

FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN BELGIUM

Political. France regards a strong Belgium as essential to the preservation of the balance of power in western Europe against the possibility of German aggression. Some Frenchmen think the solution lies in the neutralization of Belgium under adequate international guaranties. Others, skeptical of this arrangement, desire an independent Belgium in friendly alliance with France.

Economic. France is partly dependent upon Belgian coal. There exists a close economic connection between the adjoining industrial areas of southern Belgium and northern France.

Belgium is an important market for French products. In 1912, France exported to Belgium to the extent of 908,000,000 francs, while Belgium exported to France to the extent of 752,000,000 francs. Thus France was importing from Belgium more than from any other country except Germany.

Strategic. A restored Belgium, adequately guaranteed against German aggression, would safeguard the rather indefensible northern frontier of France, and a friendly or allied Belgium would even enable France, by a quick thrust, to reach the vital industrial centers of Westphalia and Rhineland, as before suggested.

Racial. The Walloon part of the Belgian population is French in blood and language. France has every concern, therefore, to see that the interests of this largest block of French-speaking people outside of France are safeguarded and furthered.

Cultural. The culture of the Walloons is French, a fact which reinforces the racial interest and deepens French concern in Belgium. Should the Walloons ultimately succeed in assimilating the Flemings, thereby making Belgium a solidly French-speaking nation, it would obviously mean a marked gain for French cultural power.

Religious. Virtually no religious interest figures in French calculations regarding Belgium.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN BELGIUM

Political. English political thought regards a strong and independent Belgium as essential to England's position as a great power. England realizes that the possession of Belgium by any Continental great power would mean the holding of the key to the European situation.

Economic. In 1912, England stood third in Belgian trade countries both as regards imports and exports, imports standing 505,000,000 francs and exports 594,000,000 francs. The economic tie is close,

Strategic. A German-controlled Belgium would menace England's sea-power by giving Germany naval bases on the English Channel. This is especially significant as a potential menace since the development of the submarine as a factor in naval warfare. It would also threaten England with direct military invasion.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

HOLLAND'S INTERESTS IN BELGIUM

Political. Mutual trade between Holland and Belgium is large. In 1912, Holland exported to Belgium to the extent of 356,000,000 francs and imported from Belgium to the extent of 367,000,000 francs.

Strategic. A German-controlled Belgium would leave Holland with an indefensible frontier against Germany.

Racial. The Flemings are blood-brothers of the Dutch. There is virtually no racial difference between the two stocks.

Cultural. Flemish and Dutch culture are essentially the same. The Flemish tongue is a dialect of the Dutch. The literary language of the two bodies is the same. This unity of blood and culture has led many, on both sides of the frontier, to regret the violent separation of 1830 and to dream of a political reunion of the Flemish part, at least, of Belgium with Holland. This aspiration is embodied in the "Great Netherland" school of political thought.

Religious. The fact that the Flemings are predominantly Roman Catholic, while the Dutch royal house and most of the Dutch people are strong Protestants, is a formidable handicap to the spread of the Great Netherland idea. Religion is the principal factor which has kept apart these two stocks racially indistinguishable.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY
MEAN1. *Status Quo ante bellum under Stronger International Guaranties.*

A guaranteed independence for Belgium naturally appeals to the greatest number as the essentially just and desirable solution. The continued security of Belgium as a small state would be the living symbol of a just and stable world order. But the independence of Belgium is important not only as a symbol of the recognized rights of small nations as a general principle, but for the maintenance of the liberties of Europe. The way in which, at each instance of aggression against Belgium, leagues of European states have spontaneously formed to resist the aggressors, as in the case of Spain, France, and Germany, proves that there is clear recognition, instinctive as well as reasoned, that Belgium in the hands of any one strong power would threaten Europe with subjection to the military despotism that nation could thereby create.

The fact that Belgium has a maximum of desirability and a minimum of defensibility makes it a vulnerable point in the European fabric and a constant invitation to aggression.

Two things are essential to the successful maintenance of an independent Belgium: the establishment of a new international order that will conduce to greater international cooperation and world security instead of the traditional clutching at distributive shares of desirable territory, and a constructive solution of Belgium's internal racial strife between the Flemings and the Walloons.

2. *A Greater Belgium.*

The suggestion of such a solution would most probably come from the French-speaking Walloon school of thought, supported by their sympathizers in France, representing as they do the imperialistic sentiment in Belgium. This would

probably imply the annexation to Belgium of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Dutch Flanders, with a Belgian-Dutch co-ownership of the mouth of the Scheldt, and Dutch Limburg. These annexations have been urged in some quarters for years.

This would mean, by the resulting extension of territory and population, an appreciable strengthening of Belgium. It would not, however, lift Belgium to the rank of a great power or lessen materially the necessity for international guaranties. While extending the size of the Belgian state, it would intensify the internal race problem. The Flemings would object to such spoliation of Holland. The inhabitants of Dutch Flanders and Limburg would look with little enthusiasm on such a change of allegiance.

Since the war began some Belgians contend that a band of German territory to the east of the present Belgian frontier should be annexed in order to give Belgium a strategic frontier against renewed German attack. Some Belgians desire to extend their frontier even as far as the Rhine. This would still leave Belgium a small power, however, and would intensify Belgium's racial problem by bringing in a body of recalcitrant Germans. It would imply permanent hostility to Germany and probably close alliance with France.

3. *A German Annexed or Controlled Belgium.*

This would virtually mean a German hegemony of Europe. It would give Germany a strategic position on the English Channel from which she could bring a menacing pressure upon, if not invade, England. It would mean a German envelopment of France on the north and east sides. It would mean an enormous accession of economic power to the German Empire by giving it the resources of Belgium and the port of Antwerp.

4. *A Division of Belgium along Racial Lines.*

This would imply the extinction of Belgium as a state, and

its division between France and Holland, France taking the Walloon part and Holland the Fleming part. This would of course remove the standing racial friction. Division could be made along fairly clear lines, leaving very few conflicting elements in either part. A proposal for division would get its main support from the extreme elements among the Flemings, who dream of a Greater Netherland in which they would join their Dutch kinsmen, and from the extreme element among the Walloons who would prefer to join their French kinsmen rather than make further political and cultural concessions to the Flemings. Against these elements and points of view would, of course, be the national patriotism that has grown up during the century of Belgian independence and which has been vivified through the common defense during the present war.

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LUXEMBURG: ANNEX TO THE BELGIAN PROBLEM

Luxemburg is an independent, neutralized grand duchy, situated at the junction of Germany, France, and Belgium. Its area is 999 square miles; its population 260,000. Its inhabitants are mostly of Teutonic blood and speak a German patois, though the upper classes also speak French. The country is, in fact, a meeting-ground of German and French culture.

Though small in area, Luxemburg is a valuable bit of territory. Its hilly surface covers rich iron deposits much worked in recent years. The soil is generally fertile.

Though politically independent of Germany, Luxemburg is within the German Zollverein, or customs-union, and most of its trade is with Germany.

For centuries Luxemburg has been a bone of contention between France and Germany. During the Middle Ages it formed part of the Medieval German Empire (Holy Roman Empire), though the French made several attempts to conquer it, and actually held it for several years during the reign of Louis XIV in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Again conquered by the French in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna Congress of 1814 assigned it to the King of Holland. It was not, however, made Dutch territory, but was left within the Germanic Confederation, the rights of the Dutch king thus being dynastic, not national. When the Germanic Confederation was dissolved in 1866, Luxemburg was declared a neutralized principality under the Dutch crown. This arrangement lasted until 1890, when the male line of the Dutch royal house failed, the last Dutch

king being succeeded by his daughter, the present Queen Wilhelmina. By the ancient Salic law of succession, which covered Luxemburg, a younger branch of the Dutch royal house succeeded to the Ducal throne, and Luxemburg thenceforth became an independent grand duchy under its own line of sovereigns.

In August, 1914, Luxemburg was overrun by German troops and has since been in German hands.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would imply Luxemburg as an independent grand duchy under international guaranties. This arrangement virtually stands or falls with the independence of Belgium under international guaranties. The same factors govern both situations. In such a world as Belgium can live in, Luxemburg may know security.

2. *Annexion of Luxemburg to Germany.*

This would mean less of a wrench to the feelings of the Luxemburgers than the annexation of Belgium would to the Belgians, since Luxemburg is already within the German customs-union and is a part of the German economic system. Most of its trade is with Germany. Most of the inhabitants speak a dialect of German as their mother tongue. There is, however, a strong local patriotism, which has probably been heightened by the German military occupation since 1914.

3. *Annexion of Luxemburg to France.*

Strong cultural ties bind Luxemburg to France. Most educated Luxemburgers speak French as their second language and look upon France as their natural protector against German annexation. The annexation of Luxemburg to France

would hardly be feasible except in connection with a French annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, since otherwise Luxemburg would be a small salient extending into German territory.


4. *Annexation of Luxemburg to Belgium.*

Were the inhabitants to face the proved impossibility of continued independence, the annexation of Luxemburg to Belgium would better reconcile them to the loss of national identity than annexation either to Germany or to France. Such a solution would also remove the possibility of either France or Germany charging the other with imperialistic designs.

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WESTERN EUROPE
ALSACE-LORRAINE



N°2 ALSACE-LORRAINE

CHAPTER II

ALSACE-LORRAINE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As its hyphenated name suggests, Alsace-Lorraine is composed of two distinct regions the geographical differences of which are pronounced. Alsace is a sharply defined area consisting of a long and rather narrow alluvial plain stretching north and south between the Vosges Mountains and the River Rhine. Lorraine is a hilly plateau, bounded on the west by the river valley of the Moselle, and to the eastward sinking into the Alsatian plain.

The history of these two regions has been as different as their geography. Indeed, their history has been to no small degree different, just because their geography has been different. True, they were both thoroughly Latinized under the Roman Empire, but thereafter their development was divergent.

Because the Alsatian plain was open and accessible, when the Roman Empire fell the incoming tide of Teutonic barbarians from across the Rhine easily flooded the Alsace region and overwhelmed entirely the old Gallo-Roman population. From that time on Alsace has been thoroughly Teutonic in blood and speech.

But the broken hill country of Lorraine acted as a check on the Teutonic tide. The Teutonic hordes were able to occupy only the eastern portion of the Lorraine region, the western part remaining predominantly Latin in language and Gallo-Roman in blood. This racial division has persisted virtually unchanged to the present day. In 1910, the official census of the German Empire indicates 1,634,000 of the

Long before 1766, however, France had acquired Alsace. The complete prostration of Germany during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) enabled France to possess much of Alsace, the remainder of the region being annexed during the latter part of the century; so that by 1700 all Alsace was a French province save a few small enclaves which retained their independence until the French Revolution (1789).

Two factors reconciled Alsace-Lorraine to French rule and furthered the spread of French culture and French ideals: the gradual nature of the French conquest and the tactful policy of the French government, which made no attempt to uproot the German language and culture of the Teutonic inhabitants. But it was the French Revolution that really bound Alsace-Lorraine to France. From that time until 1870 the vast majority of Alsace-Lorrainers felt themselves to be Frenchmen and expressed no desire for political union with their Teutonic kinsmen beyond the Rhine. When, by the Treaty of Frankfort, which concluded the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the new German Empire, the change was bitterly resented by the inhabitants of the two provinces. Fully 50,000 Alsace-Lorrainers emigrated to France at that time rather than become German citizens. And this emigration has never quite ceased, although of late years it has dwindled to negligible proportions.

Since 1871, Alsace-Lorraine has been subjected to a systematic process of Germanization. The results of this Germanization process have varied greatly, however, with the different sections and racial elements.

The French-speaking population of western Lorraine has stubbornly resisted Germanization, and beyond doubt to-day desires reunion with France. In fact, so solidly French was this region that Germany probably would not have demanded its cession had it not contained the great fortress of Metz,

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which German military leaders considered vital to a strategic frontier.

On the other hand, the German-speaking population of eastern Lorraine apparently is fairly well reconciled to its new political status.

In Alsace the bulk of the population seems to take a middle ground. The Alsatian, resembling in many ways his near kinsman the German Swiss, is a strong individualist, with a keen love of personal liberty. Two generations within the German Empire have doubtless done much to stimulate the fundamental Teutonism of the Alsatian nature. In fact, had German rule been tactful and liberal, Alsace might to-day be a contented member of the German Empire. But the tactless, oppressive, and brutal German rule, which has striven to uproot the last vestige of French culture, has sorely irritated this highly individualistic and liberty-loving people.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

Alsace-Lorraine is an area of high economic importance due to its fertile soil, extensive mineral deposits, and effectively developed industrial life.

Alsace is agriculturally the more important of the two provinces. The alluvial plain of the Rhine Valley and the lower parts of the numerous river valleys opening into it from the Vosges Mountains are markedly fertile. Lorraine soil is less fertile, but by no means barren.

The 1913 crop-statistics, stated in metric tons (2,204 lbs.), showed the following yield: Wheat, 238,048 tons; rye, 92,889 tons; barley, 108,678 tons; potatoes, 1,266,463 tons; oats, 209,963 tons; hay, 1,137,786 tons; tobacco, (dried) in 1912, 4,878 tons; hops, 1,595 tons.

In addition, 67,090 acres of vineyards yielded 3,934,442 gallons of wine.

At the beginning of 1913 the live-stock possessions of Alsace-Lorraine stood as follows: Horses, 136,536; horned cattle, 522,029; sheep, 45,519; goats, 70,978; pigs, 430,161.

The mountain pastures of the Vosges conduce to the raising of live stock. The famous Münster cheese is one of the valuable dairy products of this region.

The greatest mineral asset of Alsace-Lorraine is iron, possessing, as it does, the largest deposit of iron ore in Europe. The iron beds of western Lorraine are reckoned to contain two billion tons, or five sevenths of the estimated total iron resources of the German Empire. The iron output of this region in 1913 was 21,000,000 metric tons. Because of the phosphoric quality of this iron, it yields fertilizer by-products sufficient to supply the entire German Empire and leave an export surplus. In 1902 valuable potash deposits were discovered in the Alsatian Vosges.

Other mineral products, such as coal and salt, are found. The 1913 mineral-statistics stood as follows: Iron, 21,136,265 tons; coal, 3,795,932 tons; salt, 76,672 tons.

Besides these, there are valuable gypsum and limestone quarries; 38,509 persons were employed in the mines and quarries.

The chief industry of the region is the textile works, found

mainly in Alsace, centering at Mülhausen and Colmar and in the neighboring valleys of the Vosges. The cotton manufacture is the most important in the German Empire. The woollen industry is of smaller proportions. About 76,000 persons were employed in these industries in 1913.

The industry and commerce of Alsace-Lorraine are enhanced by the fact of excellent facilities of communication. The region is a natural connecting-link between the north and south and the east and west. This is particularly true of Alsace. The River Rhine, the numerous canals, and good railways constitute a good transportation system.

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THE FACTS ABOUT ALSACE-LORRAINE

WHERE ALSACE-LORRAINE IS LOCATED

Alsace-Lorraine is the long and rather narrow border-land lying between France and Germany and stretching from Belgium to Switzerland. Since 1871, of course, it has been politically German.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Alsace has an area of 3,202 square miles.

Lorraine has an area of 2,403 square miles.

Alsace-Lorraine has, therefore, a total area of 5,605 square miles and is about as large as the combined areas of Rhode Island and Connecticut.

DIFFERENT RACES IN ALSACE-LORRAINE

NOTE: Alsace-Lorraine is an exception to the tendency prevailing in Europe for the national preference of a population to coincide with its blood and speech. Therefore, while the language statistics of Alsace-Lorraine may be rightly taken as the basis for estimating the racial elements, the reader must not be misled into thinking that all persons here listed as German-speaking are German in their national preferences or sympathies. This number includes native-born anti-German Alsace-Lorrainers, as well as such Alsace-Lorrainers as have German sympathies, and the Germans who have settled in such large numbers in Alsace-Lorraine since 1871.

The *German*-speaking element numbers about 1,634,000 and is found throughout Alsace-Lorraine except in the western part of Lorraine, and even here there are large German garrisons and a considerable German civilian population in the towns. Most of the German preponderance in the towns of western Lorraine represents German settlement since 1871. The Germans are found in all social classes. Virtually all of the official class is German. They are politically and economically dominant.

The *French*-speaking element numbers about 204,000 and is concentrated to a marked degree in western Lorraine, especially in the country districts. The French are likewise found in all social classes. They are politically depressed, but their French culture exerts much influence throughout Alsace-Lorraine.

WHO CONTROLLED ALSACE-LORRAINE BEFORE THE WAR
Germany.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED ALSACE-LORRAINE
SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Germany has maintained her control of this region with the exception of a small area in the extreme south of Alsace, which has been under French military occupation since the autumn of 1914.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN ALSACE-LORRAINE

Political. Nearly all Germans regard Alsace-Lorraine as an integral part of the historic German fatherland and insist that its loss would inflict an unhealable wound upon the body politic of Germany.

Economic. Its economic and industrial value to the German Empire is regarded as critically important. The crux of Germany's economic interest is the iron deposits of Lorraine, which represent about seventy-five per cent. of the iron output of the German Empire. This has been the basis of Germany's marked industrial development and has underlain her ability to arm and to carry on the war. Germany realizes that the loss of this region would be not only an economic, but a military, blow as well.

Strategic. Alsace-Lorraine makes an ideal frontier both defensive and offensive. In French hands it would constitute a threatening wedge driven deep into Germany. Both

Germany and France regard the possession of this region by the other as a threatening advantage.

Racial. The deliberate racial displacement that has gone on since 1871 has left the majority of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine to-day Germanic in speech and blood.

Cultural. The majority of the inhabitants are Germanic in original culture, although most of them are impregnated with French culture.

Religious. Of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, 1,428,343 are Roman Catholics, 408,274 are Protestants, 3,868 are other Christians, and 30,483 are Jews. Religion, however, plays virtually no part in the problem.

FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN ALSACE-LORRAINE

Political. Nearly all Frenchmen regard Alsace-Lorraine as an integral part of the historic French fatherland. In French opinion the return of this region to France is the only thing that will heal the wound inflicted by the mutilation of 1871, when Germany wrested it away.

Economic. The great economic resources of the region would obviously mean a vast accession of economic strength to France. It would tend to tip the economic balance between Germany and France in favor of France.

Strategic. Alsace-Lorraine in French hands would mean a wedge-like frontier driven into Germany, giving France undoubted advantage both for defense and offense.

Racial. The French majority in western Lorraine and the French element throughout all Alsace-Lorraine represent the racial interest of France in this region.

Cultural. France asserts that virtually the entire population of Alsace-Lorraine, regardless of racial origin, is French in culture.

Religious. Religion plays little part in the claims of France.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY
MEAN1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would mean, of course, the continuance of Alsace-Lorraine as a *Reichsland* in the German Empire. A *Reichsland* corresponds in a general way to the territorial dependencies of the United States. That is to say, its representation and powers are not those of a fully federalized unit in the empire, just as the representation and powers of Alaska in our House of Representatives differ from the representation and powers of Alabama. This solution is not likely to be tried. Local sentiment is against it, and the German government has given out intermittent hints that it intended turning Alsace-Lorraine into a federalized state of the empire.

2. *Federalization in the German Empire.*

In the event that Alsace-Lorraine should remain a part of the German Empire, the transfer of the territory from the status of a *Reichsland* to that of a federalized state of the empire, with the accompanying increase of representation and powers, will be a desirable, if not inevitable, move. But the value of federalization as a solution of the problem will vary according to whether Germany is liberalized or remains autocratic either in fact or form.

a. *Under an Autocratic Germany*

The undoubted resentment against the tactless administration of Germany in her attempt to root out French culture and language might make the inhabitants willing to throw away all economic advantages of German control, if they could hope for nothing but a continuance of the same policy of complete Prussianization of spirit and culture involved in further dependence upon an autocratic Germany.

b. *Under a Liberalized Germany*

Should Germany become liberalized and grant full rights of language and culture to Alsace-Lorraine as a federalized state of the empire, the anti-German spirit might in time be tempered, and the argument of economic interest might have weight toward some ultimate solution that would not mean complete severance from the German Empire.

In the event of such development, certain results may be predicated. If the Alsations secure, in addition to the economic rights that they have, the political rights that they do not have, much of their standing grievance might be canceled. Were the Alsations to become fairly well reconciled to such an arrangement, and were it to become evident that they were a real factor in a responsible Germany democratized in essence, if not in form, the *revanche* spirit in France might tend to die. For we do not go out to avenge satisfied peoples. The Alsations in their intense individualism are anti-Prussian, and therefore their hearty approval of a solution, if freely given, would be good evidence of its justice. Such a solution would of course raise no inverse *revanche* spirit in Germany.

3. *Annexation to France.*

This solution would of course meet the approval of the French and French-feeling elements in Alsace-Lorraine; it would satisfy the almost universal desire of Frenchmen for the return of territory and kinsmen which they regard as having been wrested from them by force untempered by justice or right. Should this territory not revert to France either through arms or council, France would be left with the bitterness of a baulked ambition, which during the last forty years has been an abiding, even though quiescent purpose, waiting only for the stress of war to whip it into an almost religious crusade.

In such a mood of disappointment, and with such a sense

of justice outraged, France might, just because human nature is what it is, subordinate all other policies to a new and intensified *revanche*; and in her sullen determination to improve the "next chance" to regain Alsace-Lorraine, she might not collaborate with a whole heart in the establishment of a stable world order.

The obvious obstacles to this solution are the preponderant Germanic population and the completeness with which German finance and industrial administration have interlaced themselves in the life of the country. These factors have doubtless been accentuated during the war by extensive purchase of French-owned little farms, individual homes, and larger estates, and a settled policy of increasing the distinctly German ownership of the country.

Of course the retrocession of this region to France would create an inverse *revanche* spirit in Germany that might poison international relations for generations to come. All sections of German thought, even the Socialists, outside the most extreme types, regard Alsace-Lorraine as an integral part of the fatherland—at least the German-speaking part of the region.

Against the handicap of a sullen and revengeful Germany that would be likely to result from a French annexation of Alsace-Lorraine should be placed the fact that, deprived of the vast iron resources of the region, Germany would not be in a position readily to rearm on an extensive scale.

4. *Division between France and Germany along Racial Lines.*

This would probably mean that western Lorraine would go to France, while eastern Lorraine and Alsace would remain with Germany. Were this to prove a feasible treatment, it would, of course, reduce to a minimum the present conflicts of language and culture. Although it would fall short of both French and German dreams, it might have the merits of a

compromise solution. Both would have got something; the French the most French part, the Germans the most German part.

If life were always logical, such a solution might in time be expected to mollify the *revanche* spirit both in France and in Germany. Such a division would also give the value of continuity of economic administration over the most industrial part of the region. One stubborn element would be that such a disposition would transfer the enormous iron resources of western Lorraine to France, a fact that would give Germany pause, since so much of her power of industry and arms depends upon this resource.

5. *Plebiscite.*

It has become almost an axiom of Allied statesmanship, certainly one of the most-used slogans of the war, that peoples shall have the right to determine their political allegiance. At first glance it would seem that a plebiscite, or the taking of a referendum vote, that would give the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine a chance to say what they desire in the matter, would be the simplest and most just solution.

The proposal for a plebiscite may be qualified by many plans of procedure. A separate vote might be taken in each of the divisions, one in Alsace and one in Lorraine. Separate votes might be taken in the sections where a racial majority is clear. Still other and smaller local units might be voted separately. The withdrawal of belligerent authority might be made precedent to the plebiscite, and the vote taken under neutral guaranty against undue pressure from keenly interested nations.

Certain practical difficulties, however, intervene. It would probably be difficult to get a really free expression of the popular will. Indirectly, if not directly, pressure would inevitably come from both Germany and France. The vote would probably show "indecisive and patchy results," as

some one has phrased it. And that would increase the difficulties of the final settlement, whichever way the result turned. It would dramatize the internal differences. Then, too, the problem of Alsace-Lorraine happens to be quite as much an international as a national problem. Recorded experience indicates that plebiscites among subject peoples invariably confirm the wishes of the controlling government.

6. *Alsace-Lorraine as an Independent Buffer State between France and Germany.*

However desirable this solution may, at first consideration, appear as a means of keeping France and Germany apart and thus eliminating the threat of future invasions, its practicability may be gravely doubted. Alsace-Lorraine is too small to stand alone as an independent political and economic unit unless there occur developments of international organization and control which the political realist must still regard as in the field of hope rather than of fact.

7. *Alliance with Belgium and Switzerland in a Solid Band of Small Neutral States across Europe under International Guaranty.*


This suggestion is ingenious, but of doubtful feasibility. And yet it may be only one of a series of such arrangements which, impossible under the old régime, will become possible under some new international synthesis that may rise out of the otherwise sordid bargainings of a peace table.

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NORTHERN EUROPE
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN



N° 3 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

CHAPTER III

SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Schleswig-Holstein has always been a disputed frontier region between the Germans and the Danes. Holstein was from the first predominantly German, having originated as a German *Mark*, or frontier colony, against Danish incursions into Germany. Schleswig, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, seems to have been predominantly Danish in race, although during the course of centuries it became increasingly Germanized. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Schleswig and Holstein were united politically under a single ruler. When his line died out, they passed by inheritance, in 1460, to the royal house of Denmark, with the proviso, however, that they should maintain their political existence apart from the Danish kingdom under a personal union with the Danish king as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and with the agreement that the duchies should never be separated.

So things stood down to the middle of the nineteenth century, when it became clear that the old Danish royal house was about to die out. The question of the dynastic succession to the duchies which ensued is a complicated problem of genealogy which need not concern this study, for the very good reason that it was used as a pretext by the really interested parties, the Danish, and German peoples. The nineteenth century, the era of nationalities, had roused both peoples to a high pitch of national consciousness, and both were resolved to incorporate these disputed territories into their respective nations. The Danes wished to make Schleswig and

Holstein simple Danish provinces. The Germans, invoking the fact that Holstein formed part of that rather anomalous political entity, the Germanic Confederation, declared that, on the extinction of the old Danish royal house, the duchies would cease automatically to have any connection with Denmark, and through Holstein would become part of the Germanic political body. When Danes proposed a division of the duchies under which Schleswig would go to Denmark and Holstein to the Germanic Confederation, the Germans harked back to the Indissoluble Union of 1460, and declared that Schleswig and Holstein could never be separated. Meanwhile the German and Danish elements in the duchies themselves came to blows, volunteers streamed in from both Denmark and Germany, and there was begun a civil war, which was smothered only by the intervention of a concert of European great powers in 1850.

The question was, however, merely adjourned. The extinction of the old Danish royal line in 1863 brought matters to a climax. At this point Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, strode forward as the champion of Germanism, got Austria to back him, and proceeded to expel the Danes from Schleswig-Holstein. Denmark, relying on the intervention of other European powers, particularly England, stood her ground. But no one came to her assistance, and in a brief campaign the Prussian and Austrian forces crushed the small Danish army and forced Denmark to yield all her rights to Schleswig-Holstein in 1864. For two years the duchies were jointly occupied by Prussia and Austria. Then, when the two Germanic powers fought their war of 1866, Prussia obtained Schleswig-Holstein as a part of the spoils of victory. The duchies were annexed to Prussia as ordinary Prussian provinces. Since 1871 they have, of course, formed part of the German Empire.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Schleswig-Holstein is predominantly an agricultural and stock-raising country. Woodland is rare, and no minerals exist save a little rock-salt.

The shores of the peninsula are fertile, especially the North Sea coast, much of which has been reclaimed from the sea, after the manner of Holland, and has to be defended by an elaborate system of dikes. Vegetables are extensively grown. Much of the interior is unproductive heath and moor.

Cattle-breeding and dairy farming are as important as agriculture. The Holstein milch-cows have a world-wide reputation, and dairy products form one of the principal items of export. The province also produces a good breed of horses.

In the larger towns industries of various sorts are established. The Kiel Canal has given the province great commercial importance. The city of Kiel is a flourishing port, its prosperity being further enhanced by the presence of a large naval arsenal.

THE FACTS ABOUT SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

WHERE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN IS LOCATED

The long peninsula between the German mainland and the Danish province of Jutland is Schleswig-Holstein.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Schleswig and Holstein.

The total area is 7340 square miles, about the size of New Jersey. The population is 1,620,000. The Danes number about 150,000, or eight per cent. of the total.

DIFFERENT RACES IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

The *Germans* number 1,425,000, or eighty-nine per cent. of the population, and are found throughout. In Holstein the

population is solidly German. In Schleswig the southern part is solidly German, and the towns in the northern part are also predominantly German (from fifty to sixty-five per cent.), while Flensburg, the chief city of North Schleswig, is overwhelmingly German (ninety-three per cent.). The Germans are of all social classes; the upper classes of Schleswig are almost entirely German. Of course all the officials are Germans. The German element in both Schleswig and Holstein is dominant in every way.

The *Danes* number 150,000, or eight per cent. of the population. They are found in North Schleswig. They are mostly peasant farmers, although in the small towns of North Schleswig the Danish element also forms a large proportion of the population. They are a thrifty folk, economically prosperous, but politically depressed.

The *Frisians* number 45,000, or three per cent. of the population. They are found in Schleswig. These people, a branch of the Dutch Frisian stock, occupy a narrow strip of coast-land on the western (North Sea) shore of Schleswig, together with the adjacent islands off the coast. They are fishermen and small farmers, and are politically unimportant. They have no real national consciousness. The Frisians side politically with the Germans, and will probably ultimately be Germanized.

WHO CONTROLLED SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN BEFORE THE WAR
Germany.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
SINCE THE WAR BEGAN
Germany.

A SPECIAL NOTE REGARDING CONFLICTING NATIONAL
INTERESTS IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

In considering this problem, we should carefully distinguish between Schleswig and Holstein. Holstein, a solidly German

land, is hardly ever claimed by even the most extreme Danish nationalists. To annex Holstein to Denmark would mean bringing the Danish frontier down to the north bank of the River Elbe, thus all but inclosing Germany's chief seaport, Hamburg, as an enclave in Danish territory. This would appear intolerable to all Germans, and would expose Denmark to a certain German war of revenge. It would also mean bringing a solid block of nearly a million recalcitrant Germans into Denmark's political life. As Denmark is a very small country, with fewer than three million inhabitants, this would make Danish domestic politics almost unworkable.

Only less serious would be the problem involved in a Danish annexation of the whole of Schleswig. The population of Schleswig, taken as a whole, is nearly three fourths German. Also, its southern border parallels the Kiel Canal, so that Schleswig in Danish hands would jeopardize the key to German sea-power. This state of affairs would also appear to Germany an intolerable situation, which she would endeavor to upset as soon as the general European situation should enable her to make a successful spring at her Danish neighbor.

For this reason most Danes limit their hopes to *North* Schleswig, the northern two fifths of the province, adjoining the Danish province of Jutland, where the Danish element in Schleswig is concentrated. Nevertheless, since many Danes still dream of annexing the whole of Schleswig, we shall consider this possibility in the following analysis. Holstein, however, will be left out of the discussion as beyond the bounds of practical politics.

It is true that many Allied publicists, mostly English and French, have advocated giving both Schleswig and Holstein to Denmark in case of an Allied victory in the present war; but any such proposal would probably be negatived by Danes themselves as exposing them to certain German vengeance at some future day.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

Political. Loss of Schleswig would deprive Germany of one of her important positions on both the Baltic and North Seas, and would undermine her sea-power.

Economic. Schleswig is a fertile agricultural country with a very high-grade population, and as such is important to Germany.

Strategic. Since the southern boundary of Schleswig parallels the Kiel Canal for a considerable distance, the annexation of Schleswig to Denmark would strike a deadly blow at German sea-power, one of whose chief assets is the ability to transfer the German navy from the Baltic to the North Sea through a wholly German waterway absolutely secure from hostile attack.

Racial. Taking the province as a whole, the bulk of the population of Schleswig is German.

Cultural. The German element in Schleswig is thoroughly Germanic in culture.

Religious. None.

DENMARK'S INTERESTS IN SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

Political. Annexation of Schleswig to Denmark would give that small country a relatively large extension of area and population, and this, together with her partial control of the Kiel Canal, would considerably increase her importance in European politics.

Economic. Schleswig is a fertile province with a very high-grade population. The economic life of Schleswig is virtually the same as that of Denmark; therefore annexation of this region to Denmark would increase the agricultural and dairying importance of Denmark.

Strategic. Since Denmark has no navy worthy of the name, Schleswig would be strategically rather a detriment than a benefit, because its long coast-lines could easily be

turned by landing-forces superior to the small Danish army.

Racial. Annexation of the Danish element in North Schleswig would be a solid racial gain to Denmark.

Cultural. The Danish element in North Schleswig is thoroughly Danish in culture.

Religious. None.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would conserve Germany's commercial and naval advantages involved in the retention of the Kiel Canal by Germany, but would leave untouched the problem of North Schleswig, which is predominantly Danish and which is the source of Danish resentment against Germany.

2. *Annexation of North Schleswig to Denmark and Retention of the Remainder by Germany.*

This would remove Danish-German irritation. Racial division would be easy, because race-lines are sharply defined. This would be no real menace to Germany, since the entire course of the Kiel Canal would remain well within German territory and the slight accession of strength to Denmark could involve no threat to Germany, since Denmark would still be small.

3. *Annexation of all Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark.*

This would place a large German population under Danish rule and create an almost certain irredentist movement in Germany. Germany would plan re-conquest. This would be intensified by the restrictions it would place on German commercial and naval advantages by the loss of the Kiel Canal and the fact that the Danish frontier would then run up to the north bank of the River Elbe, beyond Hamburg, leaving this greatest of German seaports a semi-isolated enclave in Danish territory.


4. *Neutralization of the Kiel Canal as a Corollary to Danish Annexation.*

This would temper the restrictions upon Germany's commercial and naval advantages, but would not touch the racial factor involved.

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NORTHERN EUROPE
FINLAND



Nº 4 - FINLAND

CHAPTER IV

FINLAND

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Finland is a vast region only recently emerged from the glacial period. It is studded with lakes and to a great extent covered with forest. The soil is not fertile, and the winters are long and cold. For this reason the relatively small population (3,200,000) is concentrated on or near the coast, the interior being very thinly inhabited.

Finland's geographical position also explains its history, which up to a century ago was indissolubly bound up with that of Sweden. Before the age of roads and railways Finland was quite isolated overland, its neighbor Sweden, just across the narrow Gulf of Bothnia, being the sole link with the outer world.

Finnish history begins with the Swedish invasion of the twelfth century. The native Finns, a people of Mongolian stock, were rude savages who accepted unmodified the civilization of their conquerors. For this reason Finland became not so much a dependency as an integral part of Sweden. The very physical type of the Finnish people was modified by the steady current of Swedish immigration, so that the originally black-haired, Mongoloid Finns to-day show close affinities with the blond Scandinavian race. The chief outstanding difference between Finns and Swedes is language, the mass of the Finnish people having retained their old Asiatic tongue.

So matters stood at the time of the Russian conquest of 1809 which tore Finland from Sweden and linked its destinies

with the great Slav Empire. Finland's new status was not, however, that of a mere Russian province. So greatly was this eventuality dreaded that the Finns swore to fight to the death rather than pass under unrelieved Russian rule. To avoid a long and harassing struggle, Czar Alexander I reconciled the Finns by the grant of complete autonomy. Finland was, in fact, not annexed to Russia at all, but was declared a grand duchy governed, subject to its own constitution, by the Czar of Russia as Grand Duke of Finland. This satisfied the Finns, and until the close of the nineteenth century Finland remained the most contented and prosperous of the Czar's dominions.

In 1899, however, this happy era came to a violent end. In that year the Russian government determined upon the Russification of Finland, the solemn promises of several successive Czars were summarily revoked, and the country was treated virtually as a Russian province. This roused the Finns to desperation. A dogged folk, stubbornly attached to their ancient liberties, they resolved never to be Russianized. Since armed rebellion was impossible, passive resistance was employed, Russian arbitrary government being universally ignored. This roused the Russians to brutal severities, answered by sporadic Finnish terrorism. The situation was becoming almost hopeless when the Russian Revolution of 1905 enabled the Finns to extort from the tottering czardom a confirmation of their old liberties. A few years later, however, when czardom had recovered most of its former power, it broke its word and again undertook the Russification of Finland. The situation promptly grew tense once more, and by 1914 things were in a bad way.

One of the results of Russian tyranny has been to heal the breach which had opened between the Finnish and Swedish elements of the population. In 1809 the Finns had felt themselves virtually Swedes, but political separation from Sweden gradually roused the Finns to a sense of their peculiar race

identity. This dawning Finnish nationalism was strongly resisted by the pure-blooded Swedish element in Finland, which, although numerically a small minority of only fourteen per cent., included most of the landed aristocracy and townsmen, and which had always held political power. By the close of the nineteenth century, however, the Finns had gained the upper hand, and relations were decidedly tense when the Russian coup forced both parties to rally in defense of their common liberties.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

Despite the industry of its people and the intelligent care bestowed on farming methods, Finnish agriculture has to struggle against serious handicaps. A rather infertile soil, long, cold winters, and frequent summer frosts combine to deprive the Finnish farmer of the full reward of his efforts. Nevertheless, the crop yield is considerable. In 1913 the principal crops, reckoned in bushels, were: Oats, 21,338,000; potatoes, 17,516,000; rye, 9,948,000; barley, 4,742,000; wheat, 159,000. The flax and hemp production totaled 1097 tons.

A large part of the country is devoted to hay and pasture, supporting considerable live stock. In 1913 there were: Horses, three years old, 297,183; horned cattle two years old,

1,178,192. These cattle are mainly bred for dairy purposes, Finnish butter ranking second among Finland's exports.

Finland is, however, a land of forests, and wood-products are therefore Finland's chief products. Both timber and wood-pulp are produced in enormous quantities, standing first among Finnish exports.

Finland's forests also furnished her first industries—wood industries and paper-mills. During the last generation, however, Finland's industrial life has become much more varied, many mechanical works and textile mills having been introduced, stimulated by the cheapness of electric power derived from Finland's numberless lakes and waterfalls.

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THE FACTS ABOUT FINLAND

WHERE FINLAND IS LOCATED

The great block of territory lying opposite Sweden on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Bothnia, the northern arm of the Baltic Sea. Another arm of the Baltic, the Gulf of Finland, forms the country's southern border. It is connected with Russia by a narrow tongue of land between the Gulf of Finland and an immense lake, Lake Ladoga. Finland stretches northward almost to the Arctic Ocean, being separated therefrom by a thin strip of Norwegian territory. Its eastern frontier is the watershed between the Baltic and Arctic river systems. Its area is 125,689 square miles, or about the size of New Mexico.

DIFFERENT RACES IN FINLAND

The *Finn*s number 2,571,000 and are found throughout. They constitute an overwhelming majority and are found in all social classes save the old aristocracy and a portion of the middle class, which are Swedish in blood. They are politically dominant.

The *Swedes* number 339,000 and are found throughout. Only along the coast and in the towns do they form any large part of the population. The former political ascendancy is now at an end, but the Swedish aristocracy still retains much social prestige.

The *Russians* number about 7000 and are found throughout. They are almost exclusively officials, there being virtually no civilian Russian population. The number here quoted does not include the large Russian garrisons quartered in various parts of Finland.

WHO CONTROLLED FINLAND BEFORE THE WAR
Russia.WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED FINLAND
SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Russia maintained control of Finland until the Russian Revolution of March, 1917. Since this revolution Finland has freed itself from all effective Russian control. The country has been much disturbed by factional struggles between the radical and conservative elements of its population.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN FINLAND¹

Political. Although the more democratic elements in Russia would be willing to accord Finland local self-government,

¹ The Bolshevik régime has affected to disregard nationality as commonly defined, and has renounced many of the orthodox national claims

nearly all Russians believe that Russian control of Finland is necessary to the safety of Russia itself. The Finnish frontier is only a few miles north of Petrograd, and an independent Finland would make Russia's capital a frontier town, while its sea approach (the Gulf of Finland) would be flanked by a foreign power. Also, an independent Finland would flank the railroads to Russia's arctic ports—Archangel and the new harbor on the Murman coast. Russian imperialists have further reason for wishing to keep control of Finland. They dream of breaking a path to the Atlantic Ocean by seizing northern Norway and Sweden, which can be done only through Finland. This is the main reason why Russian imperialists demand the Russification of Finland: it is a necessary first step in their designs on Scandinavia and the open sea.

Economic. The natural resources of Finland, although not great, are made the most of by the country's thrifty, intelligent people.

Strategic. Russian possession of Finland not only defends Petrograd and northwest Russia, as suggested above, but also gives Russia a potential stranglehold on Sweden through the Finnish archipelago of the Åland Islands, which lie only a few miles off the Swedish coast. This gives the Russian fleet a base within a short distance of the Swedish capital, Stock-

of Russia, substituting therefor class interests and a yet incompletely defined proletarian internationalism.

If this Bolshevik philosophy should attain general acceptance, it would obviously mean a new world order in which "national interests" as here tabulated would be superseded by an entirely new category of interests. This being not a book of prophecy but a record of facts read in the light of the existing world order, we have been obliged to view Russia's interests from the same angle as those of other nations. Unless the Bolshevik régime continues to dominate Russian policy the interests here listed will most likely be the interests to be reckoned with at the settlement. This observation applies throughout this book wherever Russia's interests are listed.

holm, and lays the very heart of Sweden open to the threat of Russian invasion.

Racial. Virtually none.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Virtually none.

SWEDEN'S INTERESTS IN FINLAND

Political. Sweden has never got over the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809, Finland having been always regarded as an integral part of Sweden rather than as a dependency. The rise of Finnish racial self-consciousness since 1809, to be sure, makes many Swedes doubt whether the old intimate connection between Sweden and Finland could ever be restored. For this reason Sweden might be fully reconciled by the establishment of a Finland under merely nominal Russian suzerainty. But all Swedes feel that a Russified Finland would be a deadly threat to their national life, since it would put Sweden virtually at Russia's mercy.

Economic. The trade relations between Sweden and Finland are very close.

Strategic. Finland in the hands of an aggressive Russia would threaten Sweden by land in the extreme north, where Sweden possesses some of the richest iron deposits in the world. Also, the Åland Islands threaten Stockholm itself with a Russian bombardment and landing on very short notice.

Racial. The fate of the large Swedish element in Finland is naturally an object of keen solicitude to Sweden.

Cultural. The culture of Finland is wholly Swedish, even the most anti-Swedish of the Finns being indebted to Sweden for their civilization.

Religious. Lutheran Protestantism, professed by the entire population of Finland, is an offshoot of the Swedish church.

NORWAY'S INTERESTS IN FINLAND

Political. Like Sweden, Norway is menaced by a Finland controlled by an imperialistic Russia. Northern Norway is a narrow fringe of territory entirely backed by Finland. In places the Finnish frontier reaches to within a few miles of the head waters of the Norwegian fjords. Owing to the Gulf Stream, these fjords are always free from ice, thus offering Russia the temptation of possible naval stations on the open Atlantic Ocean.

Economic. Slight.

Strategic. A Russified Finland places northern Norway at Russia's mercy.

Racial. The Norwegians are so closely allied racially to the Swedes that many Norwegians take a Scandinavian interest in the fate of the Swedish element in Finland.

Cultural. The same is true regarding culture as just stated in the matter of racial claims.

Religious. Norway, Sweden, and Finland are all Lutheran countries in closest religious communion.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY
MEAN1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would mean Finland as an autonomous unit under Russia. Such a solution presupposes a liberal Russia. Imperialistic Pan-Slavist leaders in Russia who broke promises to Finland at the close of the nineteenth century made the *de jure* autonomous status of Finland a farce. Such leaders would do the same again. Even some of the Russian liberals think the same. It might be workable under a liberal Russia. It would satisfy all Finland except the Swedish minority. It would satisfy a liberal Russia that had no designs of conquest in Scandinavia, because it would fully protect the land

and sea approaches to Petrograd. A contented autonomous Finland under a liberal Russia neither could nor would desire to strike a blow at Russia. It would satisfy Norway and all except a few imperialists in Sweden, because Scandinavia would thereby be assured against Russian intervention by this autonomous buffer state. It would satisfy the world at large because fears of Russia's obtaining naval bases on the Atlantic (Norwegian fjords) and domination of the Baltic would be allayed.

2. Russification of Finland under Imperial Russia.

This would pave the way for a Russian conquest of Sweden and Norway which would give Russia ample warm-water outlets on the Atlantic and also insure her domination of the Baltic, to say nothing of adding the considerable resources of the Scandinavian peninsula to the Russian Empire. It would involve a drastic crushing of stubborn Finns and Swedes, which would be accomplished only by the most ruthless measures. They have shown they would resist to the death.

3. Independent Finland.

This might work, but the Finnish and Swedish elements would probably conflict. It would be a temptation for both Swedish and Russian intervention or conquest. If the Finns oppressed the Swedes of the southwestern coast and towns, Sweden would resent it. The Finnish frontier, so near Petrograd, would be an incitement to Russia to reconquer the territory. The smallness and relative poverty of an independent Finland would make its economic existence precarious.

4. Autonomous Finland under Sweden.

This would probably mean the appointment of the King of Sweden as Grand Duke of Finland, as the Russian czars were from 1809-99, or the installation of a cadet branch of

the Swedish royal family as grand dukes under the suzerainty of the Swedish crown.


This solution would probably work. It would assure the Finns the right of management of their own affairs. Finnish economic life is as related to Sweden as to Russia, so no serious economic disturbance would be involved. Russia would have little to fear, for, even with Finland as autonomous, it would still be too small alone to menace Russia. And, too, Sweden would be so contented with the righting of what she regards as an historic wrong that she would be little tempted to join a league of greater powers against Russia. The world at large would be satisfied because, in the event of imperialistic designs on the part of Russia, Sweden would be in a better position to hold her own until other nations could come to her assistanee.

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NORTHERN EUROPE .
THE BALTIC PROVINCES



Nº 5 THE BALTIC PROVINCES

CHAPTER V

THE BALTIC PROVINCES

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The three Baltic provinces, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia, form a belt of low-lying country on the east coast of the Baltic Sea extending from the German frontier to the Gulf of Finland. This extensive region, with an area of 35,614 square miles (about the size of Indiana) possesses a certain geographical unity, especially on its eastern side, where it is marked off from the great Russian plains beyond by large lakes and a long belt of rough hill country.

Thus protected from the east and facing the Baltic Sea, it is not surprising to find that the influences shaping Baltic Province history have mostly come from the west. This history really begins with their conquest during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by the Teutonic Knights of the Sword. The Knights, a German crusading order, undertook the task primarily to Christianize the natives, fierce Lettish and Finnish or Esth tribes fanatically devoted to their native heathenism. The result of this conquest was the establishment of an ecclesiastical state governed by the Teutonic Order, which imposed upon the original inhabitants not only Christianity, but Germanic civilization as well. For this reason the Germans, though never more than ten per cent. of the population, set upon the Baltic Provinces a cultural stamp which no subsequent changes have been able to efface. Both the powerful Baltic Province nobility, owning nearly all the land, and the upper classes in the towns are to-day of German blood and intensely aware of their Germanism.

The medieval prosperity of the Baltic Provinces received a rude shock from the great Russian invasion of 1558 under Czar Ivan the Terrible, who anticipated by nearly two centuries Peter the Great's longing to break a path for Russia to the Baltic Sea. The Knights, it is true, ultimately ejected the Russians, while the general disorganization into which Russia sank after Ivan's death long averted the danger of Russian conquest. Nevertheless, the devastations of Ivan's half-savage hordes had dealt the country a blow from which it did not recover, and the weakened land fell a prey to the rival ambitions of Denmark, Sweden, and Poland. After a confused struggle the great Swedish monarch Gustavus Adolphus brought the whole region under his sway early in the seventeenth century, and it remained Swedish for a hundred years until the collapse of Sweden in the struggle against Peter the Great brought the Baltic Provinces under Russian control in 1721.

This Russian conquest did not, however, cause any immediate changes in the internal life of the country. The real rulers of the Baltic Provinces were still the landowning German barons, the descendants of the Teutonic Knights, a masterful breed whose ancient privileges the Swedish kings had been always careful to respect. Peter determined to follow the Swedish precedent, and the Baltic Provinces therefore continued to enjoy essentially complete home rule. Not until the latter half of the nineteenth century was this state of affairs altered. Then, however, the Pan-Slavist ideas which dominated the Russian thought of that time led the Russian government to attempt the Russification of the Baltic Provinces. Gradually the old liberties were swept away, Russian arbitrary rule was introduced, and efforts were made to root out German culture and convert the inhabitants from Lutheran Protestantism to Russian Orthodoxy. Especially Russia strove to set the Lettish and Esth peasantry against the German upper classes. These efforts were largely suc-

cessful. Despite their Germanic culture and Lutheran faith, the peasants of the Baltic Provinces had retained their old languages and customs, and here, as elsewhere, the nineteenth century awakened these dormant nationalities to self-consciousness. The result was a bitter struggle for predominance between the different race elements. In this struggle the German minority, despite extraordinary vigor, steadily lost ground. In 1914 the Baltic Province Germans had lost most of their former political supremacy, although they still dominated the economic and social life of the country.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The Baltic Provinces are predominantly an agricultural country. To be sure, a severe climate and a cold soil which, generally low lying, inclines to be marshy, are undoubted handicaps to agriculture. But the intelligence and aptitude of the peasantry overcome these natural difficulties sufficiently to produce large crops of the more northern cereals, especially rye, oats, and barley. Considerable flax is also grown. A good deal of the country is under forest.

The large amount of meadow-land makes possible the extensive raising of live stock. On some of the larger estates the breeds are very fine. The dairy products of the Baltic Provinces form one of the chief items of export. Valuable fisheries exist off the coast, a considerable proportion of the population being devoted to seafaring pursuits.

The industrial life of the Baltic Provinces is centered at Riga, a great port which serves as the commercial outlet for much of western Russia. Libau and Reval are also port towns of importance. Within the last half-century industrial life in the modern sense has been begun in the Baltic Provinces. Numerous textile and flax spinning-mills, tanneries, breweries, sugar refineries, distilleries, woodworking establishments, and miscellaneous industrial establishments exist.

THE FACTS ABOUT THE BALTIC PROVINCES

WHERE THE BALTIC PROVINCES ARE LOCATED

The Baltic Provinces are the broad band of territory on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. An arm of the Baltic—the Gulf of Finland—forms the northern boundary of the Baltic Provinces. To the east lies Russia proper, from which it is separated by the large lakes Peipus and Pskov and by a long chain of rough hills. To the south the Baltic Provinces shade imperceptibly into the Lithuanian provinces of Russia. At its extreme southwestern tip the coast-line of the Province of Courland just touches the extreme tip of the German province of East Prussia.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Courland has an area of 10,435 square miles and a population of about 783,000.

Livonia has an area of 17,574 square miles and a population of about 1,493,000.

Esthonia has an area of 7605 square miles and a population of 492,000.

The total area of the Baltic Provinces is 35,614 square miles, about the size of Indiana. The population is 2,768,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES

The *Letts* are found in Courland and Livonia. They form the bulk of the population in Courland and in the southern part of Livonia. They are mostly peasants and town workmen, although a middle class is developing. They are of fairly high intelligence and growing economic prosperity, and are rapidly gaining in political power.

The *Esths* are found in Esthonia and Livonia. They form the bulk of the population in Esthonia and northern Livonia. They are mostly peasants, sailors, and fishermen, not quite so

quick intellectually as the Letts, but steadier, more energetic, and economically more prosperous. They are more devout Protestants than the Letts and not so anti-German. They are gaining ground against the Letts along the racial boundary in mid-Livonia.

The *Germans* are scattered throughout all the provinces. The genuine Baltic Province Germans (that is the old medieval stock) number about 200,000. They are the social élite of the country, including both the landowning nobility and the almost equally aristocratic burgher families of the towns. They form about eight per cent. of the population. Besides these, there are about 50,000 Germans recently from Germany. The 45,000 Jews of the Baltic Provinces, mostly of a fairly good type, speak German, not Yiddish. They generally side with the Germans. There are also about 300,000 Letts and Esths who speak German and act like Germans, but who are not technically considered Germans in the strict racial hierarchy that prevails. The majority of this class sides with the Germans. This German block thus numbers from about 500,000 to 600,000. Politically it has lost much of its former predominance, but economically and culturally it still dominates the country. The old-stock Baltic Province Germans are a strong and masterful type.

The *Russians* are found in all the provinces. They are mostly officials, although they form a certain civilian element in the large towns. There are also a few colonies of Russian peasants near the Russian border. Their total number is about 130,000.

WHO CONTROLLED THE BALTIC PROVINCES BEFORE THE WAR
Russia.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED THE BALTIC PROVINCES
SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Courland has been mostly under German control since the

autumn of 1915. Livonia and Esthonia have been under Russian control, with possibility of German military conquest.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES ¹

Political. The Baltic Provinces are Russia's "window on the Baltic" through which alone Russia can communicate freely by sea with the outer world. By their ports alone can Russian sea-power exist. Their loss would "blind" Russia, shutting her back into the purely continental position which she occupied before Peter the Great acquired them 200 years ago. All Russians therefore consider the retention of the Baltic Provinces as vital to Russia's future as a great power.

Economic. It is as a transit area that the chief economic value of the Baltic Provinces to Russia resides. The great Dvina River, which falls into the Baltic at Riga, in Livonia, drains a large part of western Russia, and a number of railroad trunk-lines carry to Riga and other Baltic Province ports the produce of interior Russia for export to the outer world. Riga is a great sea-port with 558,000 inhabitants, being in fact the sixth largest city of the whole Russian Empire. The loss of Riga and the other Baltic Province ports would deal a staggering blow to Russia's economic life.

Strategic. Russia's naval bases in the Baltic Province harbors are the foundations of her sea-power. Without them the Russian navy could not exist. The loss of the Baltic Provinces would bottle up Petrograd and menace it with capture, the frontier of Esthonia being only about seventy miles west of the city. In fact, the loss of the Baltic Provinces would lay all northwest Russia open to attack.

Racial. The number of Russians in the Baltic Provinces is small, being about 130,000.

Cultural. Russia's cultural interest is very slight. The culture of the Baltic Provinces is fundamentally German. The attempted Russification of the Baltic Provinces has had very superficial cultural results.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

Religious. The religion of the Baltic Provinces is Lutheran Protestantism. Russian attempts to convert the population to Orthodoxy have signally failed.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES

Political. German annexation or control of the Baltic Provinces would give Germany a powerful hold upon Russia, would insure her absolute mastery of the Baltic by eliminating the fleet of the only other Baltic naval power, and would open up a great field for German emigration and economic exploitation. The area of the Baltic Provinces is one sixth that of the German Empire.

Economic. Although the present economic condition of the Baltic Provinces is by no means backward, the possibilities for intensive exploitation such as Germany could give are very great.

Strategic. The acquisition of the Baltic Provinces would enable Germany to hold northwest Russia virtually at her mercy. Russia would no longer possess a defensible frontier in this quarter, and Petrograd would lie exposed to German attack. The German navy would absolutely dominate the Baltic.

Racial. The German nobility and townsfolk of the Baltic Provinces are of such a strong, high type that their incorporation into Germany would be a great gain for Teutonism.

Cultural. The culture of the Baltic Provinces is fundamentally German. Even the most anti-German Letts and Esths are indebted to Germany for their civilization. With no native culture or upper classes of their own, the Lettish and Esth peasantry could not long resist a strong current of German immigration. They would ultimately be completely Germanized, and the Baltic Provinces would then become thoroughly German.

Religious. The Lutheran Protestantism of the Baltic

Provinces, historically a mere offshoot of German Lutheranism, is another close bond with Germany.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN.

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave the Baltic Provinces in the Russian Empire without local autonomy. This situation would prevail under an imperial autocratic Russia, and even under a certain type of Russian Liberals. It would satisfy the Russians, but not the inhabitants.

2. *Autonomous Provinces Under Liberal Russia.*

This would safeguard Russia strategically and economically, leaving to Russia her outlets to the sea. It would reasonably satisfy the aspirations for local self-government. The only question raised is this: Would the different races dispute and make the area dangerous to the future peace of the world?

3. *Independent Baltic Province State.*

The objection raised to this is that it would be too small and possess too few resources.


4. *Union of Baltic Provinces with the Lithuanians and a Letto-Lithuanian State.*

This is discussed in the chapter on Lithuania.


5. *German Control or Annexation of the Baltic Provinces.*

This would satisfy Germany and the Germanized upper class minority of the Provinces. It would mean for the time being at least the dissatisfaction of the Letts and Esths. However, this might be only temporary, because both the Esths and the Letts are culturally and religiously so much affiliated with the Teutonic world that under German rule,

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF EUROPE



EASTERN EUROPE
POLAND



№ 6 THE POLISH PROBLEM

CHAPTER VI

POLAND

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The tragedy of Poland is rooted in its geography. Save on the south it has never known the protecting and preserving advantage of natural frontiers. Consequently its political boundaries have shifted and reshifted with successive conquests and partitions. And every shift has meant a new act in the Polish tragedy. The problem of Poland is strangely tangled and difficult to present clearly.

The Polish race centers in the inland plains which are drained by the Vistula River and lie between Russia and Germany. This region includes the so-called Polish Governments of Russia, the western part of the Austrian province of Galicia, and portions of the Prussian provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and Silesia. This area is about 70,000 square miles in extent, or about the size of Missouri. Within this region the Poles are in the majority. The region is something of a huge oblong, the southern base of which rests upon the Carpathian Mountains, Poland's only natural frontier. On the south, therefore, the line between Polish and non-Polish peoples is clear, but to the east, north, and west this Polish nucleus shades off imperceptibly into regions inhabited partly by Poles and partly by other races. In nearly all this mixed zone, which covers almost 300,000 square miles, the Polish and non-Polish elements are mixed in hopeless confusion. How this Polish "dispersion" occurred and what the present situation is can be explained only by a glance at Polish history.

The origin of Poland is bound up with the Slav migrations of the sixth century A. D. At that time countless Slav swarms burst out of the Russian plains and deluged central Europe from the Baltic to the Balkans. The northern end of this Slav wave penetrated Germany as far west as the River Elbe, driving out the original Teutonic inhabitants and turning all of eastern Germany into a solidly Slav country. But these Slavs were rude barbarians, divided into many small tribes, and showing even then that tendency toward political anarchy which has been the bane of the Slav race.

There was naturally a Teutonic reaction against this Slav conquest of German territory. It came in the tenth century, and the mass of petty Slav tribes were struck full and fair by the German *Drang nach Osten*—the March to the East. The Germans, now strong in their newly assimilated Roman civilization, quite outmatched the unorganized and barbarous Slavs. They made rapid eastward progress, expelling or absorbing the Slavs as they came.

It was the ancestors of the modern Poles who checked this German March to the East. There arose in the region to-day the Prussian province of Posen a dynasty of able chieftains, the Piasts, who welded the Slav tribes into a state which blocked the German advance. This first Kingdom of Poland was composed not only of Posen, but much of the eastern German plain-country, including the present Prussian provinces of Silesia and Pomerania. For two centuries Poland was strong, the Germans were checked, and the Polish tribes to the east and the south, Russian Poland and Galicia, were incorporated into the Piast kingdom, thus uniting the whole Polish race as it then existed within the bounds of one state.

But in the twelfth century the Piast dynasty lost its vigor, and Poland broke up into several principalities and in the thirteenth century the terrible Tatar invasion, which prostrated Russia, reached into Poland and left the land desolate and depopulated.

The Poles had become so weak that the heathen Lithuanians and the Old Prussians to the north threatened to overrun the country. These peoples were neither Slav nor Teuton, but a separate branch of the Aryan race which had dwelt throughout recorded history about the southeastern corner of the Baltic Sea. In fear the Poles called in the Teutonic Knights, a German crusading order pledged to the subjugation and conversion of the Lithuanian pagans. Establishing themselves on the lower Vistula, in the country of the Old Prussians, or the western branch of the Lithuanian race, the Teutonic Knights began a ferocious struggle with the redoubtable heathen. So unbending were these stubborn folk that the war ended in their absolute annihilation. The Old Prussians were wiped from the face of the earth, and their land, the present German provinces of East and West Prussia, was resettled by Germans brought in by the Teutonic Knights.

This resettlement by Germans was anything but agreeable to Poland. The Poles had hoped to obtain the mouth of the Vistula and that access to the sea so essential to the prosperity of Poland. Instead, Poland saw arising a neighbor which threatened to become even more dangerous than the Old Prussians had been; for the Teutonic Knights built up a formidable military state which aspired to conquer both Lithuania and Poland.

Under the pressure of this common peril Poles and Lithuanians laid aside their ancient enmity and drew together against the common foe. In 1386 the Lithuanian prince, Jagiello, abjured paganism, married the daughter of the Polish king, and united Poland and Lithuania against the Germans. A terrible struggle ensued, ending in the defeat of the Teutonic Knights, whose aggressive power was broken in the memorable battle of Tannenberg in 1410. In 1466 a peace was signed by which the Teutonic Knights ceded West Prussia to Poland and as vassals of the Polish crown retained East Prussia. By acquiring West Prussia, Poland obtained

her coveted access to the sea and in the succeeding centuries of Polish rule West Prussia was partly Polonized, although the towns, especially the port of Danzig, at the mouth of the Vistula, remained racially German.

The Jagiellon dynasty produced a succession of able kings under whom the new state of Poland-Lithuania became a really great power. Although the old Polish provinces of Pomerania and Silesia were not recovered, being hopelessly lost to Germanism, the union with Lithuania had brought Poland an immense extension of territory to the east. The Lithuanian homeland on the northeast of Poland was a small country, but just before the union with Poland the Lithuanians had waged successful wars against Russia, which was then broken and devastated by the Tatar invasions, and had annexed an immense tract of Russian territory extending beyond the Dnieper River and reaching almost to the Black Sea. The common task of holding and exploiting these immense regions drew the Poles and the Lithuanians together. The Russian inhabitants, being Greek Orthodox Christians, hated the rule of the Roman Catholic Poles and Lithuanians. The Poles and Lithuanians united in the repression of their Russian subjects, who sank to the status of serfs, exploited by an aristocratic caste of Polish-Lithuanian landlords.

The decline of the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania began with the extinction of the Jagiellon dynasty in 1572, at which time the crown became elective with the Polish nobility, the dominating element in the country, as the electors. The kings became mere shadows. The nobles split into factions whose endless broils plunged the country into anarchy. And before long Poland's growing weakness attracted the greed of foreign powers, who ravaged the country and fought over the spoils. The year 1772 saw the beginning of the end, that being the time when Poland's three strong neighbors, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, agreed upon the First Partition of Poland. Two other partitions followed in 1793 and in 1795, by which time

Poland was entirely divided up and had ceased to exist as a state. After some reshuffling of Polish territory during the Napoleonic Wars, the Vienna Congress of 1814 drew the lines of division as they were to stand down to 1914. In this last settlement Russia obtained far and away the lion's share of Poland, while Prussia and Austria got comparatively small portions.

But the political extinction of Poland did not solve the Polish problem. The hopelessly anarchic Polish state died, but the Polish people lived, with common ties that were to survive foreign domination, as Talleyrand observed upon his return from the Congress of Vienna. The very depths of their misfortunes roused them to a fresh racial consciousness. The old Poland had been divided into oppressing aristocrats and oppressed peasants, but under foreign domination all classes drew together under the pressure of a common suffering and the inspiration of a common dream—the dream of a new and regenerated Poland.

Accordingly the nineteenth century witnessed a national revival in all the sundered branches of the Polish race. Russia and Prussia failed in their attempts to denationalize the Poles under their rule, because of the resistance of a rising sense of racial rights. Austria never really attempted to denationalize the Poles in her territory, but granted them local autonomy and marked freedom in the development of their national life and institutions. The Austrian Poles have not escaped economic handicaps, but the political autonomy they have enjoyed has resulted in Austrian Poland, or Galicia, becoming the cultural center of Polish nationalism.

The regions of Polish settlement to-day fall roughly into three parallel zones running north and south. In the western zone, embracing the eastern provinces of the German Empire, the Polish element is mostly the lower classes, peasants and town workmen, while the aristocracy and the middle classes are mostly German. In the middle zone, embracing

Russian Poland and western Galicia, the Poles form the bulk of all social classes, the only considerable non-Polish element being the Jews. In the eastern zone, embracing eastern Galicia, the Ukraine, White Russia, and Lithuania, the land-owning aristocracy and upper-class townfolk are largely Poles, while the peasants are Russians of various sorts or Lithuanians.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

This survey will deal only with the regions where a Polish population predominates: that is, the Polish Governments of Russia, the German provinces of Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, and the western part of the Austrian province of Galicia. The economic survey of the eastern zone of Polish settlement will be found in the chapters on Lithuania and the Ukraine.

This area, which may be called Poland proper, possesses in the broad sense of the term a certain natural economic unity. The land is mostly a broad plain, and there are no hilly regions save in the extreme south. Climatic conditions are remarkably uniform. There are no wide variations in the character of the soil and quantity of rainfall. Most of Poland lies within the same drainage system, the basin of the River Vistula and its affluents.

These facts mean an inherent similarity of economic conditions at least as regards agriculture and trade. These natural tendencies toward economic unity have been largely nullified, however, by historical developments and by the presence of non-Polish racial elements in different parts of the country. The political division of Poland between Russia, Prussia, and Austria more than a century ago, and the intersection of Poland since that time by political frontiers and high tariff walls, have produced such diverse economic developments that separate treatment will be necessary.

RUSSIAN POLAND

Despite long winters, wet springs, and much marsh area, the soil of Russian Poland is fairly fertile, and nearly half its surface is under cultivation. Northern cereals and fodder crops are the principal agricultural products. The main cereal staples are rye, oats, wheat, and barley. Beets are largely grown for sugar, and potatoes are extensively cultivated both for food and for distilling. A good deal of tobacco is raised, though of inferior quality. The large hay crop, together with other fodder products, nourishes large numbers of cattle, horses, and sheep. Bee-keeping is widely followed, especially in the southeast. A considerable portion of the country is under forest.

The most notable feature of the modern economic history of Russian Poland has been the development of its mineral wealth and the growth of its industrial life. Half a century ago Russian Poland was an almost purely agricultural country; but the hilly southeast, near the German and Austrian frontiers, contains extensive coal-fields and rich iron deposits, and the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw an intensive development of these mineral resources, which placed Russian Poland high in the list of coal- and iron-producing regions of Europe. This exploitation of mineral wealth has been largely accomplished by foreign capital and direction. Quick to see the economic significance of the region for capitalists, modern industry was shortly introduced, so that today southeast Russian Poland contains industrial centers of first-rank importance. Lodz is the great textile center, Czenstochowa and Dombrowa, just across the Silesian frontier, are the chief mining and metallurgical areas, while Warsaw, the capital, is the seat of a variety of factory industries, especially leather, machinery, and sugar-refining.

PRUSSIAN POLAND

In the provinces of Posen and West Prussia agricultural conditions are somewhat like those in Russian Poland. On the whole the soil is not so fertile, much of it being light and sandy; but certain districts, like the reclaimed marsh-lands of Posen and the Valley of the Vistula, in West Prussia, are markedly fertile. As in Russian Poland, the chief cereal crop is rye. Oats, wheat, barley, potatoes, and sugar-beets as well are extensively cultivated. There is considerable stock-raising, cattle, sheep, and goats being the principal kinds. In West Prussia especially considerable areas are under forest. Except salt, there are no important mineral resources. Industry is not greatly developed save at the city of Dantzic, and in this the Poles have virtually no part, the city being almost purely German.

In the province of Silesia the Polish element is mainly concentrated in the southern part, in the region known as Upper Silesia. This region is the geographical prolongation of the hilly southeastern part of Russian Poland, previously described. Upper Silesia is likewise rich in coal and iron. An industrial development corresponding to that of Russian Poland has taken place on an even more intense scale, so that to-day the extreme southern portion of Silesia is a veritable nexus of coal and iron mines, factories and metallurgical works, producing a great variety of iron and steel wares.

AUSTRIAN POLAND

Austrian Poland, the western part of the province of Galicia, is agriculturally the most backward of any part of the Polish race-zone. This is due not so much to its soil, which is on the whole as fertile as the average in either Russian or Prussian Poland, but to bad social conditions. The land is largely divided into great estates, which are indiffer-

ently cultivated. Much of western Galicia is hilly or mountainous. The Cracow district is rich in a variety of minerals, especially coal and zinc, while the salt-mines of Wielicka are among the most famous in the world. Industry is still backward, the principal branch being distilling. The rich petroleum-fields of eastern Galicia are in the Ukrainian rather than in the Polish race-zone.

THE FACTS ABOUT POLAND

WHERE POLAND IS LOCATED

Considering Poland in the widest sense as comprising all regions that have an appreciable Polish element, it may be placed as the whole vast region between the Baltic Provinces on the north, Hungary on the south, central Russia on the east, and central Germany on the west.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Russian Poland comprises, firstly, the "Polish Governments" of Russia; or the governments of Kalisz, Kielce, Lomza, Lublin, Piotrkow, Plock, Radom, Suwalki, and Warsaw. It has an area of 43,804 square miles and a population of 11,500,000, of which seventy-four per cent., or 8,470,000, are Polish. These figures are from the census of 1907, which was an official estimate on the basis of the census of 1897.

The Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement is, in the broad sense, also a part of Russian Poland, and includes Lithuania (provinces of Kovno, Grodno, Vilna) with an area of 46,505 square miles; White Russia (provinces of Minsk, Mohilev, Vitebsk) with an area of 70,707 square miles; and the Ukraine (provinces of Podolia, Volhynia, Kieff) with an area of 61,599 square miles. Total area 198,901 square miles. Population, 26,000,000; Poles, 1,800,000, or seven per cent.

Prussian Poland. Posen: Area, 11,190 square miles.

Population, 1,887,000. Poles, 1,167,000 (62 per cent.). West Prussia: area, 9,854 square miles. Population, 1,563,000. Poles, 555,000 (35 per cent.). East Prussia: area, 14,282 square miles. Population, 1,986,000. Poles, 311,000 (15 per cent.). Silesia: area, 15,566 square miles. Population, 4,668,000. Poles, 1,305,000 (28 per cent.). Total, area, 50,892 square miles. Population, 10,114,000. Poles, 3,338,000 (33 per cent.). These figures are from the census of 1900.

Austrian Poland. Galicia: Area, 30,321 square miles. Population, 7,315,000. Poles, 3,292,000 (45 per cent.). Austrian Silesia: area, 1,988 square miles. Population, 691,000. Poles, 233,000 (34 per cent.). Total, area, 32,309 square miles. Population, 8,006,000. Poles, 3,525,000 (41 per cent.). These figures are from the census of 1900.

DIFFERENT RACES IN POLAND

RUSSIAN POLAND¹

(a) *In the Polish Governments of Russia.*

The *Poles* number about 8,470,000, or seventy-four per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the territory. They are of all social classes; but whereas in the rural districts, except the government of Suwalki, they form almost the whole population, in the great cities the Poles average only sixty per cent. of the population, and in the small towns only from thirty to forty per cent. (Warsaw, fifty-eight per cent. Poles; Lodz, fifty-two per cent.; Lublin, thirty-eight per cent.; most of the balance Jews.) The Poles tend to gravitate to-

¹ Great changes in population have taken place in Russian Poland since the beginning of the war, especially owing to the systematic evacuation of the civilian population ordered by the Russian Government at the time of the retreat of the Russian armies before the Austro-German invasion in the Summer of 1915. But here, as elsewhere in this book, we have used pre-war statistics for the reason stated in the preface.

ward the two ends of the social scale. At society's top is a solid Polish aristocracy; at its bottom, a solidly Polish peasantry and a predominantly Polish urban proletariat. The middle and artisan classes are largely Jewish and German, though a Polish middle class is fast developing. The Poles are politically oppressed, the official class being almost exclusively Russian. The Poles of this region are still economically backward as compared with the Jews and Germans.

The *Jews* number 1,756,000, or thirteen per cent. of the population. They are found throughout, especially in the towns. The Jewish element is almost exclusively urban, such Jews as are found in the country being engaged in non-agricultural pursuits—small traders, peddlers, usurers, etc. The Jews control business, the poorer classes of the race being artisans, factory operatives, etc. In the smaller towns the Jews form a good half of the entire population; some towns, such as Lublin, being overwhelmingly Jewish. The Jews are politically oppressed by both Russians and Poles, though the Russian government sometimes uses them as political counterweights against the Poles. Of late years Polish anti-Semitism has been growing, the Poles believing that the Jews are enemies of Polish nationalism. The economic boycotts proclaimed by the Poles against the Jews have hit the latter hard, and the Poles' growing economic efficiency threatens the Jews' former business monopoly.

The *Germans* number 587,000, or five per cent. of the population, and are found throughout in the cities. Even more than the Jews, the Germans concentrate in the cities. As the Jews dominate trade, so the Germans tend to control industry. Some of the great manufacturing centers are almost entirely in German hands. Lodz, the textile center, is twenty-four per cent. German.

The *Russians* number 193,000, or 1.5 per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the region, especially in Warsaw, the capital. They are almost exclusively officials.

There are few civilians except at Warsaw, where the Russian element forms seven per cent. of the population. This does not include the large Russian garrisons quartered in various parts of the country before 1915.

The *Lithuanians* number 320,000, or 2.7 per cent. of the population. They are concentrated in the northern part of the Suwalki government, which is racially part of Lithuania. Here they form virtually the entire population except a few Polish landlords and some Jews and Germans in the towns.

The *Ruthenians* (also known as Ukrainians and Little Russians) number 358,000, or three per cent. of the population. They are concentrated in the eastern part of the Lublin government. This district is racially a border-land between Poles and Ruthenians. The Ruthenians are a rural population, peasants and agricultural laborers.

(b) *In the Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement*

This vast region, comprising Lithuania, White Russia, and a large part of the Ukraine, was under Polish rule for about four centuries, from 1386 to 1772. During that period the aristocracy and town upper classes were Polonized, and despite the strongest denationalizing efforts of the Russian government since 1772, these classes remain largely Polish to-day. The Polish element at present numbers about 1,800,000, or seven per cent. of the entire population. It is composed almost exclusively of the landed gentry and upper-class townfolk. It is strongest in Lithuania, where it forms over fifteen per cent. of the population; weakest in the Ukraine provinces, where it is barely four per cent. Some of the large Lithuanian cities are virtually Polish colonies (Vilna, forty-four per cent. Poles; Kovno, forty per cent. Poles). In Minsk, the chief city of White Russia, the Polish element is twenty-five per cent. In Kieff, the capital of the Ukraine, the Poles number eleven per cent.

The Polish element is everywhere politically depressed.

The Russian government has long adopted toward it measures far harsher even than those in force in Poland proper. This Polish element of the Eastern Zone is economically somewhat stronger than its kinsmen of the Polish Governments, being more of an élite, with stimulating traditions of dominance and executive power. Its future is, however, menaced by both the hostility of the Russian government and the growing nationalisms of Lithuanians and Ukrainians. Only the White Russians remain racially inert and acquiescent in the historic hegemony of the Polish element.

PRUSSIAN POLAND

(a) *In Posen.*

The *Poles* number 1,167,000, or sixty-two per cent. of the population, and are found throughout the region. They are of all social classes except officials, and include a numerous landed aristocracy and town middle class. The latter is mostly a recent development. The Poles of Posen have learned the lesson of German economic efficiency and are now fully the equals of their German neighbors in economic ability, although lack of capital and the disfavor of the German government and the German financial world still debar them from absolute equality with the Germans in commercial and industrial lines.

In Posen, as in other parts of Poland, the Poles are a rural rather than an urban people. The percentage of Poles is therefore highest in the country districts, there averaging about seventy per cent., although there are German peasant colonies scattered all over the province. On the other hand, many of the towns are predominantly German. The provincial capital, Posen city, has fifty-nine per cent. Poles. The Poles are politically depressed.

The *Germans* number 694,000, or thirty-seven per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the region, especially in the towns. The Germans of Posen are the special

care of the Prussian government, which aids them in every way against the Polish majority. They are of course politically dominant, all the officials being Germans. Owing to the close relations between the German government and German finance, business, etc., the Germans manage to maintain a slight economic superiority over the Poles, despite the latter's high economic ability. The Germans are of all social classes, though they form a rather higher percentage of the upper and middle classes than do the Poles.

The *Jews* number 26,000, or one per cent. of the population. They are found in the towns. The Jewish element of Posen, once large and influential, has now declined almost to extinction. In the bitter racial struggle between Poles and Germans, a struggle largely economic, the Jews have been nipped between the two sides and have been literally squeezed out of Posen's economic life. Furthermore, the Poles, in particular, are strongly anti-Semitic, and their economic boycotts have dealt the Jews blows from which they have never recovered. The same is true of the other Polish provinces of Prussia. Everywhere the Jewish element is on the decline.

(b) *In West Prussia.*

The *Poles* number 555,000, or thirty-five per cent. of the population, and are found mostly in the central part of this region. Unlike Posen, which is an ancient seat of the Polish race, West Prussia represents Polish colonization in the later medieval period (1466 to 1772). This colonization was mostly from Posen, up the west bank of the River Vistula, which cuts entirely across the province. East of the Vistula the population remained mainly German. Furthermore, the towns all over the province remained German, the Poles settling mainly in the country. The Poles of West Prussia are therefore mostly peasants and workmen, the upper and middle classes being mainly German.

On the Baltic sea-coast, just west of the port of Dantzig,

solidly German, is a population of fisher-folk, the Kassubs, who, although counted as Poles, are really descended from the old Pomeranian Slavs, a people related to the Poles, but of a different type.

The Poles of West Prussia are politically depressed and are not nearly so strong economically as their kinsmen in Posen.

The *Germans* number 1,000,000, or sixty-five per cent. of the population, and are found throughout the region. The German element, besides constituting the great majority of the urban population throughout, is also settled in two solid peasant blocks in the eastern and western parts of the province. Between these two masses stretches the wedge of Polish peasants, just touching the Baltic through the Kassubs. The German element in West Prussia is dominant in every way. It is, of course, aided by the Prussian government. The great seaport of Dantzic is almost solidly German. The second largest city, Thorn, on the border of Russian Poland, has a population seventy per cent. German, thirty per cent. Polish.

(c) *In East Prussia.*

The *Poles* number 311,000, or fifteen per cent. of the population, and are located in the extreme south. Although of Polish blood and speech, it is doubtful whether these people should be classed politically as Poles. Known as the Mazurs, they inhabit the strip of territory between the Mazurian Lakes and the southern frontier of East Prussia. They have been under German rule since the fourteenth century, have much German culture, and are Lutheran Protestants. In eastern Europe religion plays such an important part in determining nationality that these people are separated from the strongly Roman Catholic Poles by a wide gulf of creed and culture. The Mazurs are almost all peasants.

The *Germans* number 1,665,000, or eighty-five per cent. of the population, and are found throughout. They constitute the great majority of the population of all classes. There are

many even in the Mazurian district. They are dominant in every way. The exposed position of these Germans makes their race consciousness particularly intense.

(d) *In Silesia.*

The *Poles* number 1,305,000, or twenty-eight per cent. of the population. They are located in the southeastern part of the province. The Polish element in Silesia has been politically separated from Poland since the thirteenth century, and a half a century ago it had almost no race consciousness (they are known as Wasserpolacken), but the Polish national revival has reawakened its dormant Polonism and it now feels itself Polish. They are mostly peasants and workmen in the coal-fields. They are politically depressed and economically weak.

The *Germans* number 3,336,000, or seventy-two per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the region. They constitute the entire population except in the southeast, and even here they are preponderant in the industrial towns. (Gleiwitz, eighty per cent. Germans; Königshütte, on the frontier of Russian Poland, sixty-two per cent. Germans.) They are dominant in every way.

AUSTRIAN POLAND

(a) *In Galicia.*

The *Poles* number 3,292,000, or forty-five per cent. of the population, and are found throughout the region. Galicia is divided into two sharply contrasted race-zones. Western Galicia is an ancient seat of the Polish race, and here the Poles form the great bulk of the population of all ranks except the business class, which is mainly Jewish. In Eastern Galicia, on the other hand, the bulk of the population is Ruthenian (Ukrainian). Nevertheless, even here the towns are largely Polish or Jewish. In fact, conditions in eastern

Galicja closely resemble those already described in the Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement in Russia. The historical background is much the same. Eastern Galicja was conquered and held by Poland from the fourteenth century down to 1772, and during that time the aristocracy and town upper classes were Polonized. Thus to-day Lemberg, the capital of eastern Galicja, has fifty-two per cent. Poles.

In Galicja alone of all the disunited fragments of Poland are the Poles politically dominant, the Austrian Government favoring them and allowing them full local self-government. Virtually all the officials are therefore Poles, though of recent years the rising nationalism of the Ruthenians has compelled the Poles to grant them some share in the governance of eastern Galicja. Economically, however, the Galician Poles are decidedly weak. The Polish middle class is relatively small, trade being controlled by the Jews and industry by the Germans. The ruling Polish aristocracy, though politically clever, is economically inefficient.

The *Ruthenians* (Ukrainians) number 3,072,000, or forty-two per cent. of the population, and are found throughout eastern Galicja. They are overwhelmingly peasants. Very few of them are found in the towns. Lemberg, their chief city, has only ten per cent. Ruthenians. For centuries they have been terribly exploited by both Poles and Jews, and even to-day most of the Ruthenians are miserably poor. But their recent nationalistic revival has given them new energy and produced an intellectual class, and now they are asserting themselves. (See Chapter on Ukraine Territories.)

The *Jews* number 770,000, or thirteen per cent. of the population, and are found throughout, especially in the towns. As in Russian Poland, the Jews form a great part of the urban population, actually predominating in some of the small towns. They control business, and the poorer classes of the race are artisans, factory operatives, etc. Throughout the

country-side they are also found as small traders, peddlers, usurers, etc. They are politically depressed, and are hated by both Poles and Ukrainians.

(b) *In Austrian Silesia.*

In the extreme east of this small province, adjoining Galicia, is a district whose peasantry are Poles, numbering 233,000, or thirty-three per cent. of the population. They are politically and economically dominated by the Germans.

WHO CONTROLLED POLAND BEFORE THE WAR

Russian Poland, Russia; Prussian Poland, Germany; Austrian Poland, Austria.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED POLAND SINCE THE
WAR BEGAN

Russian Poland. All the Polish Governments of Russia have been in Austro-German military occupation since the autumn of 1915. The same is true of Lithuania. The bulk of White Russia and the Ukraine remained under Russian control until the beginning of 1918, when a German advance was imminent.

Prussian Poland. Germany.

Austrian Poland. The Russians conquered the eastern part of Galicia in the autumn of 1914, lost most of it in 1915, and were entirely expelled from the province in the summer of 1917. Thus Austrian Poland is entirely in Austrian hands once more.

POLISH INTERESTS

The first interest which suggests itself is that of the Poles themselves. The ardent desire of the Polish people for a recreated Polish state is too obvious to need topical analysis. The natural desire of the Poles is that the frontiers of the

new Poland should coincide with the boundaries of the Polish race. This, however, as has already been shown by the analysis of the racial composition of the territories involved, is an extremely complicated matter, vitally affecting the interests of the three existing states (Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary) now possessed of these territories. The analysis below will therefore refer to the effect upon each of these powers of the loss of their respective share of Polish territory to a possible Polish state. We can thus best gauge the opposition likely to be exerted against the formation of a new Poland.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN POLAND¹

In considering Russia's interests we must make a sharp distinction between the Polish Governments—Russian Poland proper, and the immense Eastern Zone of Polish Settlement (Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine). In this latter area the Poles are only a small upper class, while White Russia and the Ukraine are inhabited by populations which, though differing considerably from the Great Russians of Petrograd and Moscow, are yet regarded by the Great Russians as full members of the Russian family. To abandon these blood-relatives to Polish rule would be so abhorrent to the Great Russians and so detested by most of the natives themselves that the incorporation of White Russia and the Ukraine into a new Poland would be unthinkable except as the result of a complete break-up of Russia and its reduction to absolute impotence.

Lithuania is on the border-line. The Polish minority is here much larger than in either White Russia or the Ukraine. Polish cultural influence is also very strong, and a certain element of the Lithuanians (who, not being Slavs, are related neither to Poles nor Russians) would welcome a resumption of the old historic connection between Poland and Lithuania.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

But the growing nationalism of the Lithuanians makes it unlikely that the majority would welcome the change. Lithuanian nationalists desire neither Russian nor Polish governance, but self-rule. (See chapter on Lithuania.) The determining factor would probably be Russia. And Russia regards possession of Lithuania as necessary to her continued retention of the Baltic Provinces, considered as absolutely vital to the continued existence of Russia as a great power. (See chapter on the Baltic Provinces.)

We may therefore rule out of our analysis all consideration of the Eastern Zone's incorporation into a Polish state. This will narrow our discussion to the Polish Governments, or Russian Poland in the restricted sense.

Political. It is possession of Russian Poland more than anything else which gives Russia her standing as a European great power. The latent threat behind this huge salient, thrust far in between Germany and Austria toward the heart of central Europe, enables Russian diplomacy to make its voice heard in all European questions. A Russia shut away from central Europe by the wall of a Polish state would come to be regarded as a quasi-Asiatic power, with no major interest in European affairs.

Economic. Behind the shelter of the high Russian tariff wall Poland has developed into the greatest single industrial region of the Russian Empire. The Polish "Black Country" about Lodz, with its coal, iron, textiles, etc., outclasses even the industrial areas of the Donetz and Moscow. Its loss would upset Russia's whole economic life.

Strategic. Possession of Russian Poland gives Russia a magnificent salient thrust deeply between Germany and Austria-Hungary from which Russia can strike at either country on interior lines. In the present war, to be sure, this advantage was negated by the great inferiority of the Russian railroads to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But in

1914, Russia had already begun the construction of a vast strategic railway system, and had the war been postponed till 1917, it is very unlikely that Russia could have been driven out of her Polish salient, to say nothing of possible successful Russian invasions of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The loss of this Polish salient would, therefore, make a Russian invasion of either Germany or Austria a very difficult undertaking.

Racial. The Russian element in Poland is purely official and therefore artificial. But the retention of Poland gives Russia control over the main body of the second largest subdivision of the Slav race and puts her in close touch with the Austrian Slavs. This in many ways furthers her Pan-Slavist aspirations.

Cultural. Slight. The cultural gulf between Poles, with their civilization drawn from the Roman West, and Russians, with their civilization drawn from the Byzantine East, is very profound.

Religious. None. The Roman Catholic Poles hate and fear the Russian Orthodox Church, which has persecuted them in attempts to make them abjure their faith and enter the Orthodox fold.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN POLAND

Political. To a far greater degree than either Russia or Austria, Germany considers the retention of her share of Poland as vital to her very existence. The loss of her Eastern provinces would leave Germany so weakened and mutilated that she would almost cease to be a first-class power. One fourth of the whole German Empire would be gone.

Economic. Germany's eastern provinces contain some of the most valuable economic assets of the empire. Besides a generally high level of agricultural development throughout the area, the Polish southeast of Silesia covers one of the chief

German coal-fields and is a great industrial center, while Dantzig, the great seaport of West Prussia, controls the whole Vistula River trade.

Strategic. How vital the strategic value of this area appears to Germans can be judged from the reason why Germany's present eastern frontier happened to be drawn. At the Vienna Congress of 1814 Russia strongly desired to obtain all of Poland. Prussia, however, asserted that this would leave her with an impossible eastern frontier, for Posen in foreign hands would drive a wedge of alien territory to within seventy-five miles of Berlin, while the loss of West Prussia would absolutely isolate the old German province of East Prussia, the cradle of the Prussian kingdom. The result would be that Berlin would lie open to invasion, East Prussia would be hopelessly lost, and Silesia and Pomerania would be both uncovered by the piercing flanks of the Posen salient. In other words, Prussia would lie at the mercy of her eastern neighbor. These arguments appeared conclusive to the European statesmen of the Vienna Congress. Accordingly, the present Russo-German frontier was laid down as the absolute minimum required for Prussia's strategic safety. Germans therefore assert that it is still the absolute strategic minimum, which cannot be further pared down without vital peril to Germany's existence.

Racial. Throughout most of the disputed area Germans and Poles are mixed up in inextricable confusion. Even in the most Polish of these regions, Posen, there are numerous German agricultural districts scattered over the province, while the cities are largely German. West Prussia is overwhelmingly German except for the central band of Polish peasants cutting across the province to the sea, and even here the towns are mainly German. Again in southeastern Silesia, while the country-side is mostly Polish, the towns are as strongly German. Lastly, there is East Prussia, a solid German block which would be isolated and lost if the Polish strip

in West Prussia were cut out of the present German Empire. In fact, in all four provinces except Posen the German element decisively outnumbers the Polish. The total population figures for the four eastern provinces are: Germans, 6,685,000; Poles, 3,338,000. The Germans thus outnumber the Poles two to one.

Cultural. From the German point of view these provinces are all German culture-lands, redeemed after centuries of bitter struggle from Slavism. In all the provinces save Posen the Germans are incontestably superior culturally, setting the whole tone of civilization; and even in Posen the German element is culturally more important than its relative numerical strength would indicate. To give up these regions would be for Germany to lose the fruits of her *Drang nach Osten*, the labor of a thousand years. Germanism would thereby be thrown back behind the Oder, and Berlin itself would be perilously near Germanism's eastern frontier.

Religious. In Eastern Europe religion plays a great part in determining nationality. Accordingly, in the eastern provinces of the German Empire religious differences broadly coincide with race lines, most Germans being Lutheran Protestants while most Poles are Roman Catholics. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule. The Mazurs of East Prussia are Protestants, and so are a considerable number of the Silesian Poles, while a large minority of the Silesian Germans are Roman Catholics. The effect of religion on nationality is, however, clearly apparent. Where religion coincides with nationality it greatly intensifies racial self-consciousness; where there is cross-division, religion blurs and weakens the national sense. For example, the Protestant Mazurs, though Polish in blood and speech, have so little race feeling that they would probably prefer to remain in the German Empire rather than enter a Polish state. On the other hand, the Catholic Germans are rarely so anti-Polish as their Protestant kinsmen. Most of the cases of Poloniza-

tion among the Germans come from the Roman Catholic element.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN POLAND

Political. Austria's interest in her share of Poland is much less than that of either Russia or Germany. Galicia, while a large and populous province, is a distinctly outlying part of Austria, the loss of which would involve no vital weakening or mutilation of the empire. The Hapsburg dynasty might, it is true, deeply regret the loss of an eminently loyal province, both Poles and Ruthenians having shown themselves sincere supporters of the reigning house. But the chief racial element in Austria, the Germans, would probably regard the incorporation of Galicia into a Polish state with veiled satisfaction, since this would so diminish the Slav representation in the Austrian parliament that the Germans would thenceforth hold the parliamentary balance of power.

Economic. In comparison with its size and population, Galicia is a poor country. Industry is very undeveloped, agriculture is backward, while the oil-fields of East Galicia and the salt-mines of Wielicka are its only important mineral assets. The loss of Galicia would therefore cause no profound disturbance to Austrian economic life.

Strategic. Galicia is the *glacis* of the Austro-Hungarian fortress, covering both the Hungarian plain and the Moravian Gap (the eastern key to Vienna) from direct assault. The loss of this broad outwork would therefore seriously diminish Austria-Hungary's defensive power. But, on the other hand, the relations between Austria and the Polish race have been so traditionally friendly, and there are so slight possibilities of future friction, that Austria would not run the same risk of a hostile Poland as would Russia and Germany, against both of whom the Poles have old scores and with whom exist many probable grounds of future enmity.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

Never since the partition of Poland, over a century ago, has the Polish race acquiesced in the splitting up of its national state and subjection to alien masters. And the last generation has witnessed an unprecedented revival of Polish national consciousness and an increasing demand for the establishment of a national Polish state. The present war has still further quickened Polish national consciousness, while the promises made by all three partitioning powers, in the endeavor to gain Polish support in the war, has further awakened Polish hopes and has established definite claims which Poles will press insistently for fulfilment. Such being the facts, it is evident that the *status quo* of 1914, which would be an absolute denial of all these Polish aspirations, hopes, and claims, would so ulcerate Polish feelings as to leave the Polish race in an uncompromising and rebellious mood, which would endanger the peace of Europe for generations to come.

From the point of view of the powers that would, under this arrangement, possess Poland,—Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary,—the latent threat of a restless Poland would have to be set over against the various advantages analyzed in the national interests section.

2. *New Partition of Poland.*

Any new partition would probably follow the lines of present military possession. This would involve cession by Russia of her Polish governments and possibly more eastern territory, such as Lithuania, to the Central Powers. This would bring to the Central Powers a great accession of economic

strength, as specified above, and an excellent strategic frontier against future Russian aggression. But it would bring into the political bodies of the Central Powers many millions of recalcitrant and unassimilable Poles, Jews, and other racial elements. This would seriously disturb both the internal and international political problem of the Central Powers.

3. *Autonomous Poland under Russia.*

This must be predicated upon a liberal Russia. An imperial Russia would not permit autonomy and would attempt to Russify it. The fact that such autonomy would be a long step toward a definite Polish entity would probably persuade the Poles to accept it. A liberal Russia would probably agree, because a satisfied Poland would not be a menace. Austria-Hungary could acquiesce in this because her Polish possession—Galicia—is not a vital part of her empire. The stubborn factor would be Germany, who would regard the loss of all or any considerable part of her Polish possessions as an irreparable loss and would plan to regain it at the earliest moment.

4. *Autonomous Poland under Austria-Hungary.*

The feasibility of this would depend upon whether Austria-Hungary comes out of the war more dependent upon and dominated by Germany or less so. Were Austria-Hungary a really independent empire, its Catholic and relatively non-national character might make its suzerainty bearable, if not wholly agreeable, to Poland. But this is a rather slender hope.

5. *Autonomous Poland under Germany.*

This would mean the placing of Poland's economic life upon a well organized basis of development, but there is such racial antipathy between the Poles and Germans that, even under a liberalized Germany, the relations would be tense and menacing.

6. *Independent Poland.*

This would satisfy Polish aspirations and would be the ideal solution. Would it work? If it included all predominantly Polish territory, it would incur the lasting enmity of Germany and lay the grounds for later reconquest. Austria-Hungary would probably give little trouble. Russia might object regarding the eastern part, where there are many Russians. A limited Polish state not including the present German possessions would leave the state sealed up from access to the sea, with a difficult economic position.

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
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EASTERN EUROPE

LITHUANIA



N°7 LITHUANIA

CHAPTER VII

LITHUANIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Lithuanians represent the main body of a distinct branch of the Aryan race, dwelling from time almost beyond historic memory about the southeastern corner of the Baltic Sea. Other branches of this race-stock are the Letts of the Baltic Provinces and the former Borussians, or old Prussians, who are now extinct.

The eastern Baltic lands were originally regions of swamp and forest where the Lithuanian peoples lived in primitive tribal anarchy. Their lack of political cohesion was offset, however, by a warlike disposition and a strongly developed religion maintained by a powerful priesthood akin to the Druids of the primitive Celts. This religious cult aroused a sense of common race solidarity among the Lithuanian peoples and enabled them to withstand the pressure of the much more numerous Slavs, who in the early centuries of the Christian era flooded the wide regions to east and south, territory now represented by Russia and Poland. The race consciousness of the Lithuanians was intensified when the Slavs accepted Christianity while the Lithuanians clung to their native paganism with a tenacity unexampled among European peoples.

It was this very paganism, however, which presently drew down upon the Lithuanian stocks a new enemy, the Germans. The persistence of this pagan area in the midst of the Christian world aroused increasing concern throughout Christendom, and at the end of the twelfth century two German

crusading orders undertook the conversion and subjugation of these formidable heathen. One order, the Teutonic Knights, attacked the Old Prussians, and after a century of ferocious conflict entirely exterminated them, the Old Prussians preferring death to baptism. Their country, the present provinces of East and West Prussia, were resettled by Germans. The other crusading order, the Knights of the Sword, landed in the Baltic Provinces, and eventually subdued them. Here the resistance, though fierce, was not so implacable as in Prussia. For this reason the native population, the modern Letts, was not exterminated, but was reduced to serfdom, the German conquerors becoming the aristocratic owners of the land, as indicated in the chapter on the Baltic Provinces.

Although neither Prussia nor the Baltic Provinces were fully subdued until a much later date, their conquest was so well advanced by the middle of the thirteenth century that the Teutonic orders were then able to begin a joint assault upon the heart of the Lithuanian race—Lithuania proper, or the land lying between and to the east of both Prussia and the Baltic Provinces. This German attack did not, however, succeed. Warned by the fate of their Prussian and Lettish kinsmen, the Lithuanians drew together and submitted to the rule of a dynasty of native princes which had for some time been slowly gathering the various Lithuanian tribes beneath its sway. Indeed, these Lithuanian princes now made conquests of their own. Russia had by this time fallen into anarchy under the shock of Tatar invasions, and the Lithuanians accordingly subjugated most of western Russia, their conquests extending southward almost to the Black Sea. Yet, despite this accession of strength, the Teutonic menace still threatened. For this reason the Lithuanian princes made an alliance with their old enemies, the Poles, against the common Teutonic foe, and in 1386 this alliance became a dynastic union through the marriage of the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello

to the daughter of the Polish king. Henceforth Poland and Lithuania were united in a common state. The Lithuanians finally abjured their paganism for Roman Catholicism, and the two peoples together beat down the German peril at the great battle of Tannenberg, in 1410.

As time passed, Lithuania was largely Polonized. The aristocracy and townsfolk became Polish in language and feeling. The peasants, although retaining their old Lithuanian speech and customs, sank into abject serfdom and exerted no influence on the national life. When Lithuania fell to Russia during the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, Lithuanian race consciousness had apparently ceased to exist.

But here, as elsewhere, the nineteenth century saw a re-awakening of race feeling, and a Lithuanian nationalist movement presently sprang into being. The Russian government favored the movement, since it was directed primarily against the Polish upper classes. At the present time the bulk of the Lithuanian population is certainly aware of its peculiar racial identity, and the more advanced wing of Lithuanian nationalism dreams of an independent Lithuania, freed from both Polish and Russian domination. But the aristocracy and townsfolk are still predominantly Polish, and insist upon Lithuania's inclusion in any future Polish state. Much of the history of Lithuania is involved in the chapter on Poland.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Lithuania is a poor country. Low-lying and badly drained, much of its surface is marsh, wet meadow-land, and tangled forest.

A severe climate and a frost-bound soil complete the list of handicaps to cultivation. The best part of the country is the province of Kovno, lying nearest the Baltic. Here the land is higher and better drained and the climate is milder, being tempered by the nearness of the sea. Kovno, therefore, pro-

duces fairly good crops of northern cereals, especially rye, oats, and barley, while potatoes are extensively grown for food, fodder, and distilling. Flax cultivation completes the list of its noteworthy agricultural products. Agriculture in the other provinces of Lithuania is similar in character, but in a much less prosperous condition.

The raising of live stock is carried on throughout the country.

Forest products are also an important item in Lithuania's economic life.

Industry in the modern sense is confined mainly to the larger towns. Grodno has several large woolen mills, while numerous distilleries, tanneries, woodworking establishments, and kindred industries exist in various parts of the country.

THE FACTS ABOUT LITHUANIA

WHERE LITHUANIA IS LOCATED

Lithuania is bounded by East Prussia and Poland on the west, the Baltic Provinces on the north, Russia proper on the east, and White Russia on the south.

THE TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Russian provinces of *Kovno*, *Vilna*, and *Grodno*; also parts of the Russian provinces of *Vitebsk* and *Minsk*; and the northern part of the Polish Government of *Suwalki*.

The area of Lithuania proper—that is, the Russian provinces of *Kovno*, *Vilna*, and *Grodno*—is 46,595 square miles, or about the size of New York State. Its population in 1912 was 6,980,000. Of these about 3,000,000 are Lithuanians. In adjoining provinces are about 500,000 Lithuanians.

DIFFERENT RACES IN LITHUANIA ¹

The *Lithuanians* are found throughout the region. They are mostly peasants and town proletariat, although an intel-

¹ See foot-note on page 86.

lectual and middle class is developing. They are good agriculturists, but economically exploited by Poles and Jews, and politically depressed by Poles and Russians.

The *Poles* are found throughout the region. They are mostly upper-class landowners or townsfolk. The bulk of these Lithuanian Poles are of Lithuanian blood, but they have been Polonized for centuries, and to-day feel themselves true Poles. Culturally dominant and economically powerful, they are politically depressed by the Russians.

The *Great Russians* are found throughout the region. They are politically dominant, although few in numbers. Among them are some landowners and townsfolk, but they were mostly officials and garrison troops until 1915.

The *White Russians* are found in the eastern part of the region. They are poverty-stricken peasants, with almost no race consciousness or separate culture.

The *Jews* are found throughout the region. As in Poland, the Jews are very numerous, especially in the towns. They control the retail business of the region.

The *Germans* are found mostly in the towns. They are very prominent in industrial life, the wholesale trades, and kindred lines.

WHO CONTROLLED LITHUANIA BEFORE THE WAR

Russia.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED LITHUANIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Since the autumn of 1915 Germany has occupied the region.

LITHUANIAN AND POLISH INTERESTS IN THIS REGION

The interests of Lithuanians and Poles are too self-evident to require topical analysis. The Lithuanians dream of an independent or autonomous Lithuania. The Poles desire to

incorporate Lithuania into their proposed revived Polish state.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN LITHUANIA ¹

Political. The retention of Lithuania within the Russian Empire appeals to most Russians as vital to Russia's continued existence as a European great power.

Economic. Although nowhere of great fertility, the large area of Lithuania presents in the aggregate considerable agricultural resources. Cereals are widely grown, and the extensive forest areas yield considerable revenue. In the cities, especially Vilna, there is some manufacturing.

Strategic. The retention of Lithuania is considered vital to Russia's defense system on her western side. The loss of Lithuania would undermine Russia's hold on the Baltic Provinces, would virtually sever Russia from her Polish provinces, and would uncover the heart of Russia—Muscovy—to invasion.

Racial. The numerous White Russian element is claimed by the Great Russians as an integral part of their race.

Cultural. The culture of both Lithuanians and White Russians is predominantly Polish. The cultural claim of Russia is therefore slight.

Religious. Most of the inhabitants of Lithuania are Roman Catholics. The religious claim of Russia is therefore slight.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN LITHUANIA

Political. The severance of Lithuania from Russia and its erection into a separate state, either independent or under German influence, would immensely strengthen Germany's eastern position. It would shatter Russia's whole standing in eastern Europe, and open up possibilities of German domination over this entire region, made up of Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, and Poland.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

Economic. Germans already play a leading part in industry. Also, many landed estates are in German hands.

Strategic. It is through Lithuania that Russia touches East Prussia. A Lithuanian state would remove all direct Russian pressure upon eastern Germany, and might lay open the Baltic Provinces, Poland, and Russia proper to German invasion.

Racial. The racial interest is very slight.

Cultural. Cultural claims do not enter.

Religious. Religious interests are not a factor.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave Lithuania an undifferentiated part of Russia. It would disappoint the aspirations of both the Lithuanian majority and the Polish minority. It would best please the Russians, even liberal Russians. Lithuania is so much a geographical part of Russia that even liberals would probably not view its severance with the relative equanimity that they would the severance of Poland.

2. *Independent Lithuania.*

This would satisfy the aspirations of Lithuanian nationalists. Its feasibility is questionable on the grounds that it is too small, has too little variety of economic resources, and has too many refractory elements to maintain itself successfully.

3. *Independent Lithuania Augmented by the Lettish Part of the Baltic Provinces.*

This would reunite the whole Letto-Lithuanian race, and would therefore seem the racially desirable solution. But even so, the state would be very small, and would arouse Russian hostility through possession of Riga and the lower Dvina River, one of Russia's chief economic outlets. It is not certain that the Lithuanians and the Letts would get on together.

Racially of the same stock, they have divergent histories. The Lithuanians are Roman Catholics with Polish culture. The Letts are Protestants with German culture.

With the further inclusion in this state of the northern part of the Baltic Provinces, it would be subject to the same weaknesses as the above, plus the presence of the Esths of these provinces, who are of an entirely different race and of refractory inclinations.

4. *Incorporation of Lithuania within a Polish State.*

This would follow the old historic lines of the Polish-Lithuanian state as it existed from the later Middle Ages down to the extinction of the Polish state at the close of the eighteenth century. This would satisfy the Polish minority in Lithuania, but would disappoint the Lithuanian majority.

5. *Autonomous Lithuania under Russia.*

Under a liberal Russia the Lithuanians would probably be satisfied with such an arrangement. The chief difficulty would be the internal friction between the Lithuanian majority and the Polish minority.


6. *Autonomous Lithuania under Germany.*

This implies, from the geographical position of Lithuania, a German hegemony over Poland. The Polish minority would probably be discontented. The Lithuanian majority might be satisfied, as there does not seem to exist the same racial antagonism against Germany as between the Poles and the Germans. The chief objector would be Russia, because of the strategic threat from Germany it would make.

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EASTERN EUROPE
CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES



CHAPTER VIII
CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The home of the Czecho-Slovaks is a long band of territory stretching due east and west across east-central Europe. Its physical character varies greatly, its three historic divisions (Bohemia, Moravia, and the Tatra, or western Carpathians) denoting distinctly diverse geographical regions.

Bohemia, the westernmost of these regions, is by far the most important. It is a great plateau in Europe's very heart, ringed about with mountains. Bohemia's dominant position, overlooking as it does the flat lands of Germany to the north and the Danube Valley to the south, has given it the significant title of the Citadel of Europe.

East of Bohemia, and separated from it by a chain of rough hills, lies Moravia. Moravia is a transition land of hill and plateau broken by wide river-valleys draining south to the Danube. Its northern border is formed by projecting spurs of the Bohemian and Carpathian mountain-systems, reaching out toward each other, but just failing to meet. The result is a stretch of fairly low country between—the famous Moravian Gap—through which unnumbered tribes and peoples have poured from the boundless Russian plains into central Europe.

East of Moravia, again, rises the Tatra, or Western Carpathians. The Tatra is a mass of rugged mountains, steep to the north, but opening out on the south into river valleys draining the wide Hungarian plain.

The history of these lands begins with the Slavic invasion

of the sixth century, A. D. At that epoch the ancestors of the modern Czechs and Slovaks poured through the Moravian Gap, expelled the Teutonic tribes who then peopled the region, and settled down as masters. These Slavs were rude barbarians, but they prospered greatly in their new homes, and when they had acquired the rudiments of civilization they built up powerful states in both Bohemia and Moravia. Only the eastern branch of the race, the Slovaks, side-tracked in the remote and infertile Tatra, fell behind and never made the political and cultural progress of their Czech kinsmen to the west.

In the early Middle Ages the Kingdom of Bohemia, which had absorbed Moravia, was one of the leading states of Europe; but in the thirteenth century the old dynasty of native Slav kings died out, and the throne fell to foreign monarchs who favored that German infiltration which had already been long at work. When the Czechs occupied Bohemia in the sixth century they tarried in the fertile central plain, leaving the mountain rim in the hands of the dispossessed Teutons. Now little by little the Germans began to descend from the mountains toward the plain once more, while German merchants and artisans, favored by the crown, settled all over Bohemia and Moravia in the towns, gradually giving them a Teutonic complexion. The terrible Hussite Wars of the fifteenth century, although purely religious in form, were in fact largely a Czech nationalistic revolt against encroaching Germanism, and their effect was to check the progress of Germanism for a full century.

The struggle was renewed in the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), but this time the Czechs lost. Their Hapsburg sovereigns, who represented Germanism, took a terrible vengeance upon the rebellious Czechs. Bohemia and Moravia were half depopulated, while the old Czech nobility was entirely rooted out, their estates being given to foreigners, mostly Austrian Germans. Thus deprived of their natural leaders,

the oppressed Czech peasantry sank into a political and cultural stupor which looked like death. Outwardly the land was entirely German, the Czech language being spoken only by peasants.

However, the nineteenth century, that awakener of dormant nationalities, roused the Czechs from their long slumber. A vigorous nationalist revival began, and the increasing economic prosperity which Bohemia then enjoyed permitted the rapid growth of a Czech middle and educated class, which furnished able leaders to the national revival. Step by step, despite stubborn opposition, the Czechs drove the German minority from their privileged positions, and by the beginning of the twentieth century the Czechs were in full political control of those parts of Bohemia and Moravia in which they constituted a numerical majority; in other words, most of the country.

The long struggle had, however, aroused great bitterness on both sides. The German minority, infuriated by Czech successes and alarmed for its future, openly preached secession from Austria to the German Empire, while the Czech nationalists demanded the erection of Bohemia and Moravia into a fully autonomous unit wherein they, as the numerical majority, might Slavize the unprotected Germans. When Austria refused their demands, many of the Czech nationalists fixed their hopes on Russia. Bohemia and Moravia were thus full of race-hatred, secessionism, and general unrest when the European War broke out in 1914.

Of the Slovaks there is little to be said. They have always been a population of backward peasants, and since the early Middle Ages they have been under the political domination of the Magyars, or Hungarians. Originally identical with the Czechs, long centuries of contrasted environment and history have differentiated them considerably from their western kinsmen. The Czech nationalists wish to incorporate the Slovaks in their projected Czecho-Slovak state.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

The lands of the Czecho-Slovaks are, in the aggregate, fertile, well endowed with mineral wealth, and possessed of a rapidly expanding industrial life.

This is notably true of Bohemia, which is in every respect a highly favored region. To begin with, the combination of a good climate and a laborious peasantry has brought agriculture to a high prosperity. The central plain is generally cultivable, certain areas ranking among the most fertile in Europe. Large crops of cereals and potatoes are raised, and of recent years the cultivation of sugar beets has greatly extended. Flax and fruit are also grown with success. Bohemia's most notable agricultural specialty is hops, those of the Saaz district being acknowledged to be the finest in the world. The mountainous rim of Bohemia is clothed with

fine and well-tended forests, the yield of which is valuable. Bohemian live stock is distinctly specialized, goose-raising and bee-keeping being the principal branches. Bohemian honey enjoys a wide-spread reputation.

Bohemia's mountain rim is stocked with almost every useful metal and mineral except salt. The most important mineral products are coal and lignite. Some of the richest lignite-fields in Europe are found in the northeast, while valuable coal-fields occur in the northwest. In the north, near the Saxon frontier, are good iron-mines. Other valuable metals are silver, lead, tin, antimony, graphite, kaolin, and radium, while copper, sulphur, cobalt, alum, nickel, arsenic, and certain sorts of precious stones are found in paying quantities. Bohemia is unusually rich in mineral springs. Several of these, notably Carlsbad, Franzensbad, and Marienbad, have valuable medicinal qualities which have a world-wide reputation.

Well provided with coal, iron, and water-power, Bohemia has naturally developed a varied industrial life. Some of her industries are of long standing, Bohemian glass and porcelains having been famous since the Middle Ages. During the last half-century, however, the staple industries of the modern world have developed so greatly as to place Bohemia first industrially among Austrian provinces. These great staple industries, textiles, cloth-making, and iron and steel works of every description, are centered in northern Bohemia in close juxtaposition to the water-power sources and the coal- and iron-fields. The rise of beet-sugar growing has dotted the Bohemian plain with sugar refineries, while the output of the great breweries of Budweis and Pilsen goes all over the world. Other industrial specialties are chemicals, leather, paper, pencils, and musical instruments.

Moravia is in many respects the economic counterpart of Bohemia, although not quite so well favored by nature. In northern Moravia a relatively severe climate and less fertile

soil check the development of agriculture, but southern Moravia possesses much fertile land, producing heavy cereal crops. The mountainous north is covered with valuable forests. Sheep-raising and horse-breeding are Moravia's chief live-stock occupations.

As in Bohemia, the mountains contain a varied wealth of minerals and metals, notably coal, iron, and silver.

As in Bohemia, again, the presence of coal and iron makes possible an important industrial life which has acquired great importance during the last hundred years. The principal manufactures are textiles, woolens, linens, iron, and steel products, and some specialties, such as leather and brandy.

Austrian Silesia, although very small, is a flourishing area both agriculturally and industrially, with considerable mineral wealth. It is in most respects a microcosm of Moravia, of which, economically, it forms a part.

The only really ill-favored portion of the Czecho-Slovak area is the Slovak country of the western Carpathians. This mountainous district has neither mineral wealth nor fertile soil, while the Slovaks themselves, a backward, depressed people, show little aptitude for modern industrial life.

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THE FACTS ABOUT THE CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES

WHERE THE CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES ARE LOCATED

A long band of plateau or mountain country lying along and within the northern frontier of Austria and the northern frontier of Hungary. This area is bounded on the north by

Germany and Poland, while to the south it sinks into the Danubian plains of Austria and Hungary. This country of the Czecho-Slovaks divides into three distinct geographical regions: (1) the plateau of Bohemia, entirely surrounded by mountains; (2) east of Bohemia, the plateau of Moravia; (3) east of Moravia, a tangled mass of mountains known as the Tatra, or Western Carpathians. This last is the Slovak country, Bohemia and Moravia being the habitats of the Czechs.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Bohemia has an area of 20,065 square miles.

Moravia has an area of 8584 square miles.

Austrian Silesia has an area of 1988 square miles.

Tatra, or Western Carpathians, has an area of about 20,000 square miles.

The combined area of these regions is about 50,000 square miles, or a little larger than New York State.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES

The *Czechs* number 6,435,000. They are found in Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia.

The *Czechs* in Bohemia are concentrated in the plains, where they form the great majority of the population outside of a few towns. Formerly politically depressed, they have been politically dominant for nearly a generation. Always good agriculturists, they are developing industrially, and a business class is fast appearing. In Moravia all the above is true to a less degree. In Austrian Silesia the *Czechs* are a minority of the population, and have little political or economic power.

The *Slovaks*, numbering 1,967,000, are found in the Tatra, or Carpathian, uplands of northern Hungary.

The *Slovaks* are peasants, politically depressed, economically weak, and culturally backward.

The *Germans* number 3,300,000. They occupy solidly the mountainous rim of Bohemia and form a large part of the town population of Bohemia and Moravia. They are the majority in Austrian Silesia. There is a sprinkling of German villages in the Tatra.

In the mountainous rim of Bohemia the entire population is German. In Bohemia and Moravia a large part of the town population is German, particularly the upper classes. They are economically dominant in both Bohemia and Moravia, and of course in Austrian Silesia. In the Hungarian Tatra they are few in numbers and of slight importance.

The *Magyars* are found in the Tatra region. They are landlords and officials, numerically few, but politically dominant.

The *Austrian aristocracy* is a racially mixed group, found in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. They are great nobles and landowners, holders of rich clerical benefices, etc. Their former political power has been much undermined by the more democratic trend of recent Austrian political life; but they are still politically, economically, and socially powerful. They support the Hapsburg dynasty rather than any particular racial element of the empire, thus being supra-national.

WHO CONTROLLED CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES BEFORE
THE WAR

Austria-Hungary.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED CZECHO-SLOVAK
TERRITORIES SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Austria-Hungary.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN CZECHO-SLOVAK
TERRITORIES ¹

Political. Austria-Hungary naturally desires the retention of these regions as one of the chief parts of Austria and

¹The foregoing analysis postulates as "Austro-Hungarian" the point

of an important part of Hungary. The loss of these regions would so mutilate Austria and cut her off from the main body of the Germanic world that her continued existence would be impossible.

Economic. Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, besides great agricultural wealth, possess important mineral deposits, and also are the greatest single industrial region of the empire.

Strategic. An Austria without Bohemia and Moravia would have no defensible frontier on the north. Vienna would be almost a frontier city and would lie entirely open to attack. Hungary, also, by the loss of the Tatra region, would have her Carpathian rampart breached, and in its stead an indefensible frontier in the Hungarian plain dangerously near Budapest.

Racial. The large German minorities of Bohemia and Moravia (in Bohemia thirty-five per cent.) and the isolated German block in Austrian Silesia would be lost. The Magyar gentry of the Slovak Tatra would be engulfed.

Cultural. Bohemia and Moravia are largely Germanic in culture as a result of centuries of Germanic predominance. Even the purest-blooded Czechs are strongly impregnated with Germanic culture. But were this area cut out of Austria, it might be culturally lost entirely to Germanism, and instead

of view of the ruling classes in the empire, together with that of the two leading races, Germans and Magyars. As to the sentiments of the population of the particular territories involved, there would seem to be three shades of opinion: (1) *Independence.* This is the wish of a large minority of Czechs and of some Slovaks. The idea is that Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the Slovak Carpathians be erected into an independent state. This state, from its small size and exposed situation, would probably be under the influence of its natural protector, Russia. (2) *Autonomy under the Hapsburg crown.* The idea is that these lands be formed into an autonomous unit of a federated Austria-Hungary. Before the war this was the point of view of most Czechs and nearly all the Slovaks. (3) *Status quo.* This is the desire of a few Czechs, most of the German minority, and most of the nobility and the official class.

an irreconcilable Slav culture-area injected into the midst of the Germanic world.

Religious. The Czechs are nearly all Roman Catholics, while many of the Slovaks are Protestants. But religion plays little part in the problem.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES

Political. A Czecho-Slovak state would disrupt Germany's chief ally, Austria-Hungary, and would erect upon Germany's southern frontier a naturally hostile Slav state in close touch with Russia. It would also erect a barrier between Germany and the friendly Magyars (Hungary).

Economic. A Czecho-Slovak state would cut Germany's shortest trade-route to the Mediterranean and the Near East, to-day favored by special economic agreements between Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Strategic. Such a state would transform Germany's southern frontier from a friendly line requiring no guarding into an inevitably hostile border requiring heavy defense.

Racial. Large German-speaking minorities would be lost, and a Slav wedge would be driven between Germany and the Austrian Germans of the Danube Valley.

Cultural. A large area to-day largely Germanic in culture would be lost.

Religious. Practically none.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN CZECHO-SLOVAK TERRITORIES

Political. The existence of a Czecho-Slovak state would mean the existence of a friendly, and probably dependent, Slav nation driven like a wedge into the Germanic world and separating Germany from its natural allies against Slavism—the Magyars. It would tend to make Russia dominant in central Europe. It would also give Russia a powerful hold on Hungary.

Economic. Russia being so economically backward, her economic interests here are slight.

Strategic. The mountain fortress of Bohemia has often been termed the Citadel of Europe, while through the famous Moravian Gap Russian armies could pour freely upon Vienna or Budapest. Also, Russian armies could enter Hungary further to the eastward over the Slovak Carpathians.

Racial. The full Slavization of these regions would entrench Slavism firmly in the heart of central Europe, and this would normally redound to the great advantage of Russia, the natural head of the Slav world. It would also enable Russia better to further the interests of the Yugo-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, etc.).

Cultural. The closer connection with the advanced and progressive Czechs would probably have enriching effects upon Russian cultural life.

Religious. The Czechs being Roman Catholics and the Slovaks Protestants, the religious interests of Orthodox Russia are not involved.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

In the present Austria-Hungary, allied to Germany, the Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia would be integral parts of the Austrian monarchy, with a considerable measure of local self-government and with representation in the Austrian Reichsrat. During the last ten years most political discrimination against the Czechs in favor of the Germans has been done away with, although the Czech demands for extensive local autonomy have been refused.

The principal outstanding grievance of the Czechs in recent years, outside of extremists who wish for a virtually independent Czecho-Slovak state, has been not so much the matter of local autonomy as the fact that the foreign policy of the

Austro-Hungarian government has effected a close alliance with Germany, which has meant a hostile attitude towards the rest of the Slav world, particularly the South Slavs and Russia.

So long as Austria-Hungary remains in close alliance with Germany a majority of the Czechs will probably remain discontented despite further concessions of local self-government. The Czechs regard themselves as the advance guard of the Slavic world and resent having their activities contribute to German rather than Slavic progress.

If, however, the peace conference results in a constructive settlement, giving a greater sense of security to all parts of Europe, the sense of "standing on guard" for their racial interests, which both the Czechs and the Germans have, would tend to be allayed. With such a lessening of the Czecho-German antagonism, the problem of the Czechs in Austria might be solved by an increasingly liberal attitude that the Austrian government might be inclined to adopt in a measurably "secure" situation in which it was not threatened by the Czech and other minorities which it has hitherto feared as the tools of larger imperialisms. Attitude of mind here counts for more than formal constitutional changes.

The Slovaks in Hungary have not received the political advantages that their Czech kinsmen have in Austria in recent years. They are still greatly oppressed by the Magyars, and enjoy virtually no local self-government. The Magyars show no signs of granting such concessions. So long as a Magyar-ruled Hungary remains, therefore, the Slovaks will remain discontented over their hard lot under the iron-handed rule of Magyar landlords.

2. Independent Czecho-Slovak State.

This would satisfy Czech nationalists, but such a state could survive only by grace of the constant support of Russia.

Germany would regard it as a menacing political tool of

Slavic imperialism, cutting into the German Empire, separating large sections of German population, and constituting an economic barrier to trade routes of the German Empire to the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and the Near East.

Russia could reach her Czecho-Slovak protégés only through Poland, thus implying Russian possession of Poland or the alliance of a Polish state with Russia.


It would be an inland state, with a difficult economic situation. All trade connections would be through Germany or German parts of Austria. Germany could put pressure on its economic outlets.

In such a liberalized, pacified Europe as would follow a constructive settlement, the Magyars would be obliged to give the Slovaks political rights and local self-government, because all nations would put pressure on the Magyars to set their house in order so as to remove an explosive situation that might upset the peace of Europe.

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EASTERN EUROPE
UKRAINE TERRITORIES



CHAPTER IX

UKRAINE TERRITORIES

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ukrainians (also known as Little Russians and Ruthenians) occupy a vast belt of plain country stretching from Poland eastward across south Russia to the middle reaches of the River Don. They were settled in their present homes by the early centuries of the Christian era, although their primitive tribal system prevented the formation of any strong state until the rise of the Kingdom of Kieff, on the River Dnieper in the ninth century, A. D. During the next two centuries the Kingdom of Kieff was a powerful state. It was, in fact, the center of Russian life. The modern Great Russians (the people generally spoken of as Russians to-day) are really the descendants of colonists from the original Ukrainian center who migrated to the great forest regions of north Russia and there mingled their blood with Finnish tribes, becoming thereby a different stock.

The Great Russians owe their civilization and religion to Kieff, which received both from Byzantine Constantinople and distributed them throughout the Russian world.

The center of Russian life would probably have continued to be Kieff instead of Moscow and Petrograd had it not been for the terrible Tatar invasion of the thirteenth century, which destroyed Kieff and turned all south Russia into a desert. Only the western portion of Ukrainia, near Poland, escaped the Tatar hordes, and this broken remnant soon fell under Polish rule. For the Ukrainians this was a great misfortune. The Poles, although fellow-Slavs, had taken their religion and

civilization from the Roman West, and they now attempted to force Roman Catholicism and Polish culture upon the Ukrainians with their Greek Orthodox faith and eastern European civilization. The Ukrainians resisted doggedly, displaying that race-tenacity which is their most marked characteristic; but they were degraded to the level of wretched serfs, persecuted and exploited by their Polish masters.

The Ukrainians, however, presently made a bid for freedom. Taking advantage of a gradual waning of the Tatar scourge, Ukrainian colonists pushed out into the south Russian plains, striving to regain the lost lands of their ancestors. These hardy pioneers called Cossacks, soon founded a strong military republic. But Poland, fearing that this would become the center of an Ukrainian national revival, attempted to subdue the Cossacks, and a bloody struggle raged throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. Feeling themselves too weak to maintain their independence against Poland, the Cossacks sought the protection of the rising czardom of Moscow, but their Great Russian kinsmen played them false, for the Czar soon made a treaty with Poland partitioning the Ukraine, and thereafter the Czar tried to make his Ukrainians into Great Russians as ruthlessly as the Polish kings had tried to make theirs into Poles. When Poland fell at the end of the eighteenth century, Russia acquired nearly all the Ukraine, only a small portion (eastern Galicia) falling to Austria.

The nineteenth century, the era of nationalities, saw a revival of Ukrainian race consciousness. This movement made most rapid progress in eastern Galicia, for the Austrian Government, having no reason to fear it, placed no obstacles in its way. By the beginning of the twentieth century the Ukrainian revival had made great headway despite Russia's best efforts to beat it down. The advanced wing of the Ukrainian nationalists dream of an independent Ukrainia. The more moderate parties would be content with local autonomy and full cultural rights under Russian or Austrian suzerainty.

The Ukrainians of Bukowina and northeastern Hungary represent streams of colonization which settled these regions during the Middle Ages. They are both somewhat out of touch with the main current of Ukrainian national feeling, and their race consciousness is as yet imperfectly awakened.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The long belt of territory occupied by the Ukrainian race-stock covers many varieties of soil, natural resources, and economic activity.

The comparatively small portion under Austrian rule (eastern Galicia and northern Bukowina) is not of special economic importance. The climate is severe, and agriculture is backward because of unfavorable social conditions, much of the land being owned by absentee landlords. The chief importance of the region arises from the existence of rich oil-wells at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains. Industry in the modern sense is virtually non-existent.

The economic, as well as the ethnic, center of the Ukrainian race is found farther east, in southern Russia. Most of this vast territory forms part of the famous Russian Black Earth zone and is therefore very fertile. All cereals grow well, and enormous crops of cereals, sugar beets, tobacco, and vegetables are raised. This region has, in fact, been sometimes termed the granary of Russia. Only in the extreme northwestern corner of the Ukrainian race-area (provinces of Volhynia, southern Minsk, and Chernigov) does the black earth fail to appear. This region is therefore relatively infertile, much of it being swamp and forest.

The industrial life of the Ukraine centers in the Donetz region, in the extreme east. Here rich coal-fields and iron-mines are found in close juxtaposition. This has naturally favored the growth of industrial life in its modern sense. Accordingly, the Donetz region is a rapidly expanding industrial center, with a variety of iron and steel works, manufac-

ories of agricultural machinery, etc. Elsewhere industrial plants are mainly sugar-mills, distilleries, tanneries, and similar workers-up of raw materials.

THE FACTS ABOUT THE UKRAINE TERRITORIES

WHERE UKRAINE TERRITORIES ARE LOCATED

The Ukraine is the great belt of territory stretching from Poland in the west right across southern Russia to the middle Don River on the east, and bounded by the Black Sea on the south.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Eastern Galicia, Northeastern Hungary, Bukowina, and Southern Russia are the units that make up the Ukraine territory.

Its area is 300,000 square miles. 25,000 square miles of this lies in Austria-Hungary, and 275,000 square miles in Russia, or about the size of Texas and Louisiana combined. The Ukrainian population in this area is 30,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE UKRAINE TERRITORIES

The *Ukrainians* are found throughout the region. Almost everywhere they are peasants and urban workingmen, depressed by centuries of racial and religious persecution and economic exploitation. Of late, especially in Galicia, they have evolved the beginnings of an intellectual and middle class, taking advantage of every possible opportunity in a way which shows the race possessed of good latent capacity. This they also show by their tenacious hold upon their racial and cultural identity despite unexampled hostile pressure.

The *Great Russians* are found in southern Russia. In most districts they compose the upper classes, and throughout they are the officials. Many of these upper-class Great Russians

are Russified Ukrainians. There are also numerous colonies of Great Russian peasants planted in the southern Russian plains, and a considerable infiltration of Great Russian workmen into the new industrial centers of southern Russia, especially the Donetz coal and iron area.

The *Poles* are found in eastern Galicia. They are the landowning nobility, townsfolk, and most of the officials.

The *Jews* are found in eastern Galicia, Bukowina, and adjacent provinces of Russia. They are traders, usurers and artisans, especially in the towns. They are economically very keen, politically depressed, socially persecuted.

The *Magyars* are found in northeastern Hungary. They are the landowning gentry and officials and are politically dominant.

Other elements are found mostly in southern Russia. The colonization of the southern Russian steppes north of the Black Sea since the overthrow of Tatar domination in the late eighteenth century, while mainly done by Ukrainians, has brought in many racial elements, so that to-day the extreme south of Russia is studded with agricultural colonies of Great Russians, Germans, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, etc. Also, along the Black Sea coast and in the Crimean Peninsula are considerable remnants of the Tatar population.

WHO CONTROLLED UKRAINE TERRITORIES BEFORE THE WAR

Eastern Galicia, Bukowina, and northeastern Hungary were under Austro-Hungarian control. Southern Russia was under Russian control.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED UKRAINE TERRITORIES SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Eastern Galicia and Bukowina have been fiercely contested battle-grounds, alternately occupied by Austro-Hungarians and Russians, according to the fortunes of war. In the

autumn of 1917 they were entirely reconquered by the Austro-Hungarians.

Northeastern Hungary has remained in Austro-Hungarian control except for a few Cossack raids in early 1915.

Southern Russia, up to the beginning of 1918, remained entirely under Russian control except for a few border raids of Austro-Hungarian troops, although an Austro-German invasion appeared imminent.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN THE UKRAINE TERRITORIES ¹

Political. Russia has hitherto considered the retention of her present Ukrainian territories as vital to her national life. The creation of an independent Ukraina would shear away all southern Russia from the present Russian Empire and would exclude the Great Russians from the Black Sea. The richest provinces of Russia would be lost. In fact, many Russians consider it necessary to annex eastern Galicia and Bukowina, contending that so long as any portion of the Ukrainian race is outside the Russian frontiers it will inevitably develop into a center of Ukrainian nationalism, which will threaten to disrupt the Russian Empire.

Economic. Russia's Ukrainian provinces are the richest part of European Russia. Within them lies most of Russia's famous Black Earth belt, which is the great wheat-growing region of the Empire, while the chief Russian coal- and iron-fields (the Donetz basin) fall mainly within the Ukrainian race-area.

Strategic. The creation of an independent Ukraina would draw a frontier right across central Russia to the River Don and would exclude Russia from the Black Sea. In fact, it would have upon Russia the same disastrous effects that the success of the Confederacy would have had upon the United States.

Racial. Most Great Russians deny that the Ukrainians are

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

a separate people and assert that they must be indissolubly connected with the Russian state.

Cultural. Most Great Russians deny that the Ukrainians have a separate language and culture.

Religious. Both Great Russians and Ukrainians belong to the Greek Orthodox Church.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN UKRAINE TERRITORIES

Political. The creation of an Ukrainia, with its attendant disruption of Russia, would be an immense advantage to Austria-Hungary. Her eastern neighbor, instead of the present huge Russian Empire, would then be a moderate-sized state, probably friendly to Austria through fear of Great Russian attempts to reconquer Ukrainia. Of course Austria would probably have to surrender eastern Galicia and Bukovina to the new Ukrainia, but this sacrifice would probably be made cheerfully in view of the immense attendant political advantages to be gained.

Economic. An independent Ukrainia, probably hostile to Russia, would open a vast field for Austrian trade and capital.

Strategic. An Ukrainia would make a perfect buffer-state, absolutely safeguarding Austria-Hungary's eastern frontier.

Racial. Even after the surrender of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, the Ukrainian inhabited districts of northeastern Hungary would remain under Austro-Hungarian jurisdiction. But these districts are relatively small, and the range of the Carpathian Mountains intervening between them and the main body of the Ukrainian race makes such a natural frontier that serious trouble would probably be avoided.

Cultural. Slight.

Religious. Slight.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN UKRAINE TERRITORIES

Germany, like Austria-Hungary, would benefit greatly from the establishment of an independent Ukrainia and the conse-

quent disruption of the present Russian Empire. Such an Ukrainia would probably look to Germany as a protector against Great Russian encroachments. Ukrainia would thus offer a rich field for German trade and economic penetration.

SOME SOLUTIONS THAT MAY BE PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would imply placing a great majority of the Ukrainians under Russia; East Galicia and Bukowina under Austria, and the Ukrainian districts south of the Carpathians under Hungary. This would involve disappointment to the Ukrainian nationalist aspirations.

As regards the parts going to Russia, the degree of bitterness of the Ukrainians would depend upon whether Russia is autocratic or liberal, although, owing to the peculiar geographical location of Ukrainia, it is doubtful whether even a liberal Russia would grant the degree of autonomy which most Ukrainians demand as it would cut Russia off from the Black Sea.

As regards the parts going to Austria-Hungary, the Ukrainians in these territories would probably follow the attitude of the main body of the race in Russia while, being so few in numbers, they probably would not take a divergent attitude.

2. *Independent Ukrainia.*

This would certainly include both Russian and Austrian Ukrainians but probably not the small Ukrainian population south of the Carpathians which is under Hungary, as this would form a geographically unnatural extension of frontier. These people have a very imperfect race consciousness.

Such a solution would satisfy Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. It would be especially pleasing to Austria-Hungary and Germany, so they would back it up. Practically, it would

be a buffer state and would break up the economic area of Russia. It would offer a good outlet for German capital. It would restore the Medieval trade route between the Black Sea and the Baltic via the Dnieper (which made the glory of Kieff). This trade route would be used by Germany and Austria-Hungary. It would make Russia the implacable enemy of the new State.

3. *Autonomous Ukrainia under Russia.*

This solution is unlikely. Russia would not want to release her direct hold on the valuable economic resources of this area, nor lose direct access to the Black Sea.

4. *Autonomous Ukrainia under Austria-Hungary.*

This would probably be ruled by a cadet branch of the Hapsburg House. It would probably satisfy most Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have long looked to the Hapsburgs as their possible liberators from the Great Russians. Since Russia would be the irreconcilable enemy of an independent Ukrainian State this would bind it to Austria-Hungary.

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
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THE BALKANS
ITALIA IRREDENTA



CHAPTER X

ITALIA IRREDENTA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Beyond Italy's northeastern frontier, in Austrian territory, lie several areas inhabited by Italian-speaking populations that are claimed by most Italians as kinsmen who have been lost out of the main body of Italian life, but must be brought back into the Italian state.

These areas, which are geographically separate from one another, are: Trentino, Küstenland, and Dalmatia. Their historical pasts are so unlike as to require separate treatment.

TRENTINO

The main chain of the Alps runs like a giant arch from the Franco-Italian Riviera to the head of the Adriatic and incloses within its span the Lombardo-Venetian plains of northern Italy, but here and there it throws spurs southward into these plains, the most prominent of these being known as southern Tyrol. Southern Tyrol forms a mountainous triangle the southern apex of which reaches far into the Italian plain, almost to the city of Verona. The northern part of this triangle is inhabited by Germans who flowed over the historic Brenner Pass and Teutonized the region at the fall of the Roman Empire. But the Latin element maintained itself in the southern apex, which is the Trentino district, and as a result it is to-day inhabited by a virtually solid Italian population. It is this Italian-speaking district which is claimed by Italians on racial and cultural grounds, though many Italians make a further claim to the whole of southern Tyrol up to the

main chain of the Alps at the Brenner Pass, which would constitute for Italy an ideal strategic frontier in this sector.

Trentino, the chief city of which is Trent, has had little political connection with Italy since Roman times. During the Middle Ages, it was a bishopric of the Holy Roman Empire, or the medieval German Empire, and enjoyed a position of semi-independence. The Congress of Vienna (1814) awarded it to Austria, which has held it ever since.

KÜSTENLAND

This peninsula, jutting into the Adriatic just east of the Italian frontier, is a jumble of mountains rising sharply out of the sea. After the fall of the Roman Empire the mountainous interior was occupied by Slav tribes (Slovenes and Croats). The old Latin population was confined to the narrow coast-line and port towns. During the Middle Ages Istria was divided between Austria and the Republic of Venice. Austria secured the major part, including the chief Istrian city, Trieste, which has been Austrian since 1382. The Congress of Vienna assigned the whole to Austria in 1814. The Italian element has long been losing ground before the Slavs, who to-day number some sixty-six per cent. of the total population as against an Italian thirty-three per cent. Even Trieste, owing to its development as a great world port, has lost the exclusively Italian character it once had, the lower classes having become increasingly Slav, while the business element is now largely Austro-German. The population of Trieste in 1900 was 229,000. Of this number 170,000, or seventy-four per cent., were Italians; 43,000, or nineteen per cent., were Slovene; 11,000, or five per cent., were Germans. The fact that Trieste is the natural outlet to the Mediterranean for both Austria and Germany gives Istria great economic and political importance.

DALMATIA

The east coast of the Adriatic is a rugged mountain wall with a fringe of rocky islands. Before modern metaled roads and railways this mountain wall almost entirely cut off the Balkan hinterland from its natural sea-frontage on the Adriatic. This narrow line of coast territory is Dalmatia. Thus cut off from the back-country, it has led a historical life apart. Dalmatia was entirely Latin under the Roman Empire, but it was invaded by Serbo-Croat Slavs in the ninth century, and the Latin element was thereafter confined to the islands and port towns. But in the early Middle Ages most of Dalmatia fell under the sway of the Venetian Republic, which spread a veneer of Italian culture over the Dalmatian Slavs, even though it failed to extend to them the Italian language. The Vienna Congress assigned Dalmatia to Austria in 1814. During the last half-century the Dalmatian Slavs have awakened to such aggressive political and cultural life that Italianism has been almost destroyed. The Italian population during this period declined from ten per cent. to three per cent. Only in the towns of Zara and Spalato and on a few islands is the population to-day predominantly Italian.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

TRENTINO

Trentino is a mountainous district with little fertile land. The chief agricultural occupations are wine-growing and fruit-raising. The mountain slopes afford a certain amount of good summer pasturage for herds of milch-cows. The district is poor in minerals. The only important industry is silk-spinning, which is carried on in the towns, especially Trent and Rovereto.

KÜSTENLAND

Economically, as well as geographically, Küstenland divides into three separate areas: Görz-Gradisca, Istria, and the City of Trieste.

Görz-Gradisca is a region of hills covered with vineyards, while its numerous valleys, notably that of the River Isonzo, are dotted with fruit orchards and mulberry plantations supporting the silkworms the product of which supplies the numerous silk-spinning establishments of the towns.

The Istrian peninsula is a region of varied agricultural products. Its mountainous interior is largely covered with forests, which occupy about one-third of its entire surface. The cultivated land of the interior is given over to cereal crops, wheat, maize, oats, and rye. The narrow coast littorals, warmed and sheltered by the overhanging mountains, are devoted to wine-growing, olive-groves, and fruit-raising. All these products are of high quality. Many of the Istrian wines are famous, while Istrian olive-oil has been prized since ancient times. The best known fruit products are figs and melons. Cattle-raising is also an important occupation of the inland, while the coast population is further employed in fishing and

the gathering of sea salt. No large towns or industries exist.

Trieste is a highly specialized urban district set in the solidly rural Istrian area. It owes its character not to its immediate surroundings, but to its functions as chief seaport of Austria and the natural outlet for central Europe's trade with the Mediterranean and Near East. It is, in fact, a typical world-port, with extensive docks, great shipyards, machine-shops, and other manufacturing plants of a metropolitan center.

DALMATIA

The ancient fertility of Dalmatia has greatly decreased in modern times, probably owing to the destruction of the magnificent forests which once clothed its steep mountains. However, where the thin soil of the hill-slopes still remains, olive-groves, vineyards, and fruit orchards produce valuable crops. One important local specialty is the Dalmatian cherry, from which is distilled the celebrated maraschino cordial. The fisheries, including sponge and coral-beds, are valuable, and employ a considerable part of the population. There is some house-industry in the towns, but of merely local importance.

THE FACTS ABOUT TRENTINO

WHERE TRENTINO IS LOCATED

Trentino is the southern apex of the triangle of southern Tyrol territory which projects into the Po Valley between Lombardy and Venetia.

DIFFERENT RACES IN TRENTINO

The *Italians* are found throughout Trentino, and constitute virtually the entire population of all classes save officials. They are politically depressed.

The *Austrian Germans* are mainly found as officials and

garrison troops, being only a small part of the population. They are politically dominant.

WHO CONTROLLED TRENTINO BEFORE THE WAR

Austria.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED TRENTINO SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Austria has maintained control of Trentino except for a few frontier posts occupied by Italian troops.

AUSTRIA'S INTERESTS IN TRENTINO

Political. Trentino has been politically associated with Austria for centuries, and there is therefore the force of tradition binding Austrian interests to this territory.

Economic. Trentino is a mountainous country. A little wine, fruit, and silk comprise the list of its valuable products.

Strategic. Its strategic value to Austria lies in the fact that this mountain barricade projecting into the Italian plains enables Austria to threaten the whole Po Valley. It also has high defensive value, for its powerful fortifications render an Italian invasion of Austria northward over the Brenner Pass virtually impossible.

Racial. Claims of race are slight.

Cultural. Virtually none.

Religious. Both Austria and Italy are Roman Catholic countries. The religious interest is negligible.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN TRENTINO

Political. Italy claims Trentino as "naturally" Italian in every respect, and therefore rightly belonging to the main body of the Italian state.

Economic. The interests of trade and natural resources are slight.

Strategic. The possession of Trentino would enable Italy to guard against an Austrian surprise attack upon the Po Valley. It would also enable Italy to throw her whole weight against Austria farther to the east (Trieste, etc.) instead of, as now, having to keep heavy reserves about Trentino to guard against an Austrian counter-stroke, which might cut off Italy's eastern armies and doom them to destruction.

Racial. The population of Trentino is thoroughly Italian.

Cultural. The culture of Trentino is thoroughly Italian.

Religious. The religious interest is negligible.

THE FACTS ABOUT KÜSTENLAND

WHERE KÜSTENLAND IS LOCATED

Küstenland is located in the valley of the Isonzo and in the adjacent Istrian peninsula, lying next to Italy's eastern frontier.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Isonzo and *Istria*, politically united, make up the Austrian province of Küstenland.

Its area is 3078 square miles, or about that of the combined areas of Rhode Island and Delaware. Its population numbers 922,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN KÜSTENLAND

The *Italians* constitute thirty-three per cent. of the population throughout the territory. They constitute the majority in the towns and along the coast. Formerly dominant in every respect, during the last half-century their former political and cultural supremacy has been undermined by the Yugo-Slavs, while their former economic preponderance has been impaired by the Austro-Germans.

The *Yugo-Slavs*—that is, the Slovenes and Croats—con-

stitute sixty-six per cent. of the population and are found throughout the territory. They are in the majority in the mountainous interior, which begins just back from the coast. They are mostly peasants, although they are fast drifting into the towns and there swelling the urban working classes. A political, economic, and cultural aggressiveness is lifting them out of their former depressed condition.

The *Austro-Germans* constitute only one per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the territory in the towns. Besides the officials, who control the political situation, there is a rapidly growing Austro-German commercial upper class in the towns, especially Trieste, where they are fast coming to dominate commercial life.

WHO CONTROLLED KÜSTENLAND BEFORE THE WAR Austria.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED KÜSTENLAND SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Austria has maintained her control of this region except for the lower Isonzo Valley, which was in Italian hands from the summer of 1915 to the autumn of 1917, when it again passed under Austrian control through the big Teutonic drive.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN KÜSTENLAND

Political. Austria considers the political control of Küstenland as vitally necessary to her future. Its loss would cut off Austria from direct access to the sea. Her sole remaining outlet would then be through the Hungarian port of Fiume, and even this outlet would lie wholly at Italy's mercy. Austria-Hungary would cease to be a naval power and would lose all influence in the Adriatic, Albania, and related regions.

Economic. The internal economic value of Küstenland is slight, but its value as Austria's only commercial sea-gate to

the outer world is regarded as vital. That specific sea-gate is the city of Trieste, a world-port with 229,000 inhabitants in 1900 and a great increase since. Deprived of Trieste, Austria's export trade would have to pass through foreign territory, and would thus be by the grace of foreign powers.

Strategic. The strategic value of Küstenland to both Austria and Hungary is incalculable. Were Küstenland in Italian possession, Austria-Hungary would cease to exist as a naval power. Even its sea-borne commerce would lie entirely at Italy's mercy, for Hungary's port of Fiume would be only a few miles east of the new Italian frontier and would be absolutely bottled up between the Istrian peninsula, tipped by the great war-port of Pola, and the Quarnero Islands, which inevitably would go to Italy along with Küstenland. The loss of Küstenland would also deprive Austria-Hungary of its present fine strategic frontier against Italy, and would open the way to possible Italian invasions of the great Danubian hinterlands which lie beyond the protecting belt of coastal mountains.

Racial. The official classes of Küstenland are mostly Austrian Germans. There is also a sprinkling of Austro-German population throughout the towns, especially Trieste, where the Germanic element numbers over five per cent. of the inhabitants.

Cultural. The Germanic element, owing to its being exclusively upper class and representing official life, exerts a cultural influence disproportionate to its numbers. It has succeeded in impressing a distinctly Austrian character on the towns of this region, particularly Trieste.

Religious. All the races of Küstenland being Roman Catholic, there is no clash of religious interests.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN KÜSTENLAND

Political. Italy feels that the Isonzo Valley and the Istrian peninsula, with its dependent island-chain of the

Quarnero, are her "natural" limits, boundaries traced by nature, and necessary to assure her a good frontier and that Adriatic supremacy which she claims is her just due. In Italian eyes Austria is an interloper upon the Adriatic seaboard, and Italians contend that Austria must be expelled before Italy can take her place as a Mediterranean great power, with her exposed eastern flank secure. Possession of the Austrian Küstenland, with its corollary, Austria's disappearance from the Adriatic, would also enable Italy to assert preponderance on the Adriatic's eastern, or Balkan, shore, particularly in Albania.

Economic. Possession of Küstenland would enable Italy to dictate the terms on which Austria-Hungary's export trade should reach the sea. This would help Italy in many foreign markets where she and Austria are to-day trade rivals, particularly in the Balkans and the Near East.

Strategic. Possession of Küstenland would make Italy mistress of the Adriatic and would eliminate the fleet of her chief naval competitor, Austria-Hungary. It would give Italy a fine natural frontier against Austria-Hungary, eliminating the chance of an Austrian invasion of Venetia and giving Italy an opportunity for powerful counter-strokes from this secure strategic base.

Racial. The population of Küstenland is one third Italian in race.

Cultural. Italy claims that the culture of Küstenland is fundamentally Italian. She denies that the Yugo-Slavs of this region have any native culture of their own, and asserts that under Italian rule they would quickly become Italianized, thus turning Küstenland into a thoroughly Italian country.

Religious. The religious interest is not an important factor.

YUGO-SLAV INTERESTS IN KÜSTENLAND

Detailed topical discussion of Yugo-Slav interests in Küstenland can be found in the Yugo-Slav chapter.

THE FACTS ABOUT DALMATIA

WHERE DALMATIA IS LOCATED

Dalmatia is made up of the long and narrow east coast of the Adriatic, including its island fringe from the Istrian peninsula down to Montenegro. The narrowness of the region can be appreciated by its 210 miles of length, as contrasted with its width, which is only 35 miles at the widest point. In many places only a few miles of territory intervene between the sea and the crest of the overhanging mountains.

Its area is 4956 square miles, or about the size of Connecticut. Its population is 660,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN DALMATIA

The *Italians* constitute only three per cent. of the population. Except on some of the outlying islands, the Italian element is found only in the towns, and even here they constitute solely the upper class except at Zara and Spalato. They are rapidly declining in numbers and influence before the Slavs.

The *Yugo-Slavs* (Croats) constitute ninety-seven per cent. of the population. By reason of this overwhelming majority, they are rapidly increasing in power in every way.

The *Austrian Germans* are very few in numbers. They are almost entirely officials and soldiers.

WHO CONTROLLED DALMATIA BEFORE THE WAR

Austria.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED DALMATIA SINCE THE
WAR BEGAN

Austria.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN DALMATIA

Political. Austria regards the political control of Dalmatia as essential to her position in the Adriatic and considers it the natural pendant to her provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just back of the coastal mountains which form Dalmatia's land frontier. Possession of Dalmatia also enables Austria to hold the whip-hand over Montenegro and to maintain her influence in near-by Albania.

Economic. Although there are a few fertile districts, the intrinsic economic value of Dalmatia is not great. Furthermore, until costly railroad lines are built over or through the rugged eastern mountain-wall, Dalmatia cannot serve as an economic outlet for its Bosnian and Serb hinterlands.

Strategic. Dalmatia's chief value to Austria is regarded as strategic. It contains many fine naval bases. Cattaro, at its extreme southern end, is one of the most impregnable naval fortresses in the world.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN DALMATIA

Political. Italian imperialists claim Dalmatia as naturally Italian. Other Italians concede that this is not the case. But nearly all Italians assert the great importance of Dalmatia for Italy. Possession of Dalmatia would rivet Italy's cherished claim to Adriatic supremacy and give Italy a valuable foothold in the Balkans.

Economic. Dalmatia would offer a good base for railroad lines into the Balkans. If these were built under Italian

auspices, it would be an important step toward Italy's projected economic penetration of the Balkan peninsula. It would tap the large adjacent hinterlands and divert much trade to Italian hands.

Strategic. Dalmatia's naval bases, especially Cattaro, in Italian hands, would virtually preclude a hostile fleet from passing up or down the Adriatic.

Racial. The Italian element of Dalmatia numbers only about three per cent. of the total population. It is rapidly dwindling before the Slavs. Half a century ago it numbered nearly ten per cent. To-day it dominates only in the towns of Zara and Spalato and on a few islands.

Cultural. Italian imperialists claim that the culture of Dalmatia is entirely Italian, that the Dalmatian Slavs have no native culture of their own, and that, once under Italian rule, these Slavs would ultimately become Italians.

Religious. None.

YUGO-SLAV INTERESTS IN DALMATIA

The interests of the Yugo-Slavs in Dalmatia are discussed in the Yugo-Slav chapter.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

THE TERRITORY CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave all of Italy's irredentist aspirations unsatisfied, and make impossible the realization of a Yugo-Slav state. It would leave Austria in a strategic position for domination of the Balkans and the Adriatic and assure Austria an economic outlet to the Mediterranean and the Near East.

2. *Annexation of Trentino, Küstenland and Dalmatia to Italy.*

This would fulfil completely the dream of the irredentists of Italy, uniting all the Italian populations of the Adriatic region in the Italian state. It would protect Italy from invasion from the north and northeast by giving her a highly defensible frontier. Possession of the Dalmatian mountain-chain would protect Italy against attack by a possible Yugo-Slav state. It would mean her absolute mastery of the Adriatic and her probable control of Albania. Through her possession of Trieste and her dominance of the Adriatic, she would control the natural trade-route of Austria-Hungary and Germany to the Mediterranean and the Near East.

Owing to the large Slav majorities in Küstenland and Dalmatia, however, this would throw more Slavs under Italian rule than there now are Italians under Austrian rule, thus creating an inverse irredentism.

The one thing that could tone down, if not eliminate, the economic stricture upon Austro-Hungarian and German commerce in its outlet to the Adriatic would be some genuine guaranty that freedom of access to the sea would be assured. This presupposes a development of really workable machinery for international control.

TRENTINO CONSIDERED ALONE

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave northern Italy open to Austrian invasion in the future and leave the irredentist dreams of Italy regarding this region unsatisfied.

2. *Annexation of Trentino to Italy, and the Part of Southern Tyrol Between Trentino and Brenner Pass to Austria.*

This would be equitable on racial grounds. Italy would get the Italian-speaking part of southern Tyrol; that is, the Trentino. Austria would retain the German-speaking part

to the northward. Austria would still hold the superior position, but Italy's frontier would be improved from the point of view of defensibility.

3. *Annexation of Southern Tyrol to the Brenner Pass to Italy.*

This would give Italy an ideal strategic frontier; but it would violate the racial principle in favor of Italy as much as the *status quo* favored Austria, since an intensely self-conscious, German-speaking population would be brought under Italian rule.

KÜSTENLAND CONSIDERED ALONE

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave Küstenland in Austrian hands. It would assure Austria an economic outlet to the sea at Trieste and give Austria a strategic frontier against Italy. It would leave Italian aspirations unsatisfied. No racial question is involved for Austria.

2. *Annexation of Küstenland to Italy.*

This would satisfy Italy's aspirations for the thirty-three per cent. Italian part of the population. It would deprive Austria of a sea outlet and disappoint South Slav hopes.

3. *Division along Racial Lines between Italy and a Yugo-Slav State.*

This would be racially just and not difficult to effect, as race lines are fairly distinct. It would result, however, in almost impossible frontiers. The economic problem would be difficult, since Trieste would have no Italian hinterland.

4. *Inclusion of Küstenland in a Yugo-Slav State.*

This would satisfy the Yugo-Slavs, disappoint the Italians,

and bottle up Austria. It would throw the important seaport of Trieste into the hands of a small state.

DALMATIA CONSIDERED ALONE

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would leave Dalmatia in Austrian hands. It would disappoint Italy and the Yugo-Slavs. It would assure Austria an upper hand in the Adriatic through control of the best war ports and harbors, Cattaro in particular.

2. *Annexation of Dalmatia to Italy.*

This would satisfy Italy, disappoint the Yugo-Slavs, and bottle up Austria.

3. *Annexation of Dalmatia to a Yugo-Slav State.*

This would assure a Yugo-Slav state its natural coast frontage, but would disappoint Italy and make possible a naval rivalry between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs in the Adriatic in the event that the Yugo-Slavs should develop sea-power.

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
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THE BALKANS
YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES



MAP II. YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES

CHAPTER XI
YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The ancestors of the Yugo-Slavs, or South Slav peoples, reached their present seats during the great migration period of the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. At that time countless swarms of Slavonic barbarians flooded southeastern Europe. They were then a relatively homogeneous type, but the mountainous character of the country in which they settled marked them off into separate population groups, which at once began a slow process of differentiation that in some cases went to a marked extent. The Bulgarians in the extreme eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula, for instance, broke away entirely from the parent stock and became a separate type, while at the northern extremity of the South Slav area the Slovenes fell under German influence and followed a distinct line of development, although not so divergent as in the case of the Bulgarians.

The main body of the South Slavs, however, never split up irremediably. Settled in the western Balkans and adjacent regions to the north, they maintained a fundamental unity of language and customs. They would probably have remained consciously one people but for the fact that the tribes settled on the Balkan shore of the Adriatic (Dalmatia) and the region just to the north (Croatia-Slavonia) accepted Christianity from Rome and civilization from western Europe, whereas the Yugo-Slavs of the Balkan interior (Serbia) took their Christianity and civilization from Byzantine Constantinople. The result was that the former people, the modern

Croats, became Roman Catholic, with a western European point of view, while the latter, the modern Serbs, became Orthodox Greek Christians, with an eastern European point of view. Different alphabets, literatures, historic connections, and economic ties united in tending to widen the breach between the two main branches of the Yugo-Slav race.

The Croats were the first to develop politically, building up a regular state in the early Middle Ages. But this state had a brief existence. It soon fell under the control of the Magyars of Hungary. The Dalmatian Croats, separated from their northern brethren, and their Serb kinsmen to the east by a range of almost impassable mountains, were too much scattered along their narrow strip of coast-land ever to attain political unity. Consequently most of them fell under the rule of the Venetian Republic. In the fourteenth century the Serbs developed a really powerful empire, which, under their Emperor Stephen Dushan, dominated the whole Balkan peninsula. But Dushan's empire fell to pieces after his death, and the whole Serb branch of the Yugo-Slav race soon sank under the iron rule of the Turks. The Croats saved themselves from a similar fate by putting themselves under the Hapsburg rulers of Austria.

The Turkish conquest of the Serbs dealt another blow to the race unity of the Yugo-Slavs. Despite degrading persecutions, the population in Serbia proper remained true to its Orthodox faith; but in the intermediate region between Serbia and Croatia (the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina) a large part of the population turned Mohammedan and became such fanatical followers of Islam that they lost all sense of race solidarity with their Serb or Croat relatives. It was the Bosnian Mohammedans who upheld Turkish power against Austrian pressure into the Balkans during the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.

Austria's progress in the Balkans was greatly furthered by the acquisition of Dalmatia, awarded her by the Vienna Con-

gress of 1814. Indeed, the Austrian statesman Metternich appears to have considered the idea of uniting the whole Yugo-Slav race under the Hapsburg crown. But the Orthodox Serbs of the Balkans had no desire to become subjects of the Catholic emperors at Vienna. They had long looked to Orthodox Slav Russia to deliver them from the Turkish yoke. Their drooping spirits were constantly revived by the spectacle of a Serb islet of freedom standing secure above the Moslem flood, the small principality of Montenegro, which the Turks had never been able to subdue. All this, together with increasing Turkish weakness, accounts for the Serbian national rising in 1804. After many vicissitudes, and thanks largely to Russian aid, this national rising ended in the establishment of an autonomous Serbia in 1830 and in the formal independence of Turkey in 1879. During the nineteenth century the Serbian state slowly grew in power and prosperity, although its progress was impeded by the turbulence of its internal political life.

As Serbia became more powerful she began to aspire to unite all the Serbs in a single national state. As things then stood, more than half the Serbs remained under Turkish rule in Old Serbia and Novibazar to the south and in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the west. Toward the close of the nineteenth century this Pan-Serb idea became merged in the larger concept of Yugo-Slav unity. The nineteenth century, the era of nationalities, had aroused all the South Slav peoples to a quickened race consciousness, and had made them remember their ancient race unity, which had long been obscured by differences of religion and civilization and by divergent historical development. Thus certain elements among both Serbs and Croats came to dream of a Yugo-Slavia which should unite all the South Slav peoples into a single national state. Even the Slovenes, hitherto politically quiescent and half-Germanized, began to stir slightly at the call of Yugo-Slav propaganda.

All this naturally alarmed Austria-Hungary, whose integrity would be threatened by any such development. Since Serbia was the obvious champion of the Yugo-Slav idea, Austrian policy became directed against any further accession of Serbian strength. In 1908, Austria dealt Serbia a crushing blow by formally annexing the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces had, it is true, been under Austrian military occupation since 1878, but Serbia herself had hoped eventually to annex these nominal dependencies of the Turkish Empire.

Henceforth the Yugo-Slav question became involved in the general tangle of European politics which preceded the Great War. Backed up by Russia, Serbia made no concealment of her dream of effecting Yugo-Slav unity, while Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany and convinced that the success of Serbia's Yugo-Slav program meant the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, resolved to avert this deadly peril by crushing Serbia at the first favorable moment. The Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 greatly increased Serbian power and made Austria more implacable. The result was that the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia, in June, 1914, precipitated a general explosion.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The lands inhabited wholly or partly by the Yugo-Slav race present such diverse features of soil, climate, and natural resources that the several units of territory require separate treatment.

SERBIA

The area here discussed includes only those territories constituting the Kingdom of Serbia as it existed prior to the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The territories acquired by Serbia

in those years are treated in the chapter on Macedonia. These Macedonian territories, with the exception of the region known as Old Serbia, lying immediately to the south of the Kingdom of Serbia, as it existed before 1912, are Bulgarian rather than Yugo-Slav in population. They do not, therefore, fall technically within the scope of this chapter, devoted to the Yugo-Slav racial area.

Serbia proper is a land of hills and mountains, among which numerous rivers, notably the Morava, wind their ways. These fertile river valleys are industriously tilled by a race of hardy yeoman farmers, although their agricultural methods are somewhat primitive. About two fifths of the country is under cultivation, the total agricultural yield reaching considerable proportions. Corn is the great cereal staple, serving both as food for the people and as feed for the numerous domestic animals. Other important crops are wheat, barley, oats, rye, and tobacco. Fruit grows well, especially the plum, from which is distilled a brandy known as *slivovitza*, which is the national drink.

For the world at large, however, Serbian agriculture is less important than Serbian live stock. In proportion to its size, Serbia has more live stock than any other country in Europe. Numerous herds of pigs fatten in the extensive beech and oak forests, while the barer hill-slopes afford pasturage for great flocks of sheep and goats. Live animals and meat products are the most important of Serbia's exports. At the end of 1910 Serbia possessed: Sheep, 3,808,815; pigs, 863,544; goats, 627,427; horned cattle, 957,918; horses, 152,617.

The forests of Serbia play an important part in the economic life of the country. They occupy nearly a third of the total area. They serve as a feeding-ground for swine, and are the sources of valuable timber products.

Serbia also has considerable mineral resources. Her copper-mines rank among the richest in Europe. Valuable coal-fields exist. There are a few gold deposits of some value. In

1911 the output of these mineral products was: Copper ore, 7,023 metric tons; coal, 235,058 metric tons; gold, 422 kilograms.

With better communications and more capital, Serbia's mineral output might be still further increased.

Industry is distinctly backward. The Serb does not take kindly to factory life. Such industries as do exist are carried on by foreign workmen. The principal industries in the modern sense are meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and tanning. There are certain old local industries, such as carpet-weaving, sandal-making, and leather working, but these are not carried on by modern methods, being still in the house-industry stage.

MONTENEGRO

Montenegro is a decidedly poor country. The western portion is a sterile mass of limestone crags, forming part of the famous "karst" region, which stretches along most of the east coast of the Adriatic Sea. Here nothing grows except brushwood and stunted scrub.

At certain places in eastern Montenegro are fertile valleys and small plains which bear good crops, mainly of corn, barley, buckwheat, and tobacco.

The eastern portion of Montenegro, though mountainous, is largely under forest. The woods are of good quality, but valueless, owing to lack of roads.

Considerable live stock is reared, largely sheep and goats.

Industry is virtually non-existent. Montenegro's whole life is very primitive and backward.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

North of Montenegro and west of Serbia lie the twin provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This country is very much richer than Montenegro and is probably better than Serbia

from an economic point of view. Bosnia-Herzegovina is predominantly hill country, but the percentage of valley and arable plateau is greater than in Serbia, while the sterile karst region is confined to the mountains bordering the Adriatic coast.

When Turkish rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina ended by the Austrian occupation of 1878 the country was in a deplorably backward condition; but the Austrian administration has set itself intelligently to the material development of the provinces, and to-day Bosnia-Herzegovina has reached a relatively high degree of prosperity. The chief thing which holds the country back is the extreme conservatism of the inhabitants, who dread innovations and cling to antiquated methods.

Even as it is, Bosnia-Herzegovina's fertile soil yields excellent and abundant agricultural products. The chief crops are corn, wheat, barley, oats, rye, millet, buckwheat, potatoes, flax, hemp, and tobacco. Fruit is extensively raised, especially the plum, from which, as in Serbia, *slivovitza* brandy is distilled. Wine of good quality is also produced.

Like Serbia, again, Bosnia-Herzegovina is an important stock-raising area. In 1910 there were in the country: Sheep, 2,499,422; goats, 1,393,068; horned cattle, 1,308,930; swine, 527,271; horses, 221,981.

The mineral wealth of Bosnia-Herzegovina is considerable; its exploitation, entirely negligible in 1878, has been greatly developed under Austrian rule. The principal mineral products are coal, iron, copper, chromium, quicksilver, and manganese. In 1912 statistics for certain minerals were: Coal, 852,920 tons; iron ore, 159,420 tons; manganese, 4,650 tons.

Since 1878 much capital has flowed into the country, and industrial life in the modern sense has taken definite root. There are to-day important iron and steel manufactures and various factories for chemicals, matches, sugar, and sundry minor products.

CROATIA-SLAVONIA

This land falls into four rather sharply contrasted geographical zones. In the extreme west is a narrow strip of coast-land fronting the Adriatic Sea. This sheltered coast strip enjoys a warm climate and its output is of typical Mediterranean products; citrus fruits, olive-oil, and wine.

Back of this narrow coast strip rise rugged mountains, mostly of the bare and sterile limestone karst type. Farther east and north is a wider belt of mountain and hill country, clothed in forest, and broken here and there by fertile valleys. In the extreme east the land sinks into flat plain, largely fertile agricultural country, but with considerable areas of swamp and fen.

With the exception of the Adriatic coast-line, the economic life is similar to that of Serbia. Agriculture and stock-raising are the two principal occupations of the people. As in Serbia, herds of swine fatten in the beech forests, while the abundant plum-crops are distilled into *slivovitza*.

Croatia-Slavonia is poor in minerals. Her industrial life is centered at Fiume, on the Adriatic. This city is Hungary's one outlet to the sea. Accordingly, the Hungarian Government has done much for its development. Fiume is to-day, therefore, a flourishing commercial and industrial center, with shipyards, iron works, and other industrial appurtenances of a modern port town. Another subsidiary industrial center is Agram, the local capital.

STYRIA, CARINTHIA, AND CARNIOLA

These three Austrian provinces, lying to the north of Croatia-Slavonia, are the northern border-lands of the Yugo-Slav race, the Slav element of their population being Slovenes. Styria and Carinthia fall mostly outside of the Yugo-Slav zone, the Slovenes occupying only the extreme southerly portions of the provinces, while the rest of the area is occupied

by Germans. Carniola, however, is almost solidly Slovene in population.

These provinces form a mountainous block with comparatively little agricultural land, most of the country being under forest. The mineral wealth of Styria and Carinthia is considerable, though it falls mostly outside the Slovene zone. Carniola is much less favored in respect to mineral wealth.

DALMATIA AND KÜSTENLAND

These provinces are considered in the chapter on Italia Irredenta.

THE FACTS ABOUT YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES

WHERE YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES ARE LOCATED

The territory of the Yugo-Slavs is an irregular block of territory in southeastern Europe, bounded on the north by the rivers Drave and Danube, on the west by Italy and the Adriatic Sea, on the south by Albania and Greece, and on the east by Bulgaria.

TERRITORIAL UNITS

Serbia, as before 1912, had an area of 18,650 square miles, or about the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined. Its population was 2,911,000 and almost solidly Yugo-Slav.

Old Serbia, Novi-Bazar, and Serbian Macedonia, Serb annexations in 1912-13, have an area of 15,241 square miles, or about the size of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut combined. Its population is about 1,600,000, mostly Yugo-Slav, excepting Macedonia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has an area of 19,768 square miles, or about the size of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island combined. Its population is about 1,898,000, solidly Yugo-

Slav, although the 626,000 Mohammedans, despite their blood, do not feel themselves Yugo-Slavs.

Montenegro, with territorial acquisitions of 1912-13, has an area of 5603 square miles, or about the size of Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined. Its population is about 516,000, solidly Yugo-Slav, except a few Albanian districts.

Croatia-Slavonia has an area of 16,421 square miles, or about the size of Massachusetts and New Hampshire combined. Its population is about 2,186,000, almost solidly Yugo-Slav.

Dalmatia has an area of 4956 square miles, or about the size of Connecticut. Its population is about 660,000, ninety-seven per cent. of which is Yugo-Slav.

Serbo-Croat districts in southern Hungary, especially the Banat of Temesvar. This region has an area of 3000 square miles, approximately. Its population is approximately 500,000, about sixty per cent. of which is Yugo-Slav.

Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Küstenland. Their area is about 19,574 square miles, or about the size of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island combined. The population is 3,311,000, fifty-five per cent. of which is Yugo-Slav.

The total area of these territories is 105,000 square miles, or about equaling the combined area of the Middle Atlantic States, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Its population totals 14,000,000. The Yugo-Slavs number 10,000,000, or seventy-one per cent. of the total population.

DIFFERENT RACES IN SERBIA (as before 1912)

Fully ninety-seven per cent. of the population is *Serbian* in blood. The only foreign elements worth mentioning are the small *Rumanian* population of the extreme northeastern districts bordering the Danube (see chapter on Greater Rumania) and a scattering of *Gypsies* and *Turks*.

DIFFERENT RACES IN OLD SERBIA, NOVI-BAZAR, AND SERBIAN
MACEDONIA (Serb annexations in 1912-13)

The *Serbs* are found mostly in Old Serbia and Novi-Bazar, where they form the bulk of the population. There are a few in Macedonia. Previous to 1912 they were a poverty-stricken peasantry, oppressed by their Turkish masters and terrorized by the Albanians. From 1912-13 the Serbs became the masters and retaliated upon their former oppressors and upon the Bulgarians of Macedonia. Since 1915 the Serbs are again oppressed, this time by the Bulgarians and Austro-Germans.

The *Bulgarians* form the bulk of the population in Macedonia. They are mostly peasants. Previous to 1912 they were oppressed by the Turks, from 1912 to 1915, oppressed by the Serbs, since 1915 they have been the masters of Macedonia.

The *Albanians* are found mostly in Old Serbia. For many years prior to 1912 the Turkish government had encouraged the immigration of Albanians to terrorize and supplant the Serbian population. In 1912, Old Serbia was dotted with Albanian colonies. From 1912-15 Serb proscriptions greatly reduced their numbers.

The *Turks* are found throughout. They were landed proprietors, townsfolk, officials, and garrison troops previous to 1912, and were politically dominant until then. Thereafter many were killed or emigrated.

The *Greeks* are found mostly in the towns. They are traders, shopkeepers, etc. In 1912 much of the business life of the country was in their hands. Since 1912 many have emigrated.

DIFFERENT RACES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The *Serbs* number about 856,000 and are found throughout. They are mostly peasants and are politically depressed.

The *Croats* number about 451,000 and are found throughout. They are mostly peasants, but there is among them a larger middle class than among their Serb kinsmen. They are better off politically and slightly more prosperous economically.

The *Mohammedans* number 626,000 and are found throughout. They compose all social classes. The landed gentry of Bosnia-Herzegovina is, however, nearly all Mohammedan. Politically favored by the Austrian government, they are prosperous and contented.

DIFFERENT RACES IN MONTENEGRO

Except for a few Albanian districts, the population is solidly *Serbian*.

DIFFERENT RACES IN CROATIA-SLAVONIA

Except for a very small *Magyar* population, mostly at the port of Fiume, the population is solidly *Yugo-Slav*. Of these, seventy-five per cent. are *Croats*, twenty-five per cent. are *Serbs*.

DIFFERENT RACES IN DALMATIA

Except for a small *Italian* population (three per cent.) in a few towns and islands, the population is solidly *Croat*.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE SERB DISTRICTS OF SOUTHERN HUNGARY, ESPECIALLY IN THE BANAT OF TEMESVAR

The *Serb* population is found in solid blocks, interspersed with other blocks of *Germans*, *Rumanians*, and *Magyars*. (See the chapter on Greater Rumania.)

DIFFERENT RACES IN STYRIA, CARINTHIA, CARNIOLA,
AND KÜSTENLAND

The *Slovenes* are found in Carniola, where they form the bulk of the population. From this center they overflow into southern Carinthia and Styria and northern Küstenland. They are mostly peasants, culturally backward, although of late years with a dawning race consciousness. They are much under German cultural influence, economically fairly prosperous, and politically contented.

The *Croats* are found in southern Küstenland. They are peasants, culturally and economically backward.

The *Germans* form the bulk of the population in Styria and Carinthia. They form a considerable minority in Carniola. There are a few in Küstenland. They are of all social classes, especially the aristocracy and townfolk, which classes are nearly all German, except in Küstenland, where only the officials and the business community of Trieste are German. They are politically dominant.

The *Italians* are found in Küstenland, along the coasts and in the towns. They are of all social classes and are politically depressed.

WHO CONTROLLED YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES BEFORE THE WAR

Serbia, Old Serbia, Novi-Bazar, and Serbian Macedonia were under Serbian control. Montenegro was under Montenegrin control. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, southern Hungary, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Küstenland were under Austro-Hungarian control.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES
SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Since the autumn of 1915 all the Yugo-Slav territories have been in the hands of the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians.

SERBIA'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES

Political. Although, as already explained in the historical background, Croats and Slovenes by no means see things eye to eye with Serbs on many points, nevertheless, Serbia is pre-eminently the representative and champion of Yugo-Slav unity. The Serbs dream of a united Yugoslavia, either directly under Serb dominance or as a federation in which Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shall form autonomous members of a larger political whole.

Such a state would be almost a first-class power. Stretching from the Danube Valley to Greece and from the Adriatic to Bulgaria, the new Yugoslavia would dominate the Balkans, control the southern Danubian area, and rival Italy on the Adriatic Sea.

Economic. The present Serbia is almost wholly an agricultural and stock-raising country of moderate economic value; but the wide areas claimed for Yugoslavia in Austria-Hungary contain lands of much higher agricultural richness, some mineral wealth, and, above all, control of one of the main trade-routes between central Europe and the Near East, the trade-route down the Adriatic from the ports of Trieste and Fiume.

Strategic. The strategic value of Serbia is high. The natural line of military advance from central Europe to the Balkans and Near East (and *vice versa*) runs via the Morava and Vardar valleys; that is, through the heart of Serbia. Could Serbia now obtain the Yugo-Slav lands of Austria-Hungary, her strategic situation would be vastly bettered, while her new Adriatic frontage would give her a secure base for the creation and upbuilding of sea-power.

Racial. Both the Croats and Slovenes are of the same race-stock as the Serbs.

Cultural. Despite the fact that the Croats and Slovenes took their civilization from the Roman West instead of from

the Byzantine East, as did the Serbs, the languages, customs, and basic ideas of all three peoples are closely akin.

Religion. Religion is the great stumbling-block to Yugo-Slav unity. Religion plays a leading part in the formation of nationality in eastern Europe. Accordingly, the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes tend through their religion to draw apart from their Orthodox Serb brethren, while the Mohammedans of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite their pure Yugo-Slav blood, regard their Serb and Croat kinsmen with fear and hatred, experiencing no sentiment of race identity.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES

Political. For Austria-Hungary, retention of her Yugo-Slav provinces is vital to her continued existence. Their loss would shear away a large part of the empire, and would entirely exclude her from the sea. On the other hand, annexation of, or lasting control over, Serbia, would ensure her domination over the Balkans and would open the road to the Near East.

Economic. Austria-Hungary's one sea trade-route is down the Adriatic via the ports of Trieste and Fiume. This route is jeopardized by Yugo-Slav aspirations. On the other hand, possession of Serbia would assure Austria-Hungary the Balkan markets, and would give her a favored position for the economic penetration of the whole Near East.

Strategic. The loss of her Yugo-Slav provinces would annihilate Austria-Hungary's sea-power, and would draw a hostile frontier athwart the middle Danube Valley perilously close to Vienna and Budapest. On the other hand, annexation of Serbia and Montenegro would make Austria-Hungary absolutely secure to south and east from any possible attack.

Racial. Annexation of Serbia and Montenegro would bring the whole Yugo-Slav race inside the Austro-Hungarian fron-

tiers, thus in a certain inverse sense solving the problem of Yugo-Slav unity.

Cultural. Slight.

Religious. Slight.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORY

Germany's political, economic, and strategic interests are, in their broader aspects, virtually the same as those of Austria-Hungary.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORIES ¹

Political. Russia has long considered itself the protector of its Yugo-Slav "little brothers." Russia's aims at Balkan hegemony and leadership of the Slav world are bound up with the continued independence of Serbia and the prospects of Yugoslavia. The destruction of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire, implied in the creation of a united Yugoslavia, would eliminate Russia's old rival in the Near East.

Economic. The economic interest is slight. There are no natural trade-routes between Russia and the western Balkans. Russia and Serbia are both primarily agricultural states and feel no need of each other's produce. Russia's manufactured goods cannot compete in the Serbian market against those of other nations.

Strategic. A friendly Serbia, necessarily dependent upon Russia, and still more a friendly Yugoslavia, would give Russia an invaluable ally in southeastern Europe, and would insure Russian hegemony over that whole area.

Racial. Most Russians regard the Yugo-Slavs as their blood-brethren.

Cultural. The fundamental ideas and customs of both Russians and Yugo-Slavs have much in common. Their languages are also somewhat similar.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

Religious. The Serbs, like the Russians, are Orthodox, this constituting a powerful bond of sympathy between them. On the other hand, the Roman Catholicism of the Croats and Slovenes tends to estrange them from the Russians. As to the Mohammedan Yugo-Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is of course no religious bond with Russia.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORY

Italy's interests are discussed in the chapter on Italia irredenta.

BULGARIA'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORY

Bulgaria's interests are discussed in the chapter on Macedonia.

RUMANIA'S INTERESTS IN YUGO-SLAV TERRITORY

Rumania's interests are discussed in the chapter on Greater Rumania.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would imply leaving Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Küstenland, and the Serbo-Croat districts in southern Hungary (especially the Banat of Temesvar) as parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

It would imply leaving Serbia, as appearing on maps prior to 1912, Old Serbia, Novibazar, and Serbian Macedonia as parts of Serbia.

It would imply the existence of Montenegro as an independent state closely allied with Serbia.

This arrangement would disappoint Yugo-Slav aspirations

and would leave the Serbs discontented and revengeful. The Croats of Croatia-Slavonia who are under Magyar rule, as that rule appears as a phase of the control arising from the connection with Hungary, would be almost as much discontented. The Croats of the Austrian provinces (Dalmatia and Istria) would probably be less discontented, since their local political life has not been so greatly suppressed as has their kinsmen's under Magyar rule. The Slovenes of Istria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Küstenland would probably not object greatly, since their race consciousness is still but imperfectly awakened.

Austria-Hungary would probably not be satisfied with a return to the *status quo*, because she would regard it as leaving unsolved the problem of the Yugo-Slav movement on the south, which she regards as a menace to the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

2. *United Yugo-Slav State.*

This would imply the union of all the above mentioned territories into a single political unit. This would satisfy Yugo-Slav aspirations and result in the formation of a large state ranking almost as a first-class power. Such a state would stand in a good way to dominate the Balkans and play a major rôle in the whole eastern European situation. In extent of territory, population, and economic resources such a state would be well fitted to maintain itself.

The difficulties that such a Yugo-Slav state would encounter may be listed as follows: Austria-Hungary would probably interpose an implacable hostility to the new state unless adequate and really workable international arrangements offset the fact that the formation of the new state would cut Austria-Hungary off from the sea, mutilate her territory, and deprive her of defensible frontiers. In such enmity Austria-Hungary would be backed by Germany, who would thereby be deprived of her natural sea outlet to the south and balked

in her political and commercial ambitions in the Balkans and in the Near East; Italy would probably be jealous of the new state, as it would run athwart her irredentist aspirations and be a potential rival in the Adriatic; Bulgaria would doubtless hold a bitter enmity for the retention by the new state of Serbia's present share of Macedonia, which is mainly inhabited by Bulgarians. Even if this region were given to Bulgaria, Bulgarians would still be jealous of the Yugo-Slav state, because Bulgaria's former primacy in the Balkans would pass to the stronger Yugo-Slav state. Minor difficulties would also grow out of Albanian hostility.

3. Annexation of Yugo-Slav Territories or Their Control by Austria-Hungary.

While this would defeat the aspiration for an independent Yugo-Slav state, it would bring the Yugo-Slav elements into a unity; and that unity might afford some degree of satisfaction if Austria-Hungary should make the Yugo-Slav territories, when unified, a third grand division of the empire, just as Austria and Hungary are parts. A possible corollary to this arrangement would be the cession to Bulgaria of Serbian Macedonia. This would not greatly effect Yugo-Slav unity, since there are but few Serbs in Serbian Macedonia.

In such a Yugoslavia, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Croats would probably become the leaders, since they are the western European element of Yugoslavia and would therefore better correlate with the general leadership of the western European empire of Austria-Hungary.

4. Possible Division of Yugo-Slav Territories between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and a Limited Yugo-Slav State.

Such an arrangement would be but temporary at best, as it would leave balked ambitions and growing aspirations on all hands. The possible divisions may be stated, however, as follows: Küstenland and Dalmatia might go to Italy; the

districts of southern Hungary (especially the Banat of Temesvar) might go to Rumania; Serbia might go to Austria-Hungary either by annexation or as a protectorate or be divided between Austria and Bulgaria; Serbian Macedonia might go to Bulgaria; and Montenegro be annexed to Austria or sustain an autonomous relation. There are several possibilities of moves on the board here; any one of the above mentioned parts might be treated as suggested and the remainder or parts of the remainder of the Yugo-Slav territories be reverted to the *status quo* or given to a limited Yugo-Slav state.

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THE BALKANS
MACEDONIA

See Map of Yugo-Slav Territories on page 166.

CHAPTER XII

MACEDONIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Macedonia is the ethnic cross-roads where all the races of the Balkan peninsula meet. It is the topographic heart of the Balkans. The various mountain-chains which wall it in on every side, save its *Ægean* sea-front on the south, give it a certain geographic unity. These mountain-chains, though high and rugged, are not impassable, and the River Vardar, which runs the entire length of Macedonia from north to south, is the main line of communication between central Europe and the East. For these reasons Macedonia has been overrun by invaders from all directions, who have fought endlessly over the possession of this coveted area.

The earliest inhabitants of Macedonia were Thracians, ancestors of the modern Albanians. The superb fighting ability of the Thracians was shown by the world-empire forged by their renowned monarchs, Philip and Alexander the Great. At that time Macedonia became Greek in culture, while long before Alexander's day Hellenic colonies had converted the *Ægean* coast-country into a racially Greek territory.

During the days of the Roman Empire the inhabitants of the interior were Latinized, and the stock seems to have been substantially modified by strong infusions of Italian blood. The great Slav invasions of the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. wrought a profound change in the racial complexion of Macedonia, turning it into the predominantly Slav land that it has ever since remained. The seaboard alone

remained Greek. The Latinized inhabitants of the hinterland were driven into the Pindus Mountains to the southwest, where to-day their descendants, the modern Kutzo-Vlachs, are found. The rest of the country became Slav of the Bulgarian rather than of the Serbian branch of the South Slav race. During the Middle Ages the Byzantine emperors of Constantinople waged a series of ferocious wars with the Bulgarians for possession of Macedonia, while in the fourteenth century the land fell under the transitory rule of the Serbian Emperor Stephen Dushan. Then Macedonia, like the rest of the Balkan peninsula, was overrun by the conquering Turk.

The five centuries of Turkish rule which followed produced further racial changes. Large numbers of Turks settled in Macedonia, and many of the native population embraced Islam and were assimilated by the conquerors. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Macedonia was at least half Turkish and Mohammedan. The tide soon began running the other way, however. The decline of the Turkish Empire, which set in about that time, permitted the oppressed Christian elements to take heart once more. The disastrous wars then waged by the Ottoman Empire and the growing internal conflicts of rival factions drained the Turkish population of its vigor, since it was the Turks who always did the fighting, the Christian serfs paying taxes in lieu of military service. The national and cultural revivals of the Christian Balkan races during the nineteenth century further increased the self-assurance and efficiency of the Macedonian Christians, while the Turkish element, ignorant, apathetic, and drained by excessive conscription, fell steadily behind, till at the beginning of the twentieth century it numbered barely a fourth of the total population.

By then it was clear that the days of Turkish rule in Macedonia were numbered. Who should succeed to the Turk's inheritance? The most likely claimant was Bulgaria. As far back as 1877, Russia, after her victory over Turkey in

that year, had endeavored to solve the Macedonian problem by assigning the country to the new Bulgarian state created by the Peace of San Stephano. That solution, to be sure, was nullified the next year by the Berlin Congress of 1878, which tore up the San Stephano treaty and handed Macedonia back to Turkish rule. But the Macedonian Bulgars never forgot the San Stephano episode and worked ceaselessly for union with the Bulgarian homeland, which was at that time rising into the first rank among the Christian Balkan States.

There were other claimants, however, for the Macedonian prize. Greece and Serbia both desired to possess themselves of large portions of the country. The Greeks claimed southern and the Serbs northern Macedonia. All the varied racial elements of Macedonia had become keenly self-conscious, with the result that these elements, covertly supported by their respective fatherlands, became involved in a complicated struggle between themselves and against their Turkish masters. These struggles resulted in Macedonia falling into deplorable anarchy, being overrun by Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian guerilla bands, and oppressed by Turkish troops and Albanian irregulars, who were employed by the Ottoman government to terrorize the Christian elements. By the beginning of the twentieth century conditions in Macedonia had become so bad that the European great powers insisted upon some measure of administrative reform. It was these demands, backed by threats of European intervention, which prompted the Young Turks to venture their successful revolution which resulted in the overthrow of Sultan Abdul-Hamid in 1908.

Moved by Young Turk promises of general political regeneration, the Western powers stayed their hand. But the Young Turks proved incapable of solving the Macedonian problem, and the Christian Balkan States presently determined to take matters into their own hands. The result was the Balkan War of 1912, by which the Turks were driven

from Macedonia. The Balkan allies quarreled over the spoils, and precipitated the second Balkan War in 1913, which ended in the virtual exclusion of Bulgaria from any share in Macedonia and the division of Macedonian territory between Serbia and Greece by the Treaty of Bukharest. Bulgaria remained sullenly unreconciled, and the present war gave her an opportunity of upsetting the Bukharest settlement. By her alliance with the Central Powers she revenged herself upon Serbia and gained possession of Serbian Macedonia in the autumn of 1915, while in the spring of 1916 the eastern portion of Greek Macedonia was occupied by Bulgarian troops.

The Macedonian problem thus remains unsettled. Its solution depends primarily upon the outcome of the present war.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

As might be expected from the chronic disturbances which have long afflicted it, Macedonia's economic life is stunted and backward. This is the more serious since even by nature Macedonia is not specially well endowed. Much of the country is rugged mountain or sterile plateau which could never be agriculturally valuable.

There are certain favored regions. The alluvial delta of the Vardar near Saloniki is capable of yielding heavy cereal crops, but neglect and insecurity of tenure have thrown much of it out of cultivation and turned once fertile fields into fever-stricken marsh-land. The only large district which has been kept to anything like its potential capacity is the coastal plain of Kavalla, in the extreme east of Macedonia. This region has long been noted for its cigarette tobacco. Elsewhere agriculture has been steadily going backward, the harassed peasantry abandoning their fields for the comparative safety of the towns or abandoning the country altogether by emigration to other lands.

The fine forests which clothed the Macedonian mountains in ancient times have been mostly destroyed by centuries of reckless deforestation, and new growths have been prevented by the flocks of sheep and goats which generations of Turkish and Kutzo-Vlach shepherds have led to pasture over the denuded areas. The result has been that the soil of the steeper slopes has been entirely washed away, so that to-day the mountain-ranges stand stripped to their rocky skeletons, pouring down spring floods of melted snow which ruin the tilled fields in the plains below. Only in the Pindus and Olympus mountains of the extreme south do substantial forests remain.

Save for the Kavalla tobacco region, the great economic asset of Macedonia is the city of Saloniki, the natural commercial outlet for the whole country and the potential terminus of a short-line trade-route from central Europe to the Near East. It is to-day the center of whatever industrial and commercial life exists in Macedonia, such activities being virtually absent in the rest of the country.

THE FACTS ABOUT MACEDONIA

WHERE MACEDONIA IS LOCATED

Macedonia is an irregularly shaped block of territory situated in the west central part of the Balkan Peninsula. Since the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, as the result of which Macedonia was taken from Turkey and divided between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, the region does not clearly appear on political maps; but on maps of the Balkans previous to 1912 Macedonia does so appear. The Turkish vilayets of Saloniki, Monastir, and Kossovo, taken together, cover virtually the geographical limits of the Macedonian area.

THE TERRITORIAL UNITS THAT MAKE UP THE COUNTRY

Serbian Macedonia has an area of 15,241 square miles.

Greek Macedonia has an area of 14,006 square miles.

Bulgarian Macedonia has an area of 7227 square miles.

Macedonia has, therefore, a total area of 36,474 square miles, or about the area of Indiana. Its population in 1912 was estimated about 2,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN MACEDONIA

No exact statistics of the various racial elements which make up Macedonia's population are, or ever have been, available. Even before the Balkan Wars Macedonia's ethnic make-up was largely a matter of conjecture. Turkish statistics were proverbially loose, while the unofficial "statistics" offered by representatives of the Christian races were mere propagandist special pleading. And since the Balkan Wars the difficulty has enormously increased. The massacres, deportations, and migrations which took place during the years 1912-14 resulted in wholesale shifts of population, while the analogous events during the course of the present war have

produced further important changes. In the racial analysis which follows, therefore, only the broader generalizations will be offered.

Bulgarians. While differing somewhat in physical type, language, and culture from the inhabitants of Bulgaria, the great majority of the Macedonian Slavs undoubtedly consider themselves Bulgarians. These Bulgar-feeling Slavs are found throughout Macedonia except in the extreme south, where the mountain region of the Olympus, the Chalcydic peninsula, and the Ægean coast generally are predominantly Greek, while in the extreme north (the region known as Old Serbia) the Slav population feels itself Serbian rather than Bulgarian. The Macedonian Bulgars are a thoroughly rural population, the great majority being peasants or agricultural laborers. Politically depressed and economically exploited by the Turks, they suffered even more severely at the hands of the Serbians and Greeks during and after the Second Balkan War of 1913. Vast numbers were expelled or emigrated from Serbian and Greek Macedonia between the years 1913 and 1915. Since the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of Serbian Macedonia in the autumn of 1915, however, the Bulgarians are dominant in that region, while the military occupation of the Drama-Kavalla region of Greek Macedonia by Bulgarian troops in the spring of 1916 has made the Bulgarians politically dominant there also. It is probable that many of the Bulgarian exiles have now returned to these regions, though exact data are wanting. In 1912 the Bulgarian element was supposed to number nearly 1,000,000, or about one-half the total population of Macedonia.

Serbians. The Serbian element is virtually confined to the region known as Old Serbia in the extreme north of Macedonia, adjoining the frontier of the Kingdom of Serbia as this existed previous to 1912. There is a thin sprinkling of villages in central Macedonia, the inhabitants of which consider themselves Serbians rather than Bulgarians. Previous

to 1912 the Serb element, which, like its Bulgarian kinsmen, was almost entirely rural, was politically depressed by the Turks and terrorized by the Albanians, who were systematically colonized in Old Serbia by the Turkish government. After 1912 the Serb population, now annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia, became the dominant race throughout northern and central Macedonia. The Serbs then revenged themselves on their Albanian and Bulgarian enemies, many of whom emigrated or were expelled. The Serbian government was encouraging a wholesale immigration of Serbs from Serbia proper and Austria-Hungary to build up the Serbian element in its new Macedonian territories, and the Serb population of those regions seems to have increased considerably between 1913 and 1915. Since the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of Serbian Macedonia in the autumn of 1915, however, the Bulgarians have become the dominant race, and from what little news is available the Serbian element appears to have been greatly reduced once more. In 1912 the Serbs of Macedonia probably numbered about 150,000.

Greeks. The Greek element in Macedonia is mainly found in the south. Two large blocks of Greek population exist: one in the extreme south, centering in the hill country about Mount Olympus and spreading northward along the Bistritza River to its entry into the Gulf of Saloniki; the other occupying the Chalcydic peninsula on the opposite, or eastern, side of the gulf. These two blocks are connected by a narrow ribbon of Greek population which follows the coast. Besides these main nuclei, there are scattered islets of Greek population found throughout south and south-central Macedonia. This is especially true of the towns. The Greek takes to town life better than to agriculture. Therefore in many parts of Macedonia almost purely Greek towns are found surrounded by a solidly Slav or Turkish country-side. As might be inferred, the Greeks form a large proportion of the commercial middle class. Since Greece acquired south and south-central

Macedonia in 1913 the Greeks have been the dominant race. Wholesale emigration or expulsion of Bulgarians and Turks has been partly counterbalanced by a large immigration of Greeks, principally refugees from Turkey and Bulgaria. For this reason the Hellenic element in Greek Macedonia is much larger to-day than it was in 1912. In 1912 the Macedonian Greeks numbered about 250,000.

Kutzo-Vlachs. Closely associated with the Greeks are the Kutzo-Vlachs, who are mostly concentrated in the Pindus Mountain district of southwestern Macedonia, near the Albanian frontier. The Kutzo-Vlachs are the descendants of the Romanized inhabitants of Macedonia who were driven to the mountains by the Slav invasions of the seventh century A. D. In physical type, language, and fundamental culture they closely resemble the Rumanians, who take a lively interest in them and who have used them as a basis for Rumanian imperialistic claims to Macedonia. At the close of the nineteenth century, backed by Rumanian support, the Kutzo-Vlachs developed a nationalistic movement; but this proved fictitious, and has now nearly died away. The Kutzo-Vlachs have long been under Greek influence. Many of them are Hellenized, and they will undoubtedly be ultimately absorbed into the Greek race. In 1912 they numbered about 50,000 in Macedonia.

Albanians. For generations a current of Albanian immigration had been setting into northern Macedonia. These masterful brigand highlanders found a congenial field in the disturbed conditions which there prevailed, and the Turkish government welcomed their presence as useful terrorizers of the restive Christian population, since most of the Albanians were Mohammedans. In 1912, Old Serbia had become fully as much Albanian as Serb in population, while a sprinkling of Albanian colonies was found throughout central Macedonia as well. When this region fell under Serb control at the end of 1912 the Serbs paid off old scores, and the Albanian ele-

ment was greatly reduced by expulsion or death. In 1912 the Albanian element in Macedonia numbered about 75,000, mostly in Old Serbia.

Jews. The Jewish element in Macedonia is mostly concentrated in the city of Saloniki. They are the descendants of refugees from Spain who came to Macedonia at the beginning of the seventeenth century. They prospered greatly, and in 1912 a great part of the commercial life of Macedonia was in their hands, half the population of Saloniki being Jews. They were favored by the Turkish government, and some of them had adopted Mohammedanism, though they formed a separate religious community, and were known as Deunmés, or Crypto-Jews. Since the Greek possession of Saloniki in 1912 the position of the Saloniki Jews has changed for the worse. No love is lost between these two essentially commercial peoples, while the pro-Turkish sentiments of the Jews made them suspect to the Greek government. Since 1912 many of them have emigrated to Turkey. In 1912 the Jews of Macedonia numbered about 75,000, mostly in Saloniki.

Turks. In this category are included all the Mohammedan elements of Macedonia except the Albanians, although, as a matter of fact, comparatively few of the Macedonian Moslems are of pure Asia Minor Turkish stock. Most of them are the descendants of Christian converts to Islam after the Turkish conquest of Macedonia five centuries ago or of Mohammedan immigrants from various regions. Before 1912 the Turks were found in all social classes except the commercial middle class, commercial aptitude not being displayed by any section of the Mohammedan population. Before 1912 they were, of course, the dominant race and thus constituted most of the official class. There were also many great landowners, while along the central Vardar Valley and in the tobacco districts of Kavalla and Drama to the extreme east were considerable blocks of Turkish peasantry. In many of the mountainous districts there was a population of Mohammedan shepherds,

the descendants of Turkoman "Yuruks" from the Asia Minor plateau. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 bore very hard on the Mohammedans of Macedonia. All the Christian conquerors, whatever their intestine quarrels, united in oppressing the Turks. Most of the Turkish landed gentry fled or were dispossessed, and the Turkish peasantry emigrated wholesale. The Turkish element has thus been greatly reduced. In 1912 the Turks of Macedonia numbered about 500,000, one quarter of the total population.

WHO CONTROLLED MACEDONIA BEFORE THE WAR

Serbia the north, Greece the south, and Bulgaria a comparatively small portion in the extreme east.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED MACEDONIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

In the autumn of 1915 the Teuton-Bulgar conquest of Serbia put Serbian Macedonia under Teuton-Bulgar military control. In the spring of 1916 Bulgarian troops occupied the Kavalla-Drama region of Greek Macedonia. Meanwhile, ever since the fall of Serbia, an Anglo-French army had occupied the city of Saloniki, and this Allied army, greatly reinforced, subsequently extended its control over all the rest of Greek Macedonia, and in the autumn of 1916 began an offensive against the Teuton-Bulgar army which resulted in the occupation of a small portion of Serbian Macedonia in the extreme southwest, including the city of Monastir.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would mean virtually the continuing division of Macedonia between Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria's share as awarded her under the Bukharest settlement of 1913 being relatively

negligible. It would also imply continued Greek possession of Saloniki, the great economic prize of the area.

The *status quo* has been from the first highly unstable. It has satisfied none of the possessing powers.

Greece feels that the hinterland of Saloniki is insufficient both strategically and economically and regrets the possession by Bulgaria of the Greek-inhabited Ægean coastal strip in the extreme northeast, which blocks her land advance toward the Greek populations of Thrace and Constantinople.

Serbia regards Saloniki as the necessary economic outlet to her Macedonian territory and begrudges Greece her possession of it.

As for Bulgaria, she is wholly unreconciled to the division of 1913, and considers it a vital matter to annex the Bulgarian-speaking populations of Serbian and Greek Macedonia, as well as to annex the Ægean coastal region of Serres-Drama-Kavalla, which is the natural economic outlet of Bulgaria proper to the Ægean Sea.

With such a nexus of conflicting interests, Macedonia, under its present territorial division, must remain a very unstable political area.

2. *Possible New Partition of Macedonia.*

No considerable party in any one of the possessing nations seriously aspires to the possession of the whole of Macedonia; but parties in all these nations do aspire to the undivided possession of so much of Macedonia that the remaining shares would be relatively negligible.

Serbian imperialists desire possession of Saloniki, with the entire Vardar Valley.

Bulgarian imperialists desire all Macedonia except the extreme south near Greece and the extreme north near Serbia as those nations existed prior to 1912.

Greek imperialists desire possession of most of Bulgaria's

present share of Macedonia, as well as a favorable rectification of the Greco-Serbian frontier at Serbia's expense.

The realization of any one of these aspirations, considering the high strategic and economic value of this Macedonian area, would go far toward giving the particular nation the hegemony of the Balkans, and therefore would be contested bitterly by the other nations concerned.

3. *Austro-German Controlled Macedonia as Part of an Austro-German Controlled Balkan.*

The outward form of this solution would probably be a partition of Macedonia between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary would probably annex the Macedonian district of Old Serbia, together with Serbia proper, and Bulgaria take the rest of Macedonia.

This would imply the annihilation of Serbia and the reduction of Greece to political insignificance.

4. *Macedonia as a Federal Reserve of a Balkan Confederation.*

Since Macedonia has been the rock on which all attempts at Balkan confederation have split, this might seem to be a rational compromise of rival Balkan imperialisms, giving them a needed bond of commercial and economic interest and removing the fear of the Balkan dominance that goes inevitably to the nation possessing Macedonia.

But the difficulty is that these rivalries are so deep-seated and envenomed by the events of recent years that the Balkan nations are deaf to reason. This difficulty would seem to make the proposal a counsel of perfection.

5. *Internationalization of Macedonia.*

This solution, or at least international control, was actually attempted by the European Concert of Powers between 1903 and 1908. Although that attempt failed, it may be that the

inability of the Balkans to settle this problem peaceably may force the world to undertake the settlement through some extension of the principle of international control which may result from the union of necessity and statesmanship at the peace conference.

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ALBANIA

See Map of Yugo-Slav Territories on page 166

CHAPTER XIII

ALBANIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Albania is a land of rugged mountains, with a race as wild as its crags. The Albanians are an ancient race which has dwelt among its bleak hills though the centuries. They are typical highlanders, divided into many tribes and clans, exhausting their savage energy in relentless blood-feuds. Despite these local broils and a total lack of any real civilization, the Albanians do possess, however, an instinctive racial self-consciousness which makes them cling fiercely to their ancient customs, and enables them to combine against a foreign intruder in hours of external peril. These qualities, together with the poverty and inaccessibility of the country, have hitherto preserved Albania from foreign conquest. No nation has ever yet really tamed these indomitable mountaineers.

The Albanians are in every sense a strong race. They are not merely tremendous fighters, but they also possess keen intelligence and some excellent moral qualities. The innate capacity of the race is shown by the number of really able men that Albania has given to the Turkish Empire, as well as by the noted persons of Albanian extraction in Greece, Italy, and throughout the Levant. To name only three instances: Mehemet Ali of Egypt, Ali Pasha of Janina, and the Italian statesman Francesco Crispi were all Albanians.

The great question is whether this race, which does so well abroad, will ever amount to anything at home. The total breakdown of the Albanian "State" set up by the European powers after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the country's

quick relapse into the customary tribal anarchy are not hopeful omens for the future. If the Albanians cannot set their house in order themselves, some one else ultimately will.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

The anarchical political conditions prevailing throughout Albania have stunted its economic life. Nevertheless, Albania possesses sufficient potential natural wealth to make it a prosperous country under normal modern conditions.

To begin with, although Albania is a mountainous country, there are many valleys and small plains with an exceedingly fertile soil. Even as it is, with a maximum of political insecurity and the most primitive methods of husbandry, these favored districts produce enough cereal crops to furnish a considerable surplus for foreign export. The cereals grown are corn, barley, oats, and rye. The lower hills also produce excellent olive-oil. In southern Albania considerable tobacco of fair quality is grown, though mainly for local consumption. The hill-slopes also furnish excellent pasture for flocks of sheep and goats, which form the principal wealth of the wild highland tribes. In the lowlands horned cattle are pastured. The magnificent forests which clothe the Albanian

mountains, though sadly diminished in many places by reckless cutting, are still a considerable asset to the country. The principal hindrance to their commercial exploitation is the almost total lack of roads and bridges, while of course no railroads exist.

This lack of communications and the anarchic political conditions unite in preventing the opening up of Albania's mineral wealth, which is considerable, although mostly unexplored. Coal and iron are probably abundant, while copper, lead, silver, and antimony are believed to exist. Gold- and silver-mines were worked in northern Albania in ancient times, while in southern Albania, near Avlona, there is a remarkable deposit of mineral pitch. However, all these workings are to-day abandoned.

Industry in the modern sense is of course non-existent.

THE FACTS ABOUT ALBANIA

WHERE ALBANIA IS LOCATED

Albania proper, a separate political entity since 1913, is a band of rugged mountain-land, bounded by the Adriatic on the west, Montenegro on the north, Serbia and Macedonia on the east, and Greece on the south. This is the immemorial seat of the Albanian race. But beyond the present frontiers of the Albanian state as traced in 1913 there stretches eastward into Serbia and Macedonia a wide fringe of Albanian population, constituting an *Albania irredenta*, which is the objective of Albanian nationalist aspirations.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Albania proper has an area of about 11,000 square miles, or a trifle larger than the combined areas of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Its population is about 800,000.

Old Serbia, Macedonia, and Epirus have Albanian elements in the population, and thus figure in the problem.

DIFFERENT RACES IN ALBANIA

The *Albanians* are found in Albania, Old Serbia, Macedonia, and Epirus. In Albania proper they constitute the entire population except in the extreme south. In Old Serbia, up to the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, they formed a considerable population, especially semi-military colonists, favored by the Turks and tyrannizing over the Serb and other Christian elements. In Macedonia they held a similar status, although not so numerous or influential. In Epirus they are mostly wild hillmen, although some are landed gentry. Since the Balkan Wars the Albanians outside Albania proper have all suffered at the hands of their new Serbian or Greek masters.

The *Greeks* are found in Epirus. Southern Epirus was annexed to Greece in 1913. Northern Epirus was assigned to Albania, but was forcibly occupied by Greece in 1914. Throughout Epirus the towns are mainly Greek in blood. In the south the bulk of the rural population is also Greek. In the north the population is about half and half. The Greeks are economically and culturally far superior to the Albanians.

The *Serbs* are found in Old Serbia and Macedonia. They were politically and economically depressed before the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. They were politically dominant thereafter until 1915. They have again been depressed since the Teuton-Bulgar conquest in 1915. They are mostly peasants.

WHO CONTROLLED ALBANIA BEFORE THE WAR

Albania was under Albanian rule, which was very anarchic. Old Serbia was under Serbian rule.

Macedonia was under Serbian rule. Only the extreme northern part of Macedonia enters into the Albanian problem.

Epirus was under Greek control.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED ALBANIA SINCE
THE WAR BEGAN

Albania has remained partly under Albanian rule, which has been still more anarchic. It has been partly under Austrian control in the hinterland, and has remained partly Italian on the coast, especially about Avlona.

Old Serbia has been under Austro-German control.

Macedonia has been under Austro-German and Bulgarian control.

Epirus has been partly under Greek and partly under Italian control.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN ALBANIA

Political. Italy desires to control all Albania. Such control would give Italy the mastery of the Adriatic and would offer a fine base for that predominant political influence in the Balkans to which Italian imperialists aspire.

Economic. Albania's chief economic value to Italy would be as a base for an economic penetration of the Balkans, which might make the peninsula an important field for Italian trade and investment of capital.

Strategic. Italian control of Avlona would give Italy an ideal naval base with which to close the Adriatic and thus insure her mastery of that sea.

Racial. None.

Cultural. Many Italians claim that what culture the Albanians possess is mainly of Italian origin, and that the Albanians are peculiarly receptive to Italian culture.

Religious. The Italian government has tried to get the Catholic tribes of northern Albania to look upon Italy as their protector, but hitherto without success.

SERBIA'S INTERESTS IN ALBANIA

Political. Serbia wants to annex northern Albania in order to get a sea-outlet for Old Serbia and Macedonia. Furthermore, Serbia thinks that her control of this region would stop the aid which the free Albanians are always giving to the Albanian colonies under Serb rule in Old Serbia and Macedonia, and thus strengthen the political status of Serbia in this region.

Economic. The harbors of northern Albania would be valuable outlets for Serbian trade.

Strategic. Possession of northern Albania would give Serbia an Adriatic foothold and consolidate her exposed strategic position in Macedonia.

Racial. There are a few Serbs in northern Albania.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Since the inhabitants of northern Albania are either Mohammedans or Roman Catholics, Orthodox Serbia has no religious interest here.

GREECE'S INTERESTS IN ALBANIA

Political. Greece wants to annex southern Albania in order to "redeem" the partly Greek population of this region, consolidate her position in the western Balkans, and prevent an Italian occupation.

Economic. Southern Albania would have some slight economic value for Greece.

Strategic. Southern Albania would give Greece a good strategic frontier.

Racial. Part of the population of southern Albania is Greek, and this element ardently desires annexation to Greece.

Cultural. Greece claims that what culture the southern Albanians possess is Greek, and that, once annexed to Greece, the whole region would become genuinely Greek in a short time.

Religious. Besides the Greek element, many of the southern Albanians are Greek Orthodox Christians in faith.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN ALBANIA

Political. Austria's political interest in Albania is largely negative. Although she would undoubtedly like Avlona as a naval base, Austria does not care to go to the expense of conquering the whole country. But she does intend to keep every other nation out. In fact, the present condition of anarchy and savagery rather plays into her hands. Such an Albania serves as an effective barrier both to Italian penetration of the Balkans and to Serb access to the sea.

Economic. What little Albanian trade exists is mostly in Austrian hands through the Austrian Lloyd Steamship service, which touches at the various Albanian port-towns.

Strategic. Avlona would make an ideal base for Austrian naval control of the Adriatic.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania have long regarded Austria as their protector.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

Before the war Albania was independent under a guaranty of the great powers made in 1913. It was to be financed internationally and policed by an international *gendarmerie*. It was an experiment in international control. When the war broke, the contingents of the *gendarmerie* went home. The viability of an independent Albania depends upon whether the long or short view is taken. The age-long tribal anarchy of Albania has made disorder so natural to the people that it would take much time, money, and energy before the coun-

try could be got under way for economic development and civilized existence. All that can be said about the political and economic capacity of the Albanians is that where they have been in civilized environment in Greece and Italy for a long time they have shown real capability. Therefore there is a good chance that, under adequate international guaranty, they would in time prove equal to the opportunity.

2. *Division of Albania Between Serbia (or Yugoslavia) and Greece.*

This would probably mean giving the northern part to Serbia and the southern part to Greece. As regards giving the northern part to Serbia it may be said that there is such deep race-hatred between the Serbs and the Albanians, intensified by religious differences, that it is difficult to imagine the Albanians reconciled to Serbian rule.

They are, however, so small in numbers as compared with the Serbs, especially in a united Yugoslavia, and the northern districts would be such a highway between Serbia and the outer world, that the problem might solve itself by the swamping and annihilating of the Albanians by the Yugoslavs.

As regards giving the southern part to Greece, it may be said that the Albanians have no such hatred for the Greeks as they have for the Serbs. The southern Albanians have certain cultural affiliations with Greece, and some are Greek Orthodox in faith. All over southern Albania there is a certain native Greek element. At first Greek rule would probably be considerably opposed by the Albanian-feeling element, but ultimately Greek absorption would be likely.

3. *Annexation of Albania to Italy.*

There is not so much antipathy between Albanians and Italians as between Albanians and Serbs, but more than between Albanians and Greeks. Along the coast there are a

certain number of Albanians who are friendly to the Italians. The old Albanian colonies in southern Italy are another link between the two races.

Italy might, in the long run, reconcile Albanians to Italian rule, but it would require great tact and involve much trouble.

4. *Albania Under Control of the Central Powers.*

This, of course, would be only in the event of a Teutonic victory, and a permanent domination of the Balkans by the Central Powers. The Catholic tribes of northern Albania have long regarded Austria as their protector; but this friendship would quickly vanish if Austria attempted to establish a strong political control of the country. What degree of antipathy the Albanians would have for Austria is hard to say, as they have never been in direct political contact. It probably would be considerable. Control would cause Austria much trouble.

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
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THE BALKANS
GREATER RUMANIA



№12 - GREATER ROUMANIA

CHAPTER XIV

GREATER RUMANIA .

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The regions inhabited wholly or partly by Rumanians form a huge flattened ellipse in the southeastern corner of Europe. The geographic center of this area is the mountain mass of Transylvania. About this lofty core the Rumanian race spreads far out over the adjacent plains to the east, south, and west.

The Rumanians are a racial and cultural puzzle. They look like Southern Italians, and speak a language more akin to the ancient Latin than any other living tongue. Yet they are separated by hundreds of miles of territory, which is inhabited by utterly alien stocks, from the nearest outpost of the modern Latin world, the Italian population at the head of the Adriatic Sea.

The Rumanians themselves explain their Latin characteristics by claiming to be the descendants of Roman colonists planted by the Emperor Trajan after his conquest of these regions (the ancient Dacia) in the second century A. D. There is probably a basis of truth in this picturesque legend, for when barbarian hordes forced Rome to abandon Dacia at the end of the third century A. D., a part of its Romanized inhabitants probably took refuge in the fastnesses of the Carpathian Mountains and there kept alive the Latin language and traditions.

Certain it is that in the early Middle Ages the ancestors of the modern Rumanians emerged from Transylvania into those wide plains north of the Danube which now make up the

present Kingdom of Rumania. They were probably pushed thither by pressure from the west. By that time the great plains of Hungary had been settled by the Magyars, and a branch of this warlike race, the so-called Szeklers, had broken into Transylvania, subjecting the less warlike Rumanians to their sway.

The Rumanian colonies in the Danubian plains gradually crystallized into two states, Wallachia in the south, Moldavia in the north, the latter including the present Russian province of Bessarabia. The Turkish conquest of the Balkan Peninsula in the fifteenth century hit the Rumanian principalities hard, but despite repeated devastations they managed to retain semi-independence as autonomous vassals of the Ottoman Empire. During the decline of Turkish power in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century the principalities suffered greatly from Russian invasions, since they were the natural highroad across which Russian armies marched to the invasion of the Balkans. Indeed, some Russian statesmen hoped to incorporate the Rumanian principalities into the Russian Empire, and the annexation of Bessarabia to Russia at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a first step to this end. But the nineteenth century, the era of nationalities, had awakened the Rumanians to full race consciousness, and the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia then aspired to throw off Turkish suzerainty, checkmate Russian encroachments, and establish themselves as a sovereign people. In 1859, despite Russian opposition, Moldavia and Wallachia merged themselves into a single state under the name of Rumania. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 gave Rumania the chance to throw off Turkish suzerainty and declare itself an independent state. This war was, however, the occasion of a sad blow to Rumanian hopes. Twenty years earlier, after the Western powers had beaten Russia in the Crimean War, they had given Moldavia the southern portion of that province of Bessarabia which Russia had seized in 1812. But

after the War of 1877, Russia, despite the valuable assistance rendered her by Rumania against the Turks, forced her small ally to retrocede southern Bessarabia, giving Rumania in exchange the previously Turkish province of Dobrudja, a sterile peninsula between the Danube and the Black Sea, inhabited mostly by Tatars. This has ever since been a sore point with Rumanians, who aspire to annex the whole of Bessarabia, a land predominantly Rumanian in race.

However, Rumania made the best of a bad bargain, and by the beginning of the twentieth century she had so increased in power and prosperity that patriotic Rumanians could dream of drawing the various outlying branches of their race within the political frontiers of the Rumanian kingdom. Besides the Rumanian populations of Transylvania and Bessarabia, already noted, the Rumanian race had expanded greatly to the westward beyond Transylvania into the Hungarian plains. The Turkish conquest of Hungary in the sixteenth century had been a bad blow to the Magyars, and when the Austrians drove the Turks out of Hungary in the eighteenth century they found the land half depopulated. Into this depopulated region Rumanians poured in great numbers, so that to-day the Rumanians stretch far out into the Rumanian plain, reaching in some places almost to the River Theiss. About this same period a subsidiary stream of Rumanian emigration had made its way northward from Transylvania into Bukowina, the Austrian province just beyond the northern slope of the Carpathian Mountains.

Thus, as the modern Kingdom of Rumania grew in power and population, its patriots eyed with increasing impatience the sight of millions of their blood-brothers under Russian and Austro-Hungarian rule, and dreamed of uniting their whole race within the bounds of a Greater Rumania.

Until the outbreak of the European War, however, these hopes had scant prospects of realization. Rumania's *unredeemed* provinces belonged to two great powers, Austria-Hun-

gary and Russia. Against both of these Rumania alone was powerless, while the fact that the provinces in question were not solidly Rumanian, but very mixed in population, added to the practical difficulties of annexation to Rumania.

In fact, Rumania's sole extension of territory before 1914 followed not the line of race unity, but the path of strategic interest. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, it will be remembered, Rumania had received the Dobrudja in exchange for southern Bessarabia. At the moment this was bitterly resented, but, as time passed, Rumania discovered that the Dobrudja possessed a special value of its own. It gave Rumania a direct frontage on the Black Sea, and its chief harbor, Constanza, grew to be Rumania's commercial gateway to the outer world. But Rumania feared that the Bulgarian frontier which inclosed Dobrudja on the south ran so close to Constanza that it would be dangerously menaced in time of war. Accordingly, when Bulgaria engaged Greece and Serbia in the Second Balkan War of 1913, Rumania invaded Bulgaria and compelled that country to cede a wide strip of territory to the south of Dobrudja, including the fortress of Silistria on the Danube. The population of this strip was Bulgarian or Tatar, with virtually no Rumanian element. This accession of territory strategically safeguarded Constanza, but it raised up against Rumania an implacable spirit of Bulgarian revenge.

So matters stood when in the autumn of 1916 Rumania entered the European War on the Allied side to obtain the Austro-Hungarian lands inhabited by Rumanians. Rumania's defeat and conquest at the hands of Teutonic and Bulgarian armies speedily followed this decision.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

The greatest treasure of Rumania is its soil. The rich loam which covers her broad alluvial plains is akin to the famous Russian "black earth." In fact, the Rumanian humus is even richer than the Russian, containing a greater proportion of nitrogenous elements. Hence Rumania is, and long has been, one of the chief granaries of Europe, being in fact one of the leading cereal-growing areas of the world. Rumania's

chief agricultural staples are wheat and corn, though other cereals are extensively produced.

In 1914 the chief agricultural crops were as follows: Corn, 98,000,000 bushels; wheat, 44,100,000 bushels; barley, 18,781,000 bushels; oats, 12,859,000 bushels; rye, 1,739,000 bushels.

Besides these staple cereals, Rumania also raises large crops of beans, potatoes, sugar-beets, tobacco, and many minor garden products. On the higher plains near the Carpathian Mountains are great numbers of thriving fruit orchards, while the Carpathian foot-hills themselves are terraced with vineyards, producing much good wine.

Rumania is also a considerable stock-raising country. In 1900, Rumania possessed 864,324 horses, 2,569,526 horned cattle, 5,655,444 sheep, 232,515 goats, and 1,709,205 swine.

Half a century ago reckless deforestation had largely stripped the Rumanian side of the Carpathians. Since then, however, governmental foresight has restored Rumania's forests to something of their former magnificence. The woods of these Rumanian forests are of high quality, being mostly oak, beech, and pine.

Rumania's chief mineral asset is petroleum. The whole southern slope of the Carpathian Mountains is underlaid with an immense oil-field, which follows the curve of the range uninterruptedly from one end of the country to the other. In 1914 the petroleum output of Rumania was 1,783,957 metric tons, this making Rumania one of the chief oil-producing countries in the world. The same area also includes rich coal deposits, while iron, copper, lead, nickel, mercury, sulphur, arsenic, and other metals were also found in paying quantities. The gold-mines of the Rumanian Carpathians, once profitable, have to-day been abandoned.

Despite the presence of coal, iron, and abundant water-power, Rumania has proved unable to develop any important industries. By the aid of foreign capital and direction a certain part of her raw products have been worked up; but aside

from these oil and sugar refineries, lumber works, and flour mills, few factories exist. The Rumanian does not take kindly to industrial life, and Rumanian factory labor is not of high quality.

The regions of Austria-Hungary which Rumania claims as territory, with *unredeemed* Rumanians, are quite similar to the Kingdom of Rumania, economically. Transylvania is the most valuable, and possesses the greatest variety of natural resources. It is mountainous, like the Carpathian frontier districts of Rumania, but contains many exceedingly rich valleys and some open country of great fertility. Its mineral wealth is great. Very little oil occurs, but its gold-mines are the richest in Europe.

The Banat of Temesvar is a microcosm of Rumania. Its eastern portion, adjoining Rumania, is mountainous and contains much mineral wealth. Its western portion is fertile plain-country producing rich cereal crops.

The Eastern Alföld is all plain-country, devoted to cereal growing and stock-raising.

Southern Bukowina is economically closely akin to the adjacent regions of Rumania (Moldavia). It is fertile and grows good cereal crops.

The Russian province of Bessarabia is predominantly an agricultural country, its soil being a prolongation of the famous Russian "black earth" zone. The principal cereal crops are wheat and corn, though other cereals—flax, fruit, and tobacco—are also grown. The middle portion of Bessarabia contains a range of hills covered with forests. The southern portion of Bessarabia, near the Black Sea, tends to become steppe country, but of a high grade, affording excellent grazing-ground for large herds of live stock of all kinds. Few mineral products are found. Industry is virtually non-existent.

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THE FACTS ABOUT GREATER RUMANIA

WHERE GREATER RUMANIA IS LOCATED

The regions inhabited wholly or partly by Rumanians form a huge flattened ellipse in the southeast corner of Europe. The base of this ellipse rests solidly on the north bank of the lower Danube River from the Black Sea westward to a point almost opposite the Serbian capital, Belgrade. In fact, just

before reaching this point, the line of Rumanian settlement crosses to the south bank of the Danube, the northeast corner of Serbia being partly Rumanian in race. From the point opposite Belgrade the western limit of Rumanian population runs in a wavering line northward across the Hungarian plains, trending gradually eastward until it reaches the head waters of the river Theiss, whence it runs due east across the Carpathian Mountains and includes the southern part of the Austrian province of Bukowina. From this point the line of Rumanian settlement crosses into Russian territory, bending sharply southward, and following the west bank of the River Dniester till it reaches the Black Sea once more, not very far from its starting-point.

The area of Rumanian settlement thus includes not only the present Kingdom of Rumania, but large portions of Austria-Hungary and Russia and a small district of Serbia as well.

Of course, this area is not solidly Rumanian in population, many non-Rumanian racial elements also dwelling therein. The line above described represents the extreme geographical limits of Rumanian settlement and indicates the extreme frontiers which Rumanian nationalists claim for their proposed "Greater Rumania."

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

The *Kingdom of Rumania*, or Rumania proper, including the Dobrudja, has an area of 53,489 square miles and a population of 7,508,000. The Rumanians number 6,240,000, or eighty-three per cent.

Eastern Hungary, including Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar, has an area of 40,000 square miles and a population of 6,000,000. The Rumanians number 2,800,000, or forty-seven per cent.

Bukowina has an area of 4033 square miles and a population of 784,000. The Rumanians number 273,000, or thirty-five per cent.

Bessarabia has an area of 17,143 square miles and a population of 2,657,000. The Rumanians number 1,100,000, or forty-five per cent.

Northeastern Serbia has an area of 2000 square miles. The Rumanians number 40,000 or thirty per cent.

The total area of this region is a little over 100,000 square miles, or the size of the Middle Atlantic States (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania). The Ruman element in its population is about 14,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE KINGDOM OF RUMANIA

The *Rumanians* number 6,240,000, or eighty-three per cent. of the population. They are found throughout except in southern Dobrudja. The striking feature of Rumanian society is its lack of a native middle class. The average Rumanian has little aptitude for commercial life, and is of an easy-going, prodigal nature which makes him economically one of the most inefficient of European races. Accordingly, we find the native Rumanians concentrated at the two ends of the social scale: at the top an extremely wealthy landowning aristocracy; at the bottom a mass of peasants and town proletarians, for the most part extremely poor and uneducated. The economic life of Rumania is in the hands of foreigners or Jews. The Rumanians are politically dominant; at least the upper class is. The peasants have very little to say.

The *Jews* number 375,000, or five per cent. of the population. They are found throughout. The Rumanian Jews are not regarded as citizens, and are subject to many legal disabilities, especially the prohibition against owning land. These disabilities are imposed because of the economic weakness of the native Rumanians. Both peasants and nobles are so thriftless that, but for these restrictions, it is feared the Jews would soon own nearly the whole country. The Jews control Rumania's retail trade, the liquor traffic, etc. Al-

though the great Ghettos are in the cities, the Jews are also numerous in the country districts, where they are peddlers, usurers, and overseers of estates of the nobles, who are mostly absentee landlords.

The *Bulgarians* number 143,000, or two per cent. of the population. They are found mostly in the Dobrudja. The Bulgarians are mostly in that part of Dobrudja (Silistria region) which Rumania forced Bulgaria to cede to her by the Treaty of Bukharest (1913). There are, however, certain Bulgarian communities scattered along the north bank of the Danube in Rumania proper. The Bulgars are politically depressed.

The *Austro-Germans* number 140,000, or two per cent. of the population. They are found mostly in the cities and industrial centers. Rumania's recent economic development is largely due to German and Austrian capital. Accordingly, the oil-fields, manufacturing, and other major aspects of Rumanian economic life are managed and controlled by Austro-Germans.

The *Turco-Tatars* number 215,000, or three per cent. of the population. They are located in the Dobrudja, where, outside the towns, they form the bulk of the population. They are a semi-nomad population, self-contained and taking no interest in politics. They are Mohammedans.

The *Szeklers* (Magyars) number 145,000, or two per cent. of the population. They are found in northern Rumania (Moldavia). This people of Magyar (Hungarian) stock is scattered in compact village communities through a large part of northern Rumania. Despite attempts to Rumanize them, they have retained their language and racial identity. They are thriftier and more prosperous than their Rumanian peasant neighbors.

The *Greeks* and *Armenians* number 50,000, or a little less than one per cent. of the population. They are found mostly in the towns. The Greeks and Armenians supplement the

Jews in controlling the minor aspects of Rumanian economic life (retail business, peddling, usury, etc.). They are very unpopular, but the Greeks are protected from persecution owing to the fact that most of them are Hellenic subjects.

The *Gypsies* number 150,000, or two per cent. of the population. They are found throughout. The Gypsies, in Rumania as elsewhere, pick up a precarious living by fortune-telling, horse-trading, and promiscuous roguery. In Rumania, however, owing to the superstitious, music-loving, easy-going character of the natives, they fare unusually well.

The *Serbians* number 40,000, or about half of one per cent. of the population. They are found in western Rumania (Wallachia). On the north bank of the Danube, opposite Serbia, are a sprinkling of Serbian peasant communities.

DIFFERENT RACES IN EASTERN HUNGARY

The Rumanian area of settlement in eastern Hungary covers three distinct geographical regions:

Transylvania, the mountainous country lying immediately to the west of the Kingdom of Rumania and half inclosed by it.

The Banat of Temesvar, a rectangular block of territory inclosed between the rivers Danube, Theiss, and Maros.

The eastern edge of the great Hungarian plain, Alföld, lying west of Transylvania.

In this entire region the Rumanian elements numbered in 1900, 2,800,000. Of this Rumanian population, 1,397,000 were found in Transylvania (fifty-seven per cent. of the total population of Transylvania); 578,000 in the Banat (forty per cent.); and about 600,000 in the eastern Alföld (from forty to fifty per cent.)

The Rumanians of Hungary nowhere form the entire population of any district. Everywhere the upper classes, whether landlords or townfolk, are of non-Rumanian race stocks, generally Magyars or Germans. In Transylvania and the Banat

the Rumanian districts are inextricably interlaced with other districts where most of the inhabitants are non-Rumanian. Everywhere, however, the Rumanians occupy the lowest grades in the social scale, landless agricultural laborers, town proletariat, mountain shepherds, etc. They are nearly all poor, ignorant, and in a generally backward social condition.

DIFFERENT RACES IN BUKOWINA

This small Austrian province is a racial medley, the towns being mainly Jewish and German. The Rumanian element is found in the southern part of the province. It numbers 273,000, or thirty-five per cent. of the total population, and is mainly peasant, but more prosperous than the Rumanians of Hungary.

DIFFERENT RACES IN BESSARABIA

The Rumanian element in this Russian province numbers a trifle over 1,100,000 (forty-five per cent.). It is mostly peasant and fairly prosperous. Bessarabia is, however, dotted with agricultural colonies of Russians, Germans, Bulgarians, Serbians, and Greeks, while the marshy Black Sea coast is thinly settled by Cossacks and Tatars. Thus, though the Rumanians form by far the largest single race element in the population, Bessarabia presents a picture of bewildering racial complexity.

DIFFERENT RACES IN NORTHEASTERN SERBIA

In the districts just south of the Danube, and opposite Rumania, is a rather thick sprinkling of Rumanian agricultural communities the population of which totals about 40,000, or about thirty per cent. of the population of said districts.

WHO CONTROLLED GREATER RUMANIA BEFORE THE WAR

The Kingdom of Rumania was under Rumanian control.

Transylvania, the Banat, and the eastern Alföld were controlled by Hungary.

Bukowina was under Austrian control.

Bessarabia was under Russian control.

Northeastern Serbia was under Serbian control.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED GREATER RUMANIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

The Kingdom of Rumania has been mostly occupied by Austro-German and Bulgarian armies since the autumn of 1916, after Rumania's entry into the war on the Allies' side.

Eastern Hungary has remained under Hungarian control except for a transient Rumanian military occupation of part of Transylvania in the early autumn of 1916.

Bukowina has been alternately occupied by Austro-Germans and Russians, according to the fortunes of war.

Northeastern Serbia was overrun by the Austro-Germans during their conquest of Serbia in the autumn of 1915.

RUMANIA'S INTEREST IN GREATER RUMANIA

Political. The amalgamation of all regions of Rumanian settlement into a single Rumanian national state would create a Greater Rumania, which would be almost a great power. Such a Greater Rumania could probably dominate the Balkans, and would certainly play a major rôle in the politics of the Near East.

Economic. All the territories coveted by Rumanian nationalists (eastern Hungary, Bukowina, Bessarabia, and Transylvania) would augment the economic power of Rumania, although it would add no distinctive or vitally necessary resources.

Strategic. The territory which has most strategic value for Rumania is Transylvania, the mountains of which dominate the Rumanian plains. With this natural fortress in its

possession, and eastern Hungary and Bessarabia as twin *glacis* to west and east, Rumania, already well protected by the Danube River on the south, would be in excellent strategic posture for both defense and offense.

Racial. All the lands coveted by Rumanian nationalists have large Rumanian populations whose "redemption" by incorporation into a Greater Rumania is ardently desired in order thus to attain the political unity of the Rumanian race.

Cultural. The culture of the "unredeemed" Rumanians of Austria-Hungary and Russia is virtually the same as that of the Kingdom of Rumania.

Religious. Nearly all Rumanians belong to the Greek Orthodox Church.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN GREATER RUMANIA

Political. The area of Rumanian settlement in Austria-Hungary is one sixth of the total area of the dual monarchy. The loss of eastern Hungary and the Bukowina would, therefore, greatly diminish Austria-Hungary's area and population, and would consequently weaken her political power in the world.

Economic. Eastern Hungary and the Bukowina are rich agricultural regions, while Transylvania has some mineral resources, as already pointed out. Their loss would obviously weaken Austro-Hungarian economic power.

Strategic. The loss of eastern Hungary would leave Hungary with no good frontier on that side. As things now are, the mountain bastion of Transylvania solidly anchors the defense-line of the Carpathian Mountains, thus effectively shielding Hungary from north and east. Were Transylvania lost, together with the Banat of Temesvar, the Hungarian frontier would run through the open Alföld, and the Hungarian plains would lie completely open to invasion. Bukowina, while of comparatively minor importance, is nevertheless a valuable outwork, covering the eastern passes of the Carpathians.

Racial. The two leading races of Austria-Hungary (Germans and Magyars) are largely represented in the population of the territories coveted by Greater Rumania. In the Banat of Temesvar there are 362,000 Germans and 170,000 Magyars; in Transylvania, 240,000 Germans and 815,000 Magyars. In the Alföld districts claimed by Rumanian nationalists the Magyars average over forty per cent. of the population, or about 500,000. In Bukowina the upper classes are largely German. Hungary has also an interest in the fate of the Magyar (Szekler) communities in northern Rumania.

Cultural. The cultural interests of Germans and Magyars in these regions are very great. The upper classes are everywhere Magyars and Germans, and the whole tone of civilization is predominantly Magyar or German. The Rumanians, belonging almost wholly to the lower social strata, have little influence in the cultural life of eastern Hungary.

Religious. Both Magyars and Germans are partly Roman Catholic, partly Protestant. None of them, however, belong to the Orthodox Church, the church of nearly all Rumanians. Thus religious differences widen the ethnic cleavage between these hostile elements.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN GREATER RUMANIA ¹

Political. Russia's most obvious interest is, of course, the retention of her province of Bessarabia, which is not only a valuable part of the Russian Empire, but is also the necessary territorial base for those plans of Balkan domination cherished by Russian imperialists. Some of these even dream of annexing the Kingdom of Rumania as the best land connection with a Russian-owned Constantinople and the straits. Russian imperialists also desire Bukowina as the pendant to their projected annexation of the Austrian province of Galicia, lying just to the west.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

Economic. Bessarabia is a rich agricultural province, which Russia naturally desires to retain.

Strategic. The wide River Pruth, which forms the western boundary of Bessarabia, gives Russia a good strategic frontier.

Racial. Many Russian imperialists claim Bukowina owing to the Ruthenian or Little Russian (Ukrainian) element in its population.

Cultural. Virtually none.

Religious. Most of the Rumanians, like the Russians, belong to the Orthodox Church.

BULGARIA'S INTERESTS IN GREATER RUMANIA

Bulgaria's interests are confined to the Dobrudja and are discussed in the chapter on the Dobrudja.

SERBIA'S INTERESTS IN GREATER RUMANIA

Serbia disputes Rumania's claim to the Banat of Temesvar, asserting that this Hungarian region should belong to her, owing to the presence of 252,000 Serbs in its population.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This implies an independent Rumania with unredeemed sections under the following controls: Austria-Hungary: Transylvania, Banat, eastern Alföld, and Bukowina. Russia: Bessarabia. Serbia: northeast Serbia.

Rumania would own Dobrudja, thus violating irredentist aspirations of Bulgaria. There are virtually no Rumanians there.

This would mean for Rumania, the non-fulfillment of irredentist aspirations. It would leave the Rumanians a disaffected and disturbing factor in southeastern European politics.

This would mean for Bulgaria disappointment in not getting southern Dobrudja, which she lost to Rumania in 1913, and it would leave a Bulgarian-Rumanian ferment.

It would mean for Russia and Austria-Hungary satisfaction except to the imperialistic elements.

2. *Greater Rumania.*

This implies adding to the Kingdom of Rumania, Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvar, eastern Alföld, southern Bukowina, and Bessarabia. It excludes from consideration north-eastern Serbia and the Kutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia, as neither is seriously claimed by the bulk of Rumanian irredentists. Only a few extreme imperialists desire their inclusion in Greater Rumania.

This would mean for Rumania the creation of a Greater Rumania, which would include virtually the entire Rumanian race, making Rumania almost a great power in extent of population, territory, and natural resources. It would assure to all branches of the race full opportunities for development of their cultural life, at present thwarted in Austro-Hungarian and Russian parts.

It would make Austria-Hungary the irreconcilable enemy to the new status of southeastern Europe. The loss of her provinces (Transylvania, eastern Alföld, southern Bukowina) would be regarded by Austria-Hungary as unbearable mutilations.

It would disturb the economic life of Austria-Hungary by the loss of the natural resources of these provinces. Austria-Hungary's new frontier would be strategically indefensible. It would mean the placing of large German and Magyar populations of these regions (almost the entire upper classes) under the rule of Rumanians, who are regarded by them as inferior in every respect.

Russia would be dissatisfied because she would lose in Bes-

sarabia a valuable frontier, and her new frontier would run dangerously near Odessa, her chief seaport; but Russia would not be so irreconcilable as Austria-Hungary, as Bessarabia is, after all, an outlying province, and there are few Great Russians in its population.

Serbia would be dissatisfied because she would not get the Banat of Temesvar, and the Serbs of that region would be put under Rumanian rule.

Bulgaria would be dissatisfied if southern Dobrudja is kept by Rumania, and there would be bitter feeling on account of the loss of Silistria, one of Bulgaria's chief towns.

The practical difficulty is the political and economic incompetence of the Rumanians. They have not been able to assimilate their alien minorities in an unrestricted atmosphere and have used the iron heel of authority to keep these minorities from business advantages, etc.

3. *Extinction and Partition of the Rumanian State.*

This might imply giving all of the territories to the Central Powers; Rumania proper (Wallachia and Moldavia) going to Austria-Hungary, and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Or it might imply a division of the territories between the Central Powers and Russia, with Wallachia going to Austria-Hungary, Moldavia to Russia, and the Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

This would mean leaving the Rumanian race irreconcilably discontented and planning a recoup. It would measurably satisfy the imperialistic aspirations of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. It would also satisfy Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Russia as a compromise solution, each realizing the major part of their dreams.

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THE BALKANS
THE DOBRUDJA

See Map of Greater Rumania on page 220.

CHAPTER XV

THE DOBRUDJA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Dobrudja is a long tongue of territory, or geographical projection of the Bulgarian uplands, thrusting northward between the Black Sea on the east and the Danube River on the west. It is this ridge of hill and plateau which forces the Danube to make its great bend after passing Silistria, and thereafter to flow due north till it washes around the end of the Dobrudja hills and bursts a way to the Black Sea.

Until recent years this barren peninsula of mountain, swamp, and sterile plateau had little importance. Its modern history really dates from its acquisition by Rumania in 1878. Previous to that time it had belonged to Turkey and had vegetated in poverty-stricken obscurity, its inhabitants being mostly Turks and nomad Tatars pasturing their flocks on its bare downs. A few Bulgarian peasants tilled the infrequent patches of more fertile soil. As a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, however, Russia compelled Turkey to cede the Dobrudja. Russia thereupon gave it to Rumania, taking in exchange the Rumanian province of Besarabia. This exchange, forced upon Rumania at the point of the bayonet, was regarded by Rumania as a robbery, for Besarabia was a fertile land peopled mostly by Rumanians, whereas Dobrudja was little better than a desert and contained no Rumanian population. However, Rumania was forced to make the best of it, and in course of time she discovered that her bargain was not so bad as she had at first supposed. The great economic development of Rumania which occurred after 1878 made necessary a short-line com-

mercial outlet to the Black Sea, and such an outlet offered itself in Constanza, the Dobrudja's chief harbor. When Constanza was connected by rail with the Rumanian capital, Bukharest, it quickly became a flourishing port, Rumania's chief commercial outlet to the Black Sea and thence to the outer world.

Rumania was, however, still dissatisfied with the situation, because Constanza was fairly close to the Bulgarian frontier, and thereby exposed to capture in time of war. Rumania remedied this strategic defect by her intervention against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War of 1913, when she forced Bulgaria to cede her the Danube fortress of Silistria, together with a strip of territory extending southeast to the port of Baltchik, on the Black Sea. This ceded strip had an area of nearly 3000 square miles, and pushed the Rumanian frontier so far southward as to preclude any Bulgarian surprise attack on Constanza. In fact, by the new frontier Rumania menaced Bulgaria's chief Black Sea port, Varna, more seriously than Bulgaria had formerly menaced Constanza.

This naturally infuriated Bulgaria. The population of the ceded strip was Bulgar or Turko-Tatar, with virtually no Rumanians. Silistria was an important Bulgarian city, while the threat to Varna and the possibility of a Rumanian thrust into the heart of Bulgaria itself made Bulgaria determined to upset the 1913 settlement and get back her lost territory with interest. Bulgaria's chance came in the autumn of 1916, when Rumania's intervention in the European War on the Entente side enabled Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, to overrun the whole Dobrudja, which at this writing is still in Bulgarian hands.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

Intrinsically the economic value of Dobrudja is not great. The backbone of this peninsula-shaped tract consists of bare hills and barren, wind-swept downs over which the Turco-Tatar shepherds drive their flocks of sheep and goats. The northern portion of the region, near the mouth of the Danube River, is marshy. It is of slight agricultural value, but serves as a feeding-ground for herds of swine, which roam freely in a semi-savage state. Only in certain sheltered spots are there patches of comparatively fertile soil.

The main economic asset of Dobrudja is the port of Constanza, Rumania's chief economic outlet and her only real seaport. It is the center of whatever commercial and industrial life exists.

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THE FACTS ABOUT THE DOBRUDJA

WHERE THE DOBRUDJA IS LOCATED

The Dobrudja is the long and relatively narrow tongue of land intervening between the Danube and the Black Sea,

after the Danube's sharp northward bend just beyond Silistria.

DIFFERENT RACES IN THE DOBRUDJA

The *Turco-Tatars*, who form the bulk of the population, are mostly herdsmen and shepherds. In the more cultivable areas they are peasants. Politically they are of little weight.

The *Bulgars* are found throughout the region save in the extreme north. They are settled especially in the towns, although some of them are peasants. They were politically dominant in the southern part until 1913; then oppressed by the Rumanians until 1916; again dominant since 1916.

The *Rumanians* are found in the northern part, mostly in the towns, especially Constanza, which is the chief port. They were politically dominant in the northern part from 1878 to 1916; they were dominant in the southern part acquired from Bulgaria from 1913 until 1916; since then they have been oppressed by the Bulgars.

WHO CONTROLLED THE DOBRUDJA BEFORE THE WAR Rumania.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED THE DOBRUDJA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Rumania maintained control until the autumn of 1916. After Rumania's entry into the war on the Allied side, the Dobrudja was quickly overrun by Bulgarian and Teutonic forces. It is now under Bulgarian military occupation.

RUMANIA'S INTERESTS IN THE DOBRUDJA

Political. Rumania claims the whole Dobrudja, including the Silistrian region, as necessary to her position as a Black Sea power and as a guaranteed sea connection with the outer world.

Economic. The Dobrudja's geographical position gives

Rumania a short line of communication with the Black Sea, and its port of Constanza has been connected by a railway trunk-line with Bukharest and the Wallachian plain, the heart of Rumania.

Strategic. Rumania claims that the whole Dobrudja, including Silistria, is necessary to protect her port of Constanza and the trunk-line railroad to Bukharest.

Racial. The Rumanian element is virtually confined to the towns, especially Constanza. It represents immigration since Rumania's acquisition of northern Dobrudja in 1878.

Cultural. Except for the above-mentioned minority, Rumania has no cultural claims.

Religious. None except in the small Rumanian minority.

BULGARIA'S INTERESTS IN THE DOBRUDJA

Political. Bulgaria claims first and foremost the return of southern Dobrudja and Silistria, which she had to cede to Rumania in 1913. She further claims the whole Dobrudja as being geographically part of Bulgaria and as having always been historically part of Bulgaria down to 1878.

Economic. The Silistrian district has some slight economic value for Bulgaria.

Strategic. The acquisition of Silistria is claimed by Bulgaria as necessary to protect her from Rumanian invasion. Possession of the whole Dobrudja would give Bulgaria the south bank of the Danube down to its mouth on the Black Sea. This would give Bulgaria a fine strategic frontier against Rumania.

Racial. The Silistrian region is mostly Bulgar in race. There are Bulgarians throughout the Dobrudja, though in the northern part they form only a small minority of the population, which everywhere, outside the towns, is predominantly Turco-Tatar.

Cultural. Except for the Bulgarian element, none.

Religious. None except for the Bulgarian element.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY
MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This implies Rumanian possession of the Dobrudja as gained by the Peace of Bukharest in 1913.

This would leave a satisfied Rumania and a dissatisfied Bulgaria.

2. *Division of the Dobrudja Between Rumania and Bulgaria.*

This would naturally follow the lines that existed before 1913. Such a compromise might satisfy the moderates in both Bulgaria and Rumania. Both Rumania's port of Constanza and Bulgaria's port of Varna would be reasonably, although not entirely, safeguarded against sudden assault by either party. The imperialists in both Rumania and Bulgaria would be dissatisfied.

3. *Annexation of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria.*

This would satisfy Bulgaria's claims to the Dobrudja, as a geographical part of Bulgaria, as a historical part of Bulgaria up to 1878, and as affording Bulgaria a fine strategic frontier along her entire northern border, the Danube. It would leave a suppressed ambition in Rumania, since Rumania would thereby lose her only seaport and her short-line railway outlet to the Black Sea, although she would still have her longer water outlet via the Danube.


Rumania would cease to be a naval or maritime power, as she would have no coast-line.

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THE NEAR EAST
CONSTANTINOPLE



CHAPTER XVI

CONSTANTINOPLE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Constantinople is the most significant city on earth. Strategically it is the world's most important capital. Situated at the key-point of the salt-water river joining two seas and sundering two continents, it serves at one and the same time as toll-gate between the Black Sea and Mediterranean and as bridge between Europe and Asia. Its name must therefore be eternally writ large on the palimpsest of history.

Constantinople was first settled by Greek colonists in the seventh century B. C., who stamped upon it that Hellenic impress which it has always retained. For the first thousand years of its existence it was known as Byzantium. Although always a place of more than local note, its world significance dates from the year A. D. 330, when the Emperor Constantine declared it the capital of the Roman Empire and gave it his name. The subsequent fall of Rome and submergence of western Europe beneath barbarian onslaughts left "the City of Constantine" the unquestioned center of the civilized world, and here the successors of Cæsar, known to history as the Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, emperors, held sway down to the Turkish conquest in 1453.

Since 1453 the Ottoman sultans have sat on the throne of the Byzantine Cæsars, and Constantinople, renamed Stamboul by the Turks, has been both the capital of the Ottoman Empire and the temporal center of the Mohammedan world, thus occupying in Islam a position analogous to that which it obtained in Christendom during the Middle Ages.

The decay of Ottoman power which began in the seventeenth century, and the possibility of the expulsion of the Turks from European soil, made Constantinople the center of that "Eastern Question" which has vexed European chancelleries for generations. Constantinople has been the great prize aimed at by every European great power seeking the reversion of the sultan's heritage. Russia has been the most insistent claimant, but France and Austria have at times dreamed of possession, with England interposing a standing veto to all such schemes, unable herself to take the city, yet determined that none other should grasp the coveted prize. Of late years two minor powers, Greece and Bulgaria, have also laid claims to Constantinople, while Germany, giving friendship as the password, was covertly admitted within the city walls by Sultan Abdul-Hamid at the beginning of the present century, and now stands the veiled, though virtual, master.

German hegemony and Turkish title-deeds are, however, both disputed by the Entente powers. When Turkey joined the Teutonic empires at the beginning of the present war, the Entente Allies announced as a part of their war aims the expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. At that time Constantinople was promised to Russia, but since the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, the Russian people have renounced all claim to its possession. Constantinople's future status is therefore to-day quite uncertain, being absolutely dependent upon the course of the war and the fiat of the peace conference which will effectuate the coming world order.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

The direct economic importance of Constantinople is to-day not great. From her once proud position as the chief emporium between East and West, receiving from the uttermost

Orient the rich products destined for distribution throughout the European West, she has now sunken to a petty seat of local trade. The endless procession of steamers bearing the produce of the Danube Valley and the Russian plains to the Mediterranean and the outer world do not break bulk, but pass her by.

Nevertheless, as the toll-gate which can stop this mighty commerce at will, her economic importance is very great, while certain recent developments presage a revival of her ancient function as the nodal point in a main-trade artery running east and west. The construction of the Bagdad Railway means the speedy opening of a short-line between central Europe and the Persian Gulf. Once the Bagdad Railway becomes commercially profitable, Constantinople will be the junction for two of the world's commercial trunk-lines, the overland route between Europe and the East and the sea route between the Mediterranean and Black seas. Her position will then be fully comparable to that enjoyed under the Byzantine Empire.

THE FACTS ABOUT CONSTANTINOPLE

The larger world-politics aspect of the Constantinople problem overshadows so completely the local interests of the population that it is hardly pertinent to treat the problem under the same outline that is applied to the other problems of this volume. It will, however, be valuable to set down the essential features of the several nations' interests in Constantinople in order to measure the conflicting desires that any attempt at solution must face.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

For centuries Constantinople has been the capital of Turkey and the center of Turkish national life. The population of Constantinople and its environs is largely Turkish. The loss of Constantinople and the Straits would involve the loss

not only of European Turkey, but also a strip of territory on the Asia Minor side of the Straits that the possessing power would need for defensive reasons. This would mean a foreign sphere even in the homeland of the Turks.

ISLAM'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

The position of the sultans of Turkey since the early sixteenth century as guardians of the holy places, Mecca and Medina, their position as Khalifas, or temporal heads, of Islam, and the present position of Turkey as the one powerful Mohammedan state, give Mohammedans everywhere a lively interest in the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire and a disinclination to acquiesce in seeing that empire reduced, as it would be by the loss of Constantinople.

GREECE'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Constantinople is the goal of the Greek imperialist, who dreams of a New Byzantine Empire and espouses the Greek *great idea* discussed elsewhere in this volume.

BULGARIA'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

History has shown that the presence of a powerful state in control of Constantinople has always meant danger to Bulgaria. The fact that most of Bulgaria's natural commercial outlets are by way of the Black Sea means that the possessor of Constantinople can at will close Bulgaria's outlets. Bulgarian imperialists dream of possessing Constantinople as the capital of a Bulgarian Empire.

THE BALKAN PEOPLES' INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

In view of the possibility, however remote, of a Balkan federation, the Balkan peoples as a whole have a lively interest in Constantinople, which would be the obvious capital for such a confederation.

.....

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Russia has a permanent economic interest in Constantinople, since the richest portion of the empire, southern Russia, looks to the Black Sea. The Russian imperialist wants Constantinople, and a peace conference must not take too seriously the revolutionist's disavowal of a claim to Constantinople, for that claim is bound to reassert itself until the problem of Russia's outlet to the sea is met by some solution as effective or better than Russia's possession of Constantinople would be.

GERMANY'S AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S INTERESTS IN
CONSTANTINOPLE

Germany and Austria-Hungary see in Constantinople a bridge over which they may extend their political and economic imperialism over the Near East.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN CONSTANTINOPLE

England does not aspire to possess Constantinople, but clearly recognizes that Constantinople in the hands of any strong power would sooner or later threaten her possession of Egypt and the Suez Canal, her position on the Persian Gulf, and her larger imperial aspirations for domination over the whole Near East south of Asia Minor and Armenia.

A SUGGESTION REGARDING A SOLUTION OF THE
CONSTANTINOPLE PROBLEM

Owing to the fact that there is a marked desire to get the Turk out of Europe, the fact that the actual possession of Constantinople by a power whose center of political and military gravity is at a distance is a liability as well as an asset, and owing to the fact that each of the great powers will be averse to having any of the others possess the city and the Straits, it is likely that some attempt at international control will be made.

As pointed out in other instances in this volume, the method of international control may be either that of administration by an international commission dealing with the Constantinople problem alone, or that of administration by a league of nations, which shall be a central organ of administration for all such international concerns. Such a solution might see to it that Constantinople should turn its strategic position to common account rather than for the benefit of one nation alone, and at the same time reduce, if not eliminate, the age-old contention about Constantinople.

Here again international control will succeed in the degree that it avoids becoming a rigid preserver of the *status quo* in the face of shifting needs and inevitable growth. It remains to be seen whether the political creativeness of the world can evolve a system of international regulation and control that will mete out a justice flexible enough to do away with the heretofore inevitable readjustments through war.

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THE NEAR EAST
ASIA MINOR

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XVII

ASIA MINOR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Asia Minor is a peninsula jutting out from the continental mass of Asia toward Europe, from which it is separated only by the narrow straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. As might be expected from its geographical conformation, it has been a meeting-place where Asiatic and European influences have struggled for supremacy. The lines of this struggle have been predetermined by the country's internal structure. Asia Minor is a high plateau, ringed about by mountains which slope sharply down into the Mediterranean, Ægean, and Black seas, which wash its sides, leaving generally narrow coast strips between mountain-slopes and seashore, Only on the western, or Ægean, coasts are there a few more gradual descents, where rivers from the interior have carved out considerable valleys.

As a result of these physical characteristics, the interior plateau has always been the somewhat sheltered home of Asiatic stocks, while the coast strips and adjacent islands, being more readily accessible, have been occupied by peoples of European blood. At times the Asiatics have conquered the Europeans, at other periods the Europeans have subdued the Asiatics; but however wide the shifts of languages, cultures, and creeds, the race lines have changed but little.

At the beginning of the historic period about 1000 B. C. the coasts and islands of Asia Minor were occupied by Greeks. These were presently conquered by the Persians after the latter had subdued the Asiatics of the interior. Then, when Alexander the Great destroyed the Persian Empire, Greek

influence spread throughout the entire region. Asia Minor remained a land of Hellenic culture down to the Turkish invasions of the eleventh century A. D., more than a thousand years later.

The Turks reversed the process, stripping off the European veneer which Hellenism had laid upon the Asiatics of the hinterland and transforming them into the modern Ottoman Turks, a stock in which the conquering Turki strain from Central Asia has been greatly diluted by the blood of the primitive Asia Minor breeds. The Greeks of the coasts and islands, however, resisted Ottomanization, and to-day remain restive under Turkish rule, just as their remote ancestors chafed under the Persian yoke more than two thousand years ago. This is the basis of the Greek claim to the Ægean coasts of Asia Minor, the region where the Hellenic population is most densely disposed.

The decay of Ottoman power and the possibility of a total break-up of the Turkish Empire has brought other peoples than the Greeks into the problem as claimants for Asia Minor spoils. Russia, Germany, Italy, and France all have interests of varying character and extent in the country. Against these foreign claimants the Turks maintain their rights as political masters of the land and actual possessors of the soil.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

As might be expected from its great size and topographical differences, an economic survey of Asia Minor presents a wide variety of conditions, with some sharp contrasts. Two rough divisions can, of course, be made—the interior plateau and the coastal regions; but within each of these two grand divisions there are wide variations of climate and soil.

The central plateau, shut off from the rain-bearing sea winds by the ring of enclosing mountains, inclines to aridity, and its heart, the great plain of Axylon, the bed of a vanished sea, is an alkali desert, broken by occasional salt lakes and marshes. Here the soil is valueless save for an evanescent spring vegetation which nourishes the Yuruk nomads' flocks of sheep and goats till the burning summer heats drive them to the hills. But about this arid center, where the land rises from its central depression toward the mountain rim, the soil is better. This intermediate zone needs only irrigation to become a great cereal-growing region, and even as it is, with ages of neglect and bad government to handicap it, certain naturally favored sections like the Sivas region contain as productive wheat-fields as exist in the world.

The coastal zone falls into three subdivisions: the Black Sea, Ægean Sea, and Mediterranean coastal regions respectively. The Black Sea coast region, exposed to the north winds from the Russian steppes, has a cold climate, with heavy rainfall and deep winter snows. Its soil is fertile and well watered, producing northern cereals and fruits. In the extreme east, the Trebizond district, under the lee of the neighboring Caucasus mountain-wall to the north, has a milder climate and produces more southerly products. The Ægean coast, with a fine, equitable climate and ample but well-distributed rainfall, is like western Europe in its soil and products. All kinds of temperate grains and fruits thrive there. The Mediterranean coast region, sheltered from the northern

winds by the overhanging coastal ranges, bathed by the warm Southern sea, and flooded with the rays of the Southern sun, is a typical Mediterranean land. Some of the alluvial plains formed by the silt of the chief rivers, notably the plain of Adana near the Syrian border, are natural hothouses in which grow a wealth of subtropical products, such as cotton, sugar, and rice. The foot-hills are belted with citrus fruit orchards, fig-trees and olive-groves. A very fine cigarette tobacco is also grown, while a number of valuable gums and licorice-root complete the long list of vegetable products.

The central plateau is almost a treeless land, but the mountain rim is clothed with fine forests except where ages of reckless cutting have stripped the steeper slopes hopelessly bare. In the north the forests are particularly fine, fir, pine, cedar, and oak predominating. In several localities valuable walnut-groves abound.

Asia Minor also contains a variety of domestic animals. The central plateau is a great grazing country. Everywhere are flocks of sheep and Angora goats, producing the valuable mohair of commerce. In the salt desert of Axylon camels find a congenial home. The plateau also nourishes a breed of small, but hardy, horses. In the agricultural regions horned cattle and buffaloes are extensively bred, especially for draft purposes.

The mineral wealth of Asia Minor is very great. Its mountain rim is richly stocked with a variety of minerals and metals, though much of this wealth is as yet unexplored and but little is actually worked, owing to bad government, lack of capital, and the meager number of roads and railways. Apparently the most valuable mineral resources are copper, iron, manganese, gold, silver, chrome, and lead, with rich coal-fields at Karasù on the Black Sea. But alum, antimony, arsenic, asbestos, borax, kaoline, lithographic stone, meerschau, mercury, nickel, rock-salt, and sulphur are known

to exist in paying quantities, and some of these are even to-day worked to a profit.

The backwardness of civilization and of general economic development naturally keeps Asia Minor's industrial life at an abnormally low level. In the immediate vicinity of Constantinople and Smyrna a few small textile, glass, and soap factories have been started, but elsewhere industry in the modern sense does not exist. Certain valuable Oriental specialties, notably carpets, rugs, silk stuffs, leather, and mohair, are, to be sure, produced in considerable quantities, but their production is carried on at the house-industry stage and under most primitive conditions.

Asia Minor is therefore a land of potentially great resources. Under modern advantages of adequate financing and effective administration it might become a prosperous economic area.

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THE FACTS ABOUT ASIA MINOR

WHERE ASIA MINOR IS LOCATED

Asia Minor is the peninsula jutting out from the Asiatic continent toward Europe between the Mediterranean and Black seas. It has an area of 200,000 square miles, or about

the size of Wyoming and Colorado combined. Its population is about 11,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN ASIA MINOR

The *Ottoman Turks* number about 8,000,000, or about seventy-two per cent. of the population. They are found throughout the region except in certain coast districts and outlying islands. They constitute the vast majority of the population of Asia Minor. They are racially very mixed, but with certain general cultural standards which, with their Mohammedan faith, have fused them into a rough national unity. They are of all social grades except the commercial classes, the Turk having shown no business ability. The Turkish peasantry, though hardworking and steady, are much depressed by taxation and conscription.

The *Greeks* number about 2,000,000, or about eighteen per cent. of the population. They are scattered all along Asia Minor's narrow coast between the coast ranges and the sea. They are also found in the towns of western Asia Minor. Some of them are peasants, and many are fishermen and sailors, especially in the islands off the Ægean coast of Asia Minor, which are solidly Greek. The Greeks also have a strong aptitude for business. Therefore the trading classes in the towns of western Asia Minor are mainly Greek. They are economically prosperous, although they have been subject to Turkish persecution since 1913.

The *Armenians* are found mostly in eastern Asia Minor, although scattered through many interior towns. On account of the persecution and massacres, reliable statistics concerning the Armenians are unavailable. They are peasants in the northeast and southeast, also workmen and artisans in the eastern towns. They are traders over a still wider area. They have a strong aptitude for commerce and industry. They have been depressed and decimated by the persecutions of the last twenty years. They are apparently well on the

road to extermination through the terrible deportations and massacres since 1914.

The *Yuruks* number about 250,000, or a little over two per cent. of the population, and are found in the desert interior basin. They are herdsmen and shepherds, primitive nomads, mostly of Turkoman blood and Mohammedan faith.

The *Levantine*s are only a sprinkling of the population. They are found in the coast towns, especially on the Ægean coast strip. They are a mongrel population of all Mediterranean stocks. Keen and shrewd, with considerable business ability, they are lacking in moral fiber. They have certain political affiliations with the Italians.

WHO CONTROLLED ASIA MINOR BEFORE THE WAR
Turkey.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED ASIA MINOR SINCE THE
WAR BEGAN

Turkey, with German oversight.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR

Turkish interests in Asia Minor are so obvious and all-embracing that they need no topical analysis. Asia Minor is the homeland of the Ottoman Turks. In the Balkans and even in Constantinople the Turk is an intruder despite centuries of political domination. East of the Taurus Mountains, which mark off Asia Minor from Syria and Mesopotamia, he is an alien conqueror, hated and despised by the Arabic inhabitants despite the bond of Islam. But the great Asia Minor plateau beyond the coast ranges which ring it in on every sea-front is a solidly Turkish land, and here the Turk must maintain his political independence unless he is to become a man without a country.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR

Political. Germany does not desire to annex Asia Minor; she prefers to let it remain politically united under the Turks. But she does aspire to economic preference or monopoly, thus reserving Asia Minor as a special sphere for German economic penetration and exploitation. Asia Minor is the necessary base for German schemes of domination over the East.

Economic. Asia Minor could easily support several times its present population. The opportunities for German capital, goods, business men, and skilled technicians are thus almost incalculable.

Strategic. Asia Minor under German control would be an invaluable base for Germany's projected ascendancy in the Near and Middle East. From this vantageground Germany could block Russia's southward advance to the Mediterranean, menace England in Egypt, and prepare schemes of aggression in both Asia and Africa.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR¹

Political. Russian imperialists desire to annex virtually all Asia Minor in order to realize two of their favorite plans; first, to secure control of Constantinople and the Straits; and, second, to obtain an alternative route to the Mediterranean at the Gulf of Alexandretta, where Asia Minor joins Syria. This, together with its necessary prerequisite, annexation of the Armenian highlands to the north, would make Russia predominant in both the Near and Middle East.

Economic. The high economic value of Asia Minor makes it a very desirable field for Russian exploitation.

Strategic. A Russian Asia Minor would enable Russia to

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

threaten England in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. From this base Russian armies could be poured freely all over the Near East.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. The Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor, like the Russians, are Orthodox Christians, but racial antipathy has in this case long nullified this apparent bond of sympathy between the two peoples.

GREECE'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR

Political. All Greeks regard the racially Greek regions of Asia Minor, especially the Ægean coast-line and adjacent islands, as irredentist ground. The extreme school of Greek imperialism claims the whole of Asia Minor as part of the Greek "Great Idea" of a restored Byzantine Empire, dominating the whole near East.

Economic. The Greeks are the most successful and aggressive economic element in Asia Minor, especially since the ruin of the Armenians. They control much of the commercial life of Asia Minor.

Strategic. Greek possession of the Ægean shore of Asia Minor and the adjacent islands would convert the Ægean into a Greek sea. Possession of this region is also necessary as the first step for Greek imperial dreams of expansion over the whole of Asia Minor.

Racial. The Greek element of the native population invokes the interest of Greece.

Cultural. The Greek element of the population is of course of Greek culture.

Religious. The Greek element of the population is Orthodox Christian.

ITALY'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR

Political. Italy aspires to control or annex southwest Asia Minor. She has already taken the first steps to this end by

her occupation of the islands of Rhodes and the Dodekanese in 1911.

Economic. The rich resources of this region would furnish a good outlet for Italian capital and trade.

Strategic. Italian possession of southwest Asia Minor would give Italy a fine base in the Near East.

Racial. Although few Italians are at present found in this region, Italy designs southwest Asia Minor as a field for Italian immigration. Its present under-population renders this feasible.

Cultural. Virtually none.

Religious. Virtually none.

ENGLAND'S AND FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN ASIA MINOR

Neither seriously contemplates the annexation of the whole or any part of Asia Minor. Their main object is to prevent any other European power from annexing it, and to keep an opening for their trade and capital.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would of course mean Turkish possession of Asia Minor. This would satisfy the vast majority of the inhabitants who are Turks, and the only native objectors would be the Greek and Armenian Christian minorities. As to European powers, this would please Germany and Austria-Hungary so long as Turkey is their ally. It would conversely displease the other European great powers, although they would all probably prefer to see Asia Minor a Turkish state rather than see it pass into the hands of any European power other than their own, or the hands of their close friends. The great objector would of course be Greece, who would not be satisfied with anything short of Greek annexation of the Ægean coast-line and the adjacent islands.

2. *Division of Asia Minor along Racial Lines.*

This would probably mean a Turkish state in the interior, Greek possession of the Ægean coast-line and the adjacent islands, with certain eastern districts given to an Armenian state.

While this appeals as the logical racial solution, certain practical difficulties are clear:

A Turkish state in the interior would always seek to recover lost districts, and since it would be more powerful militarily than either of its neighbors, the temptation to Turkish aggression on other parts would be strong.

The Greek part would have very indefensible frontiers, and, besides being a provocation to the Turkish state by cutting it off from its natural seaports, there would be a temptation to Greek imperialism to expand at the expense of the Turkish state, since, as the Italians say, "The appetite grows with eating."

An Armenian state, as discussed in the chapter on Armenia, would probably have difficulty in meeting the many apparently inevitable obstacles.

3. *Division of Asia Minor among Various European Claimants.*

This would probably mean that the Ægean region would go to Greece, southwest Asia Minor to Italy, and the rest of Asia Minor to Russia.

This would lay the foundation for possible serious future conflict. It would leave the Turkish majority sullen, embittered, and hungry for revenge.

It would probably mean quarrels among the dividers themselves, since spheres claimed by various imperialists in these countries noticeably overlap, especially Greek and Italian spheres. An imperialistic Russia would so outweigh Greece and Italy in strength and extent of territorial possessions in Asia Minor that Russia would be constantly tempted to expel

both Greece and Italy from their coastal footholds and take the whole to herself. Since this political division would also probably connote the erection of tariff walls and the establishment of economic privileges to the possessing parties, this would arouse the resentment of the excluded powers, notably Germany and Austria-Hungary, and also England and France, who, while they might assent to such division for political reasons, would dislike it for economical reasons.

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THE NEAR EAST

ARMENIA

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XVIII

ARMENIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The homeland of the Armenians is a lofty plateau intersected by still loftier mountain-ranges, culminating in the historic Mount Ararat, crowned with eternal snow. This land of short, hot summers and long, cold winters was occupied in very ancient times by a short, dark non-Aryan people which forms the substratum of the modern Armenian stock. Later this folk was conquered by an Aryan people, which impressed its language upon the country and its blood upon the upper classes, although the Armenian peasantry is still predominantly of the primitive type.

The outstanding characteristic of the Armenians is their extreme tenacity. The days of their national greatness were over before the beginning of the Christian era, the ancient Armenian kingdom having been destroyed by the Romans in the first century B. C. and ever since then they have been subjected to various foreign masters. But despite every variety of misfortune the Armenians have clung doggedly to their language, religion, and customs, and have thus preserved their race identity. In fact, taught adaptability by misfortune, the Armenians have learned to make the most of very slender opportunities, and whenever conditions have become at all bearable, they have enjoyed relative prosperity.

Such was their condition during the first half of the nineteenth century. The decay of Turkish power enabled the Armenians to purchase many privileges from the corrupt local

authorities, while the peasants of the mountainous districts enjoyed a quasi-independence.

The Berlin Congress of 1878 marked the beginning of their recent acute misfortunes. Russia then tried to make political capital out of the Armenians by claiming a protectorate over this Christian population. But England, alarmed at the prospect of Russia's gaining control of the strategically dominant Armenian plateau, blocked Russia's move by herself espousing the Armenians' cause. European powers had thus interested themselves in the welfare of Turkey's Armenian subjects, and thereby raised among the Armenians hopes of European intervention and liberation from the Turkish yoke, as the Balkan Christians had recently been liberated. But this alarmed the Turkish government and aroused the fanaticism of the local Moslem populations, fearful of falling under Christian domination. As time passed, the more impatient among the Armenians tried to bring about European intervention by initiating a revolutionary agitation marked by acts of terrorism. This, however, gave the Turkish sultan, Abdul-Hamid, the opportunity for which he had been waiting. Cleverly judging that the European powers were too disunited among themselves to intervene in Turkish affairs, he determined to crush the Armenians. The fanatical Moslem population was accordingly let loose, and in 1896 a series of terrible massacres decimated the Armenians. Thereafter massacres never wholly ceased, while the accompanying destruction of property reduced the Armenians to a state of extreme misery. The last blow fell at the beginning of the present war, when the Turkish government began a policy of wholesale deportations and massacres which has almost annihilated the Armenian population of Asiatic Turkey. The main body of the race is to-day found, not in Turkey, but in the adjoining portion of the Armenian plateau, under Russian jurisdiction.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Armenia is predominantly a country of bleak mountains and treeless, grass-covered hills, with occasional stretches of arable land in the wider river valleys or about the great lakes of Urmia and Van. The agricultural value of Armenia is, however, greater than appears from its drab and unpromising appearance. The wide plain of Van in particular is covered with a rich, brown loam, which produces excellent cereal crops. Scattered among the mountains are many deep valleys which, sheltered from the bleak winds of the plateau, are natural hothouses, producing a variety of sub-tropical products such as cotton, rice, fruits, tobacco, etc. The grass-covered hills are excellent grazing-grounds, whereon the Kurds drive their flocks of sheep and goats.

The mineral wealth of the Armenian highlands is very great, though little worked and imperfectly surveyed. The richest-known deposits are copper, which is found in many localities. Near Diarbekr is one of the richest copper-mines in the world, and other notable deposits are found near Trebizond on the Black Sea and in the Taurus region of Lesser Armenia. Iron, gold, and silver are also known to occur in paying quantities.

Industry in the modern sense does not exist. The Armenians are skilful handicraftsmen, and certain local house industries, such as carpet-weaving, are carried on. But all this is on a small scale, and the political disturbances of the last twenty years have depressed what little industrial life did exist.

THE FACTS ABOUT ARMENIA

WHERE ARMENIA IS LOCATED

Armenia proper is the mountainous plateau bounded by Transcaucasia on the north, Asia Minor on the west, Meso-

potamia on the south, and Persia on the east. It lies mostly in Turkey, but portions are under Russian and Persian jurisdiction.

Another district of Armenian population (Lesser Armenia) is the mountainous nucleus of the Taurus Mountains lying north of the Gulf of Adana, near the Mediterranean coast of Asia Minor.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Turkish Armenia, which includes the vilayets of Erzerum, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Diarbekr, Bitlis, Van, and the Kozan District of the vilayet of Adana, which is known as Lesser Armenia.

Russian Armenia, which is the southern part of Transcaucasia, near the Turkish frontier.

Persian Armenia, which includes some districts in north-west Persia near the Turkish frontier.

The combined area of these regions of Armenian population is about 80,000 square miles, or the size of Kansas.

DIFFERENT RACES IN ARMENIA

The *Armenians* are found in the Armenian plateau and in Lesser Armenia. They are also scattered in colonies in Asia Minor and in Transcaucasia. On the Armenian plateau and in Lesser Armenia they formed, until the late deportations and massacres, the largest single element of the population, although, save in a few restricted districts, they nowhere constituted a clear majority. In Armenia proper and Lesser Armenia they are mostly peasants, workmen and artisans. In the town colonies, outside their home district, they are mostly artisans and traders. They are industrious, intelligent, and with strong commercial aptitude. They are somewhat lacking in moral stamina, but with stubborn endurance. To-day they are apparently greatly reduced in numbers and economically almost ruined. The number of Armenians is

very difficult to determine. Their numbers have been greatly reduced in Turkish territory by the series of massacres and deportations which began about twenty years ago and culminated in the wholesale evictions and slaughter since 1914. On the other hand, the Armenian population in Russian Transcaucasia has grown through immigration from Turkey. In 1914 the Armenian population of the Caucasus region was 1,200,000. The Armenians of Persia number 50,000. The Armenians of Turkey must be reduced to well below 1,000,000.

The *Kurds* are found in the Armenian plateau, northeast Asia Minor, and the hill country of northern Mesopotamia. They are wild, lawless highlanders, shepherds and semi-nomads. Robbery is their ancestral trade. They are fierce, but cowardly—a worthless breed. They are Mohammedans.

The *Turks* are found throughout. They constitute a sprinkling of peasants and townfolk everywhere, including populations such as the Lazi, back of Trebizond, the littoral of the Black Sea, which, although possessing little Turkish blood, are Moslems and have been more or less Ottomanized. Also the gentry and official classes are Turks.

WHO CONTROLLED ARMENIA BEFORE THE WAR

Turkish Armenia was under Turkish rule.

Russian Armenia was under Russian rule.

Persian Armenia was *de jure* under Persian rule, but *de facto* under Russian rule.

WHO HAVE CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED ARMENIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Turkish Armenia. Russian armies occupied most of it from the beginning of 1916 until the beginning of 1918 when the increasing disorganization of the Russian armies rendered increasingly probable the loss of Russian control.

Russian Armenia. Russian, except for a few temporary Turkish raids in the autumn of 1914.

Persian Armenia. Russian, except for temporary Turkish raids.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN ARMENIA

Political. Retention of its Armenian vilayets is vital to Turkey if it is to retain its present Asiatic provinces.

Economic. The lofty Armenian plateau has such a cold climate that the country is of relatively slight agricultural value, although some sheltered districts produce good crops. There are good pasturage areas, supporting many sheep. The Armenian mountains contain considerable mineral wealth, especially copper, but it is little worked and imperfectly known.

Strategic. The strategic value of Armenia is very great. The Armenian plateau is the keystone of the arch of Turkish Asiatic dominion. A hostile power intrenched in this natural fortress would dominate the rest of Asiatic Turkey in every direction, and could throw armies freely westward into Asia Minor or southward toward Syria and Mesopotamia.

Racial. There is a large Turkish element in the population of these provinces.

Cultural. Such culture as the Mohammedan elements of the population possess is mainly Turkish.

Religious. All of the Mohammedan elements of the population are bound to Turkey by religious ties.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN ARMENIA ¹

Political. Possession of Turkish and Persian Armenia would place the whole of the Armenian plateau in Russian hands, thus enabling Russia to dominate the whole of Asiatic Turkey and northern Persia.

Economic. As previously stated, the economic value of the Armenian plateau is considerable, and, under strong government, its latent economic possibilities could be greatly developed.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

Strategic. Were the Armenian plateau wholly in Russian hands, Russian armies could pour freely all over Asiatic Turkey, and could break a path to the Mediterranean, giving Russia a valuable warm-water naval base at the port of Alexandretta.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. The religious interest is slight. The Armenians, although Christians, belong to a special branch of Christianity. Thus they do not come within Russia's protectorate of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN ARMENIA

Turkish retention of Armenia is necessary to the German scheme of a German-controlled Ottoman Empire.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN ARMENIA

England would not care to see Turkish Armenia in Russian hands, since this would enable an imperialistic Russia to conquer Mesopotamia and Syria, thus threatening both the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. The same dangers to England would be involved in an Armenia forming part of a German-controlled Turkish Empire.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would imply the continued division of the Armenian race between Turkey, Russia, and Persia. In this case the Armenians could in no way achieve a real national identity. If Turkey, Russia, and Persia are reactionary after the war, the Armenians would remain persecuted parts of these three political dominions. If these three countries should be in reality liberal after the war and should be disposed to grant local autonomy to national minorities, the Armenians would

still be unable to take advantage of the grant. Russian and Persian Armenia are such narrow frontier bands of territory that they would be difficult to administer as units. In Turkish Armenia the Armenian population is too scattered and interspersed with other racial elements.

2. *United Armenia.*

A union of the territories of Turkish, Russian, and Persian Armenia would result in enough area to constitute an independent state, but in no considerable section of this area would the Armenians form a clear majority of the population. To be sure, the Armenians would be the most intelligent and progressive element; but their numbers and their vitality has been so greatly reduced by the long series of persecutions and massacres, and there has been such extensive destruction of property in these territories, that their potential force has been so reduced as to form a serious bar to their gaining the ascendancy over the more numerous racial elements in the territory.

3. *Limited Armenian State Constituted of the Turkish Part.*

This would be even less viable than a united Armenia. It is in the Turkish part that the massacres, persecutions, destruction of property, and reduction of vitality have been greatest.

4. *Annexation of Armenia to Russia.*

The annexation of all Armenian territory to an imperial Russia would mean attempted denationalization and Russification of the Armenians, as has occurred in the past in Russian Armenia. Annexation to a liberal Russia would mean an eventual chance for the Armenians to realize, to some degree at least, their national aspirations. Russian protection could contribute an adequate policing that would restrain the

lawless elements which in an independent Armenia would probably prevent the Armenians, relatively unwarlike, from developing and maintaining political control. In such a controlled situation the Armenians could develop their economic and cultural superiority and would become the dominant element, thus gaining ultimately something of national solidarity.

5. *Autonomous Armenia under Russia.*

This would be feasible probably after a period of development under the kind of protection a liberalized Russia could give the Armenians as discussed above.

6. *Autonomous Armenia under Turkey.*

This is probably not feasible because it is hardly probable that even a liberalized Turkey would consent to allow its racial and religious kinsmen inhabiting these regions to pass under Christian Armenian rule.

7. *German-controlled Armenia as Part of a German-controlled Turkish Empire.*

This would mean strong government and economic development. With their economic superiority, the Armenians could take more advantage of such a period of economic development than could the other elements. It probably would not give the Armenians a chance to develop political strength as a start toward an Armenian nationalism, because the Germans would be obliged to take into account the sentiments of the Mohammedan majority of the Turkish Empire, which would oppose any national aspirations on the part of the Armenians.

8. *Internationalization of Armenia.*

In this instance, as in all others, the question of international regulation or control depends upon the large outcome of the peace conference. Nobody yet knows whether or not the conference will create really workable organs of international control. If a general league of nations is created,

these "areas of friction" may well become administrative wards of the league. In the absence of a general league, or in the event that a league is formed for the sole purpose of police duty, then there may be created here and there in the weak spots of international life certain local centers of international administration. At best these will represent experiments in constructive statesmanship.

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THE NEAR EAST
SYRIA

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XIX

SYRIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Syria is a long strip of relatively habitable land between the vast expanse of the Arabian desert and the Mediterranean Sea. Its chief historical significance has been due to its being the main line of communication between Asia and Africa. For this reason Syria has been a meeting-place and battle-ground of nations and peoples, so that to-day its population is racially one of the most mixed on earth. For this same reason it has never been a seat of enduring political power, its ancient states, such as the kingdom of the Jews and the city polities of the Phœnicians, having been ground up long before the Christian era under the shock of rival empires battling for the Syrian spoils.

Syria's latest master, Turkey, has been in control since the sixteenth century; but the Turk has always remained a stranger in the land, disliked by all the elements of the polyglot population.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

Taken as a whole, Syria is a poor country. In ancient times it was more favored, but ages of neglect have destroyed its forests and thus decreased its rainfall, while over-cultivation has impoverished the soil. There are still some fertile districts, especially on the Mediterranean coast and in Palestine, while the large oasis of Damascus enjoys a historic reputation. Elsewhere, however, crops are thin, and agriculture is handicapped by insufficient rainfall. Irrigation would restore many districts.

Syria is poor in minerals and in water-power. Industrial life is at a very low ebb. The native textile and silk industries have been almost destroyed by cheap European machine-made products.

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THE FACTS ABOUT SYRIA

WHERE SYRIA IS LOCATED

Syria is the long strip of territory lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian desert. Syria has an area of 114,530 square miles, or about the size of Arizona. Its population is 3,675,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN SYRIA

The *Arabs* number 3,000,000 and are found throughout, except in a few mountainous districts. The population of Syria is extremely mixed. But the numerous Arab migra-

tions which have overrun Syria, especially since the Mohammedan conquest (seventh century A. D.), together with the unifying influence of Islam, have so Arabized these mongrel populations, who to-day speak mostly Arabic, that they feel themselves to be Arabs and may be counted as such. Only the sects of religious dissidents occupying the remote mountainous districts have maintained the older religious and cultural ideas, and thus stand racially apart.

The *Turks* are found throughout the region. They are mostly officials and garrison troops. They are few in number, but politically dominant.

The *Maronites* number 350,000 and are found in the Lebanon region of northern Syria. They are the only one of the dissident sects of more than local importance. Christians, reconciled with Rome, they have for centuries been under the protectorate of France and have thus absorbed much French culture. They are the basis of French claims to Syria. In their mountain fastnesses of Lebanon they have led a semi-autonomous political existence.

The *Druses* number 200,000 and are found in the Lebanon and Damascus regions. They are an heretical Moslem sect, fierce and predatory, long the scourge of their Christian Maronite neighbors.

The *Jews* are found mostly in Palestine. They are about equally divided between Oriental Jews of Sephardin stock and recent Zionist immigrants from Russia and Rumania, mostly of Ashkenazim blood.

Minor Christian and heretical Moslem sects are found in various regions. They are obscure peasants and hillmen.

WHO CONTROLLED SYRIA BEFORE THE WAR
Turkey.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED SYRIA SINCE THE
WAR BEGAN

Turkey, until the British invasion from Egypt, which began early in 1917 and has now progressed to a point north of Jerusalem.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN SYRIA

Turkey's interest in the retention of this important part of its dominions is too evident to require topical analysis. Besides its intrinsic value, the loss of Syria would jeopardize Turkey's communications with Mesopotamia and would entirely cut off contact with Arabia.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN SYRIA

Political. Syria is the natural land gateway to Egypt and the Suez Canal. Were Syria in British hands, Egypt would be unassailable, and England's desired control of Arabia and Mesopotamia would be greatly furthered.

Economic. While the economic value of Syria is not particularly high, a considerable portion of Syria's trade is in English hands.

Strategic. As the present war has demonstrated, Syria is the obvious base for attacks on Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Virtually none.

FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN SYRIA

Political. French interests in Syria are very old, dating from the crusades. French imperialists have long regarded Syria as a possible sphere of French control.

Economic. Much French capital is invested in Syria, and several valuable railway and other concessions are in French hands.

Strategic. France's acquisition of Syria would solidify her position in the Near East by giving her a territorial foothold, which she does not now possess.

Racial. None.

Cultural. The French protectorate exercised for generations over the Roman Catholics of Syria has drawn the latter to French culture. The Maronites of Lebanon in particular are largely educated in French church schools, and have absorbed many French ideas.

Religious. The French protectorate over the Roman Catholics of Syria forms the base of religious interests.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN SYRIA

Syria as part of a German-controlled Turkey is vital to the German imperialist dream of German domination over both the Near East and Africa.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN SYRIA

Russia, as the protector of the Orthodox Christians in Asiatic Turkey, has religious interests in Syria analogous to those of France. Some Russian imperialists hope to use these religious interests for political ends.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would mean Syria as a part of the Turkish Empire, with continued discontent among nearly all parts of the population under Turkish rule. Turkey would be satisfied with this solution, and so long as Turkey was friendly to the Central powers, it would satisfy Germany and Austria-Hungary. It would greatly displease England and France and in a lesser degree Russia.

2. *German Controlled Syria as Part of a German Controlled Turkey.*

This would be an important step toward German imperialist dreams of domination of the Near East and possibly Africa. It would be bitterly opposed by England and France and to a lesser degree by Russia.

3. *Annexation of Syria to France.*

This would be welcomed by most of the Christian minority, especially the Maronites of Lebanon, with their traditional dependence upon France. It would probably be resented at first by the Mohammedan majority, although France has been so successful in handling kindred peoples in northern Africa that she might reconcile them to French rule. It would be opposed by Turkey and the Central powers. While England might not formally object to it, English imperialists would probably regret that it was not under English rule.

4. *Annexation of Syria to England.*

This is desired by British imperialists as part of their Cape-Cairo-Calcutta dream. It would be the last link save Mesopotamia in the chain of India, Baluchistan, southern Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. It would also give England control of the whole Arabian peninsula by isolating it from all foreign influence, and by inclosing it within British controlled territory and British controlled seas. This would imply a veiled protectorate of the holy places, Mecca and Medina, and thus a strong British hold over the entire Moslem world.

5. *Annexation of Syria to Egypt.*

This would be in many ways the carrying out of a tendency that has existed for ages. On numerous occasions (the Pharaohs, the Mamelukes, and Mehemet Ali) Syria has fallen under Egyptian control, and Syria is in fact the first logical possession for an expanding and aspiring Egypt. Such an

Egyptian control of Syria would at first connote English over-control, but would also contain the germ of an Egypto-Arab Empire to which the khedival dynasty of Egypt has been long secretly aspiring.

6. *Syria as Part of a Pan-Arabia.*

This is the dream of most of the Mohammedan Arab or Arabized population of Syria, as well as Pan-Arabians everywhere. Their ultimate goal is a great empire uniting all the peoples of Arab blood and culture from Morocco to Persia and from Mesopotamia to Central Africa. Such a Pan-Arabian empire would probably be opposed by all European states. (Present references by statesmen to a free and independent Arabia mean merely the Arabian peninsula, with *possibly* Syria and Egypt added and even these under European veiled control as guarantees.)

A genuine Pan-Arabian empire would menace all European possessions in Asia and Africa and would risk conjuring up the specter of a militant Pan-Islamism against European Christendom.

7. *Palestine Erected Into a Jewish State.*

This could come about only through control of Syria by some European power or powers or by an international concert.

The number of Jews in Palestine is to-day so small and their position so artificial a product of Zionist stimulation that further immigration of Jews could come only through large capitalization by wealthy Jews throughout the world.

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THE NEAR EAST
MESOPOTAMIA

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CHAPTER XX

MESOPOTAMIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As Egypt is the gift of the Nile, so Mesopotamia is the creation of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The great twin rivers, bursting out of the snow-clad Armenian highlands to the north, have deposited their abundant silt in the course of their southward flow, and during unnumbered ages have transformed what was originally a long arm of the sea into a vast alluvial plain stretching from the Armenian highlands to the Persian Gulf and filling in the whole wide depression between the Persian mountains on the east and the sterile Arabian plateau on the west. The Persian Gulf, into which the Tigris and the Euphrates finally discharge themselves, is merely the diminished remnant of the ancient sea which once stretched to the very foot-hills of the Armenian mountains.

The Mesopotamian plain, being one vast alluvial deposit, holds possibilities of marvelous fertility. A rational distribution of the river waters can easily make its rich soil bear diverse crops of incredible yield. Accordingly, whenever a strong and intelligent government has controlled it, Mesopotamia has become one of the garden-spots of the world, studded with magnificent cities and supporting a dense population. Such it was in the ancient days of Nineveh and Babylon; such again in the early Middle Ages under Haroun-al-Raschid, the mighty Calif of Bagdad.

Its present miserable condition dates from the terrible Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, which desolated the whole country and slew its industrious population. Since

then no strong, intelligent government has arisen to repair the irrigation canals; so the land has gone to waste, parched during the dry months of low water, soaked to fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods. Its present inhabitants are a mere handful of Arabized mongrels, who cling to a sprinkling of wretched villages, cowed by swarms of nomad Bedouin Arabs crowding in from the great desert to the west and pasturing their flocks and camels on the sites of ancient fields.

Turkish authority is confined mostly to the towns, for, although Mesopotamia has formed part of the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century, the Turks have never acquired more than a superficial hold upon the land. Outside the towns political power is exercised by local Arab sheiks and by the heads of the great Bedouin tribes.

ECONOMIC SURVEY

Mesopotamia is a land of immense economic possibilities ruined by centuries of misgovernment and neglect. As might be expected from a region built up mainly by alluvial deposits, Mesopotamia is devoid of mineral wealth save for some bitumen and petroleum deposits on the middle Tigris. It is also a treeless country, with the exception of some sparse growth along the river-banks and the palm-groves of the extreme south, near the Persian Gulf.

Mesopotamia is thus predestined to be an agricultural country. Nevertheless, nature must be supplemented by man. Mesopotamia's rainfall is not sufficient for regular agriculture. The winter rains clothe the land with rich herbage, but by midsummer this is burned up, and the country takes on the appearance of a desert. The key to Mesopotamia's agricultural wealth is the water of the great rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates. This water, however, needs the artificial distribution that an elaborate irrigation system would provide.

With such a system installed, there would be almost no limit to the productivity of the soil. Every kind of cereal can be grown, especially in the north, while the southern portion of Mesopotamia would offer ideal conditions for subtropical staples, notably cotton and rice. At present the only important product of Mesopotamia is dates.

In default of agriculture, Mesopotamia is to-day mainly a pastoral region. Here the Arab tribes find excellent spring pasturage for their sheep and goats, while camels also abound.

As to industrial life, it is virtually non-existent.

THE FACTS ABOUT MESOPOTAMIA

WHERE MESOPOTAMIA IS LOCATED

Mesopotamia is the region of the alluvial plains of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers lying between the Persian plateau and the Arabian desert, and stretching from the Armenian highlands to the Persian Gulf.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Mesopotamia, which includes the vilayets of *Mosul*, *Bagdad*, and *Basra*, has an area of 143,250 square miles, or about the size of Montana. Its population is about 2,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN MESOPOTAMIA

The *Arabs* are found throughout, except in the extreme north and northeast of the region. Racially the population of Mesopotamia is very mixed, but centuries of Arab invasions and immigrations, together with Islam and the general use of the Arab language, have pretty thoroughly Arabized the mass of the population. Owing to the general decay of agriculture, a large part of the population are nomads or semi-nomads with Arab tribal organizations.

The *Kurds* are found in the north and northeast of the region. Flowing down from the Armenian highlands, they

occupy the foot-hills, in some places extending out into the Mesopotamian plain itself. They are nomadic, lawless, and primitive.

The *Turks* are found throughout the region. They are almost exclusively officials and soldiers. They are politically dominant in the cities and settled districts, though the local Arab sheikhs have much authority, while the nomad tribes are virtually independent.

The *Persians* are found in central Mesopotamia, especially about Bagdad. Mesopotamia was for centuries under Persian rule. Also, some of the Shiite sacred places are in this region, and are visited by hosts of Persian pilgrims. Thus a considerable Persian population, especially religious officials, merchants, and artisans, has accumulated. Persian influence is evident throughout the vilayet of Bagdad.

The *Assyrian Christians* are found in a few scattered localities. They are the only self-conscious remnant of the older populations. They have been kept from complete Arabization through their Christian faith. They are few in numbers, depressed, and persecuted. They exert no distinct influence on the general life of the country.

WHO CONTROLLED MESOPOTAMIA BEFORE THE WAR

Turkey.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED MESOPOTAMIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

Southern Mesopotamia has been under British military control from the Persian Gulf to a point some distance above Bagdad. Northern Mesopotamia is still Turkish.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN MESOPOTAMIA

Political. English control of Mesopotamia would make her clearly predominant in the Middle East. Already possessing

Egypt and India and controlling southern Persia, British possession of Mesopotamia would virtually insure the linking up of all these regions overland by a trans-Asian railroad from Cairo to Calcutta. And this, in turn, would isolate Arabia from direct contact with any other foreign power, thereby insuring British hegemony throughout the peninsula and a more or less veiled control of Islam's holy places, Mecca and Medina. That would give England, already the greatest Moslem power, the virtual hegemony of the Moslem world. British control of Mesopotamia would also do much to allay Indian unrest by opening a field for India's congested population in a Mesopotamia regenerated by irrigation and good government. Such a Mesopotamia could support many times its present very sparse nomadic population.

Economic. In English hands Mesopotamia might become one of the granaries of the empire and one of its chief cotton-growing areas. It might also serve as an outlet for India's congested population.

Strategic. As stated under England's political interest, British control of Mesopotamia would supply the missing link in England's chain of Eastern empire from Cairo to Calcutta. It would also buttress her sea-power by absolutely precluding any land threat to the Persian Gulf, a very vulnerable spot in Britain's naval armor.

Racial. England has no direct racial interest in Mesopotamia.

Cultural. None.

Religious. England is already the greatest Mohammedan power in the world. Mesopotamia, by assuring British control of Arabia and the holy places, Mecca and Medina, would greatly enhance English prestige throughout the Mohammedan world. Furthermore, possession of the Shiite holy places in Mesopotamia, Kerbela, for instance, would increase British prestige and strengthen her hold over the Shiite Persians.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN MESOPOTAMIA

Political. Germany desires to obtain indirect possession of Mesopotamia through a German-controlled Turkey. This would mean a firm base of German power driven down between Egypt and Persia to the Persian Gulf. That would involve a general threat to English predominance in the Middle East. It would also mean for Germany the possibility of controlling Arabia and the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, thus gaining great prestige for Germany throughout the Mohammedan world.

Economic. The enormous possibilities of Mesopotamia as a wheat-raising and cotton-growing country make its control especially desirable for a central Europe such as Germany dreams of heading. This would satisfy two of Germany's chief desires, for which she has previously been obliged to look overseas, thus making her relatively immune to the economic strangulation of British sea-power. Possession of Mesopotamia would also give Germany a base for the economic penetration of Persia.

Strategic. Control of Mesopotamia would give Germany a good military base for operation against Persia and, through Persia, against India. It would also enable her to threaten British sea-power in the East by giving Germany a good naval base on the Persian Gulf.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Germany has no direct religious interest in Mesopotamia, but, indirectly, control of Mesopotamia would give Germany much influence in the Mohammedan world.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN MESOPOTAMIA

The great value of Mesopotamia in every respect makes Turkey's interest in retaining this important part of its dominion self-evident.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN MESOPOTAMIA

Some Russian imperialists dream of annexing Mesopotamia and driving down to the Persian Gulf, after having annexed Armenia and Persia, thus insuring Russian domination of the Middle East.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

This would mean Mesopotamia's being part of a German-controlled Turkey. This would satisfy Turkey and Germany, but would be bitterly opposed by England, and would probably run counter to the present desires of the native population which, so far as it has any self-consciousness, is Arab and anti-Turkish.

2. *Annexation of Mesopotamia to the British Empire.*

This would mean a real asset to English power politically, economically, and strategically. Probably the native population would not at first take kindly to British rule, as they are in reality opposed to the rule of any foreign power and wedded to their anarchic independence. This would not, however, be a serious factor, since the native population is small, semi-savage, and racially inarticulate.

3. *Mesopotamia as Part of a Pan-Arab Empire.*

This solution is the one the native population would probably prefer, but it would be bitterly opposed by all the European powers and Turkey, since such an empire would threaten both Europeans and Turks throughout the Near and Middle East.

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THE NEAR EAST
ARABIA

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XXI

ARABIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Arabia is a vast plateau, bounded by the Persian Gulf on the east, the Indian Ocean on the south, and the Red Sea on the west. Its northern or land frontier is rather indeterminate, the sterile wastes of northern Arabia melting imperceptibly into the Mesopotamian region to the northeast and the Syrian region to the northwest.

Taken as a whole, Arabia is a desert land, though there are some regions that are comparatively well favored by nature. The best parts of Arabia lie in the south. In the extreme southeast and southwest the lofty mountains of Oman and Yemen, respectively, rise high enough to catch the monsoon rains, so that these regions enjoy a fairly abundant water-supply, which makes possible regular cultivation and supports a settled agricultural population. Between these two favored coast regions stretches a vast, sandy desert almost devoid of life.

Central Arabia, though possessing no large fertile areas like Oman and Yemen, contains many oases that support a settled population, while much of its territory has sufficient rainfall to give pasturage to sheep and camels during certain seasons of the year. This is the homeland of the pastoral Bedouins who roam over its wide stretches.

Northern Arabia is less favored. It is not so inhospitable as the great southern desert, but it has a lighter rainfall than the central belt and contains fewer oases.

Arabia is probably the original home of the Semitic branch

of the human species, and the Bedouin Arabs of the interior are to-day the purest representatives of the Semitic race. The Arabs possess many high qualities. Their physical make-up is remarkably fine and their intellectual powers are great. Their chief weakness is a general instability and incapacity for political association, which has kept them divided and weak during the greater part of their history. Only once have they played a major part in world affairs. This was when their great genius Mohammed succeeded in fusing them into a temporary political and spiritual unity, which carried Arab arms and Arab civilization from France to China.

This mighty Arab outpouring of the seventh century A. D. was not enduring. But the Arabs set their mark on every portion of the Mohammedan world, and the memories of this time are enshrined in every Arab heart. From that day to this the Arabs have regarded themselves as a chosen people, and a series of politico-religious movements have swept the peninsula looking to the reestablishment of Arab power in the world.

The most recent of these movements had its roots in the Wahabite propaganda of the eighteenth century. This was primarily a religious revival aiming at the purification of Islam from various abuses into which Mohammedanism had fallen, but it soon acquired a political and even nationalistic complexion. The Wahabites found both coasts of Arabia under the power of the Turks, who were always regarded by the Arabs as a barbarous and inferior people. The aim of the Wahabites was to free Arabia, rescue the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, from Turkish pollution, and reforge the Arab race into a conquering theocracy for the triumph of Islam throughout the world. For a while they were successful. By the end of the eighteenth century the Turks were virtually driven from Arabia. However, the Turkish sultan now called upon Mehemet Ali, the new ruler of Egypt, and Mehemet Ali's European-drilled troops defeated the Wahabites and

established Egyptian control over a great part of the peninsula. The permanent retention of Arabia, however, proved too great a task. The Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn, and the Turkish Empire, then reviving under European reforms, regained its former grip on the coast provinces both to the east and the west.

The interior, however, remained independent, and continued a seat of Wahabite religious teaching, and the Wahabite leaven continually stirred the coastal populations to revolt against Turkish rule.

During the nineteenth century another foreign influence, England, became increasingly potent in southern Arabia. During that period England established herself at Aden, the extreme southwestern tip of Arabia, and brought under English control the opposite region of Oman, at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. From these two foci British influence radiated over a wide zone, particularly in the east, the Persian Gulf region becoming virtually a British sphere of influence throughout.

The present war immediately produced a test of strength between the Turks and the British to determine their respective positions in Arabia. The Turks attempted to drive the British from Aden, while the British clinched their mastery of the Persian Gulf region by landing an army at the head of the gulf and undertaking the conquest of Mesopotamia. As time passed, the British gradually got the upper hand, and in the summer of 1916 Turkish power in Arabia was dealt a crushing blow by the revolt of the Grand Shereef of Mecca, a religious potentate who led his people to the expulsion of the hated Turks. At the close of 1916, the Shereef, with British backing, declared himself Sultan of Arabia, and to-day Turkish power throughout the peninsula is virtually at an end.

As things now stand, British influence is paramount throughout Arabia. But in the long run British as well as

Turkish influence is menaced by the growth of Arab nationalistic sentiment, which, founded on the puritan zealotry of the Wahabites, has taken on an increasing political complexion since the beginning of the twentieth century. This movement is known as Pan-Arabism. Its adherents are found not only in Arabia proper, but among the Arabized populations of Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and wide stretches of northern Africa. Its thinkers dream of a great Arab empire, which will expel all foreigners and revive the glories of an Arab-controlled Islam.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

In proportion to its vast extent, the economic value of Arabia is slight, great stretches of country being absolute desert, while other large regions are sterile plateau sparsely tufted with scrub and wiry grasses which give pasture to sheep and goats at certain seasons.

The only two regions of real fertility are Yemen and Oman. Endowed with good soil and a sufficient rainfall, these districts produce valuable agricultural crops. The coffee of Yemen is noted throughout the world. In both Yemen and Oman cereals, especially wheat, barley, and millet, are extensively cultivated. Outside of a few districts in Yemen there are no forests; but the date-palm grows readily throughout the peninsula, wherever there is any water, and is one of the great food staples of the country. The aromatic gums for which Arabia was famous in antiquity are to-day but little grown.

As befits a pastoral country, Arabia supports numberless flocks of sheep and goats, which, with the camel, form the chief wealth of the Bedouin tribes. Contrary to general belief, the horse is not so abundant as the camel, its dependence upon comparatively rich pasturage making its extensive breeding impracticable. In the agricultural areas, especially Yemen, horned cattle are found.

The mineral wealth of Arabia is not great, and what little there is has been very imperfectly explored.

Industrial life, save for a few local house-industries, does not exist.

THE FACTS ABOUT ARABIA

WHERE ARABIA IS LOCATED

Arabia is the peninsula bounded by Syria and Mesopotamia on the north, the Persian Gulf on the east, the Indian Ocean on the south, and the Red Sea on the west.

TERRITORIAL UNITS INVOLVED

Turkish Arabia, which includes the vilayets of Hejaz and Yemen, has an area of 170,300 square miles and a population of 1,050,000. Since the summer of 1916 these provinces have been in revolt, and Turkish rule over them has virtually ceased. The leader of the rebellion, the Grand Shereef of Mecca, has proclaimed his independence and declared these provinces to constitute the Sultanate of Arabia. The vilayet of Nejd comprises the vast interior of middle Arabia, including a district on the Persian Gulf coast. It is a mere name, since Turkey exercises no authority in the region, all power being in the hands of local chieftains. The whole matter is the result of a political bargain struck in 1914 between the Turkish Government and the most powerful native chieftain, Abdul-Aziz Bin Saud, who theoretically recognized Turkish authority, and was thereupon appointed Vali.

British Arabia, which includes the Aden protectorate, with an area of 9000 square miles and a population of 46,000, and the Oman protectorate, with an area of 82,000 square miles and a population of 500,000.

Independent Arabia, which includes the whole vast interior, as well as part of the Persian Gulf coast. It includes the so-called Vilayet of Nejd. The most powerful ruler is Bin Saud, referred to above. Its area is 1,000,000 square miles. Its population is estimated at 3,500,000.

Arabia has therefore a total area of about 1,200,000 square miles, or about one third the total area of the United States, and a population estimated at about 5,000,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN ARABIA

The *Arabs* may be put down as constituting the essential population of the whole peninsula except for a small *Jewish* element that has been settled in Arabia since very ancient times. In southern Arabia, however, the Semitic type is much mixed with Hamitic and negroid elements from Africa.

WHO CONTROLLED ARABIA BEFORE THE WAR

Turkish Arabia was under the control of Turkey.

British Arabia was under the control of England.

Independent Arabia was under the control of local chieftains, the central region of Nejd being mostly united under the authority of Bin Saud.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED ARABIA SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

At the end of 1914, Turkish troops overran most of the Aden protectorate, but this Turkish occupation ended with the collapse of Turkish authority upon the successful revolt of the Shereef of Mecca in the summer of 1916. The west coast (vilayets of Hejaz and Yemen), including the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, now constitute the Sultanate of Arabia.

This new Arab state has been recognized and is supported by England, but is, of course, not recognized by Turkey. Independent Arabia has not changed its status. Bin Saud, ruler of Nejd, has apparently maintained an attitude of neutrality.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN ARABIA

Political. In the ordinary sense Turkey's interests politically are not great.

The possession of her portion of Arabia has been more of a burden than a benefit. It is through her possession of the holy places, Mecca and Medina, that she is able to exert influences upon pilgrims from all parts of the Mohammedan world, and these influences are a political, as well as a religious, asset.

Economic. Virtually none. Economic benefits are more than offset by the expense of maintaining Turkish authority.

Strategic. In a defensive sense Turkish Arabia is a liability rather than an asset; but to Ottoman imperialists Turkish Arabia offers necessary territorial bases for assaults upon Egypt and the Persian Gulf region and for the possible Turkish conquest of the entire Arabian peninsula.

Racial. None.

Cultural. In the strict sense, none. While Arab culture has profoundly influenced Turkish culture, it has not been influenced by Turkish culture.

Religious. This is the great interest Turkey has in Arabia. Possession of Mecca and Medina is of incalculable importance to the Mohammedan Turks.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN ARABIA

Political. England regards her possession of Aden as a necessary pendant to her control of Egypt and the Suez Canal and as an indispensable way-station on her route to the Far East. She regards her protectorate over Oman and the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula as necessary to her dominance

of the Persian Gulf. Lastly, British imperialists desire to control the entire Arabian Peninsula as a link in the projected chain of empire from Cairo to Calcutta, and as a means of strengthening the hold on England's Mohammedan subjects through a veiled control of the holy cities.

Economic. Under strong government such as England could give, Yemen, and to a lesser degree, other parts of the peninsula would admit of a greater economic development than now prevails.

Strategic. The possession of the Arabian peninsula would insure English predominance throughout the Middle East, would almost certainly involve England's possession of Mesopotamia and Syria, and would make possible a trans-Asian railroad from Cairo to Calcutta, which would solidly knit England's Asian and African dominions into a firm band of empire.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Since England to-day rules over more Mohammedans than any other power, control of the holy places would heighten her influence over her Moslem subjects and the entire Moslem world.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN ARABIA

Germany does not aspire to direct control of Arabia, but does desire veiled control of Arabia as part of a rejuvenated and German-directed and exploited Turkish Empire, with all that this implies of dominance in the Near East, influence throughout the Moslem world, and threats to England's Eastern empire.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

As to the Turkish part of Arabia, this would mean a con-

tinuous condition of unrest under a rule which the inhabitants dislike.

As to the British part of Arabia, it would mean that the unsettled condition of the rest of the peninsula would be a temptation to British imperialism.

As to the independent part of Arabia, this would mean the continuance of a favorable center for Pan-Arabia and Pan-Islam agitation.

It would mean the continuance of an unstable condition throughout.

2. British Controlled Arabia.

This would mean a strengthening of the British Empire throughout the East and the bringing of Arabia within the pale of Western civilization under strong government and rational economic exploitation. But it would probably meet with the bitter hostility of the native population, and might provoke Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arabic activity, which might react unfavorably far beyond the bounds of the peninsula itself.

3. Turkish Controlled Arabia.

It is difficult to believe that an Ottoman Empire left to its own resources, could retain permanent control of the entire peninsula. In the face of the hostility of the native population to Turkish rule, the strain would probably prove too great.

4. Arabia Under Veiled German Control.

A German-controlled Ottoman Empire would have the power to conquer and maintain control over Arabia and give it economic development. The fact that the nominal owner of Arabia would be Turkey would probably prevent native discontent from assuming a Pan-Islamic complexion. But the discontent would be none the less bitter, and it could rely

upon the support of England, who could be counted upon to oppose a German control of Arabia.

5. *Independent Arabia.*

A truly independent state, confined to the limits of the Arabian Peninsula, is probably not feasible. The present poverty of the country and the traditional political instability of the Arabs themselves would probably prevent the establishment of such a polity.

6. *Arabia as Part of a Pan-Arab Empire.*

This would imply the union of the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Mesopotamia, and very probably northern Africa into a state, the fundamental bases of which would be the unity of the Arab race and culture inspired by Islam. This religious sanction would probably be the only moral basis upon which such an empire could be effectuated. The presence of such comparatively rich and civilized areas as Syria and Egypt would give the state a nucleating center of stable economic, political, and intellectual life, not possessed by the limited Arabian state projected above.

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THE NEAR EAST
EGYPT

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XXII

EGYPT

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Egypt is the gift of the Nile. Without this current of life-giving water pouring down from the distant Abyssinian highlands and traversing hundreds of leagues of waterless country until it finally empties into the Mediterranean there would be nothing to distinguish the Nile Valley from the vast deserts which stretch away on either hand to east and west.

Along the banks of the Nile and in the broad Delta which the river has gradually built out into the Mediterranean an industrious agricultural population has been established since prehistoric times. Isolated for ages from the rest of the world, the Egyptians developed a strongly marked racial identity which has persisted almost unchanged to the present day. The Persian Conquest (521 B. C.) ended the period of native rule, and ever since the Egyptians have been ruled by a long series of foreign masters. But beneath all these shifting foreign administrations, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, Arab, Mameluke, and Turk, has lain the great mass of Egyptian peasantry, the fellaheen, unchanged and unchanging; and finally the alien intruders have been absorbed into the Egyptian type. The physical and mental make-up of the modern fellah is to all appearances precisely that of his remote ancestor who sweated under the task-masters of Pharaoh.

The modern history of Egypt really dates from the French invasion under Napoleon in 1796. Though the French were expelled in 1801, they had impressed the Egyptian upper

classes with the power and superiority of European methods, and when during the troubled years which followed the French evacuation the able Albanian adventurer Mehemet Ali made himself master of the country, he strenuously endeavored to turn Egypt into a regular modern state. During his long reign (1805–1848) he forced the Sultan of Turkey to abandon all direct interference with Egyptian affairs and to recognize him and his successors as hereditary rulers of Egypt under a merely nominal Turkish suzerainty, Egypt thus becoming virtually an independent state.

Mehemet Ali's successors shared his ambitions, but lacked his sense of proportion. Khedive Ismail in particular strained Egypt's resources by his attempts to build up a great Sudanese empire and plunged his country into debt to European financiers. In 1879, Egypt went bankrupt. Accordingly England and France intervened in the interest of the European creditors, deposed Ismail, and established a "dual control" of the country. The situation was soon complicated by a native rebellion headed by Arabi Pasha, the rebels seeking to expel the Europeans and raising the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians!" Faced by this critical situation, France hesitated, but England took decisive measures. A British army crushed Arabi Pasha at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir in 1882 and established that British protectorate which has persisted to the present day.

This protectorate was at first carefully veiled. Khedives of the Mehemet Ali dynasty nominally governed the country, British authority being exercised by an English "financial adviser"—whose advice was always taken. From 1883 to 1907 this adviser was Lord Cromer, an extremely able man, who raised Egypt from bankruptcy to prosperity.

Despite the material successes of British rule, however, Egypt has been growing increasingly restive under British control. The cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians!" first raised by Arabi Pasha has never ceased, and a strong nationalist

movement seeking Egyptian independence has persisted despite all British attempts to stamp it out.

The outbreak of the present war brought matters to a head. When Turkey, by joining the Teutonic powers in November, 1914, became the enemy of England, the reigning Khedive Abbas Hilmi, long restive under English control, threw in his lot with the Turks, and a Turkish army prepared to drive the English from the country. But England was determined on no account to lose her hold on Egypt. She had come to regard Egypt, with the Suez Canal, as the vital middle link in her world empire, and she accordingly took decisive measures to regularize her position in Egypt, hitherto rather anomalous from the strict legal point of view. Accordingly, on December 10, 1914, England issued a proclamation deposing Abbas Hilmi, appointing his cousin Hussein Kamel as sultan, and declaring Egypt a British protectorate. Egypt was thus formally incorporated within the British Empire.

This British protectorate has been assented to by Britain's allies, but has not been accepted by Turkey or the Central Powers. Egypt's status is thus still in dispute, and will be determined by the outcome of the present war.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

Egypt's economic life, like all its other forms of activity, is virtually restricted to the Delta and the narrow ribbon of alluvial soil on the banks of the Nile. The vast desert tracts to the east and west, which make up the balance of Egypt's political area, contribute nothing economically except dates from a few oases, some sheep and horses raised by the Arab Bedouins, and the produce of certain stone quarries and mines of gold and precious stones, none of these latter being of notable value.

Egypt is thus overwhelmingly an agricultural country. The Nile silt is proverbial for its richness and the fields of Egypt have for ages borne heavy crops—in many regions three a year. The character of the crops varies greatly with the season. The crop which is of greatest importance to the world at large is cotton. Egypt is an ideal cotton-raising country from every point of view, and Egyptian cotton is unsurpassed for quality. The only thing which prevents this staple from acquiring still greater importance is the limited amount of land available for its cultivation. Egypt is also a great cereal-growing country, the chief cereal crops being wheat, corn, millet, barley, and rice. Quantities of vegetables and fruits of high quality are raised, much of it for export, while flower culture for perfumes is an occupation of some importance.

The yield of principal crops for 1913, estimated in tons, stood as follows: Cotton, 379,560; wheat, 1,029,200; corn and millet, 1,640,000; barley, 245,500; rice, 191,000.

Of late years a certain industrial life in the modern sense has developed, chiefly at Alexandria and Cairo. Of course Egypt has for centuries possessed some Oriental specialties, silk-weaving, pottery, gem-setting, fine inlaying, and kindred branches. None of these have been conducted in modern factories, however, methods of production being primitive and backward. During the latter part of the nineteenth century flour and cotton-ginning mills sprang up at many points. Only very recently, however, have modern factories appeared. These are mostly textile factories. Another industry of increasing importance is the manufacture of cigarettes. These are made of tobacco imported from Turkey and Greece. They are mainly of high quality.

Although passing through Egyptian territory, the Suez Canal has comparatively little influence upon Egypt's economic life. Indeed, in some respects it is a detriment rather than a benefit, for most of the trade between Turkey and the Far East, which formerly broke bulk and passed across Egypt in transit between the Mediterranean and Red seas, now passes through the Suez Canal without any benefit accruing to the Egyptian people. The year before the war 5085 vessels passed through the canal, with a tonnage of 20,033,884 and carrying 282,235 passengers. The canal toll receipts were £5,140,000.

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THE FACTS ABOUT EGYPT

WHERE EGYPT IS LOCATED

In the broad sense Egypt comprises the whole territory between the Red Sea and the Sahara Desert, stretching from the Mediterranean south to the Nubian border, and including the Sinai Peninsula. The area of this entire region is 350,000 square miles, or about the combined areas of Texas and Arizona. Of this vast region, however, only about 12,226 square miles in the Nile Valley and the Delta is settled area. Virtually all the rest is desert. The settled area, therefore, is about equal to the combined areas of Massachusetts and Connecticut. Total population, 11,189,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN EGYPT

The *Arabs*, who constitute 97½ per cent. of the population, are divided roughly into three classes or types as follows:

The Fellaheen, who constitutes 86 per cent. of the population, there being a total of 8,786,000, are of the settled or sedentary type. They are found throughout the settled area. This ancient Egyptian stock has been singularly tenacious of its racial identity, so absorbing all its successive conquerors that the modern Egyptian peasant differs little in physical type from the peasant of the Pharaohs. But culturally he has been Arabized, and religiously he is a fanatical Moslem. He is intensely industrious, patient, and tenacious, but with little initiative and ultra-conservative.

The Bedouins, who constitute 5 per cent. of the population, there being a total of 538,000, are of the nomad type. They

are found on the outskirts of the settled area and in the desert. They are fairly pure-blooded Arabs, who maintain the life and customs of their remote ancestors in Arabia. Many are lawless nomads.

The Copts, who constitute $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the population, there being a total of 706,000, are that part of the old population which has partly resisted Arabization through their retention of the Christian faith. They are found throughout the settled area, especially in the towns. They are, in the main, traders, usurers, and artisans.

The *Europeans*, who constitute $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the population, there being only 158,000 of them, are mostly British, Italian, Greek, etc.

WHO CONTROLLED EGYPT BEFORE THE WAR

England, although a fictitious Turkish suzerainty was permitted to remain.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED EGYPT SINCE THE WAR BEGAN

England, except for Turkish raids on the eastern, and Senussi raids on the western, frontier.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN EGYPT

Political. England considers possession of Egypt and the Suez Canal as absolutely vital to the existence of the British Empire.

Economic. The large foreign trade of Egypt is falling increasingly into British hands, and immense sums of British capital have been invested in the country. Furthermore, the shares of the Suez Canal Company, control of which is in British hands, are a very lucrative investment.

Strategic. Egypt and the Suez Canal together form the keystone of Britain's arch of empire, controlling, as they do,

the communication between East and West, and protecting, as Egypt does, the immense British holdings in the Soudan and eastern Africa.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

FRANCE'S INTERESTS IN EGYPT

Political. Since the Anglo-French agreement of 1903, France has abandoned her century-old ambitions toward Egypt in favor of England.

Economic. Great amounts of French capital are invested in Egyptian bonds, Suez Canal Company shares, and other phases of Egyptian economic life.

Strategic. None.

Racial. None.

Cultural. Such European cultural influence as has been exerted upon the native Egyptian population has been almost exclusively French in character. Despite a generation of British political occupation, modern Egypt still has a French veneer.

Religious. None.

TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN EGYPT

Political. Until the British government's declaration of a formal protectorate over Egypt in December, 1914, Turkey was legally the suzerain of Egypt. This suzerainty Turkey and her allies still claim.

Turkey hopes, indeed, in case of the victory of the Central Powers, to expel the English from Egypt and assume that direct political control which she exercised prior to the nineteenth century.

Economic. Slight.

Strategic. Egypt and the Suez Canal in British hands, as

recent events have demonstrated, threaten Turkish possession of both Arabia and Syria. On the other hand, Turkish possession of Egypt would safeguard these possessions and would open the way to that reassertion of Turkish claims over Tripoli and other portions of northern Africa to which Turkish imperialists aspire.

Racial. With the exception of a certain element in the Egyptian upper class, which is of Turkish blood, Turkey has no racial interests in Egypt.

Cultural. None.

Religious. Both Turks and Egyptians are Orthodox Mohammedans.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN EGYPT

Germany's ambitions regarding Egypt would be realized through a possible control of Turkey in possession of Egypt. Such a control of Egypt through Turkey would not only buttress Germany's position in Asia, but would also open the way for German imperialist ambitions to control Africa.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo.*

This means a British protectorate over Egypt, or, in other words, Egypt as a part of the British Empire. However the problem may work out, the old status, which obtained until December, 1914,—that is, Egypt under nominal Turkish suzerainty, but effective British control,—is gone beyond recall. Egypt as a British protectorate would satisfy British desires, as well as those of Great Britain's allies. It would, however, leave unsatisfied the ambitions of Turkey and Germany, and would face the discontent of the nationalist element of the nation's population, which desires Egyptian independence and an end of British rule.

2. *Turkish Controlled Egypt.*

This would of necessity imply a German-controlled Ottoman Empire, as Turkey alone has neither the power to expel the British from Egypt nor the power to maintain control were the British expelled.

Such a Turko-German-controlled Egypt would perhaps be economically as efficiently developed as under British control; but German rule in Egypt would encounter the lasting opposition of England, France, and probably Italy, while it would also face keen native discontent, for it is difficult to believe that the Germans would succeed better than the British in reconciling the native population to European tutelage. And native discontent has long been a serious problem for Egypt's British rulers.

3. *Independent Egypt.*

This would, of course, satisfy the desires of the nationalists and the bulk of the population, but it would be opposed by all European interests in Egypt, as well as by most of the Copts, fearful of unrestrained Mohammedan rule. It is difficult to believe that the Egyptians at present possess the political efficiency required to maintain Egypt's independence.

4. *Egypt as Part of a Pan-Arab Empire.*

This would come about only as the result of a mighty outburst of Islamic religious zeal, coupled with racial and cultural self-consciousness among the Arab or Arabized populations of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and probably other portions of northern Africa. It could be effected only in the teeth of the European world, whose colonial interests in both Asia and Africa would thereby be put in jeopardy.

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THE NEAR EAST

PERSIA

See Map of the Near East on page 252

CHAPTER XXIII

PERSIA

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Persia consists essentially of a vast elevated tableland, the Iranian plateau, ringed about by lofty mountains. These mountains shut away the rain-bearing winds from the Indian Ocean and the Caspian Sea, so that the Iranian plateau suffers greatly from drought. Most of its interior is desert. The bulk of the population of Persia is concentrated in the vicinity of the mountains or in the oases which here and there break the monotony of Persia's arid plains.

In very ancient times Persia was occupied by the Iranians, a branch of the Aryan race. Persia's history has ever since been the story of the struggle of these Iranians against the invasions of foreign peoples, mostly Turanian nomad hordes from the north. Several times the Iranians have been subdued, but as invariably they have roused themselves from their servitude and overcome the invaders. The Iranians possess a race consciousness unusually strong for an Asiatic people. They have ancient cultural traditions, and are today the true Persians, the nomad or semi-nomad Turanian Turkoman tribes which occupy the deserts and mountains having contributed nothing to Persian civilization.

During the nineteenth century Persia fell into decrepitude. A line of effete monarchs had plunged the country into anarchy, while the shadow of European domination was slowly creeping over the land. Russia and England were both seeking to gain control of Persia. But with the beginning of the twentieth century there appeared signs of a national revival, which culminated in the revolution of 1906, at which

time the despotism of the ruling shah was overthrown, and Persia was endowed with the forms of a constitutional monarchy. Unfortunately, the Persians displayed little aptitude for self-government. There followed a period of acute political disorder, which was complicated by Russian and British intrigues. Finally, in 1909, Russia and England composed their differences and agreed upon what amounted to a veiled partition of Persia, Russia taking northern Persia as her "sphere of influence," England the south, with a neutral zone between. The Russo-British agreement terrified and infuriated the Persian patriots, but they were helpless. The outbreak of the European war led many of them to turn to Germany and Turkey for aid against the Anglo-Russian peril. Since 1914 Persia has been a battle-ground of rival factions.

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ECONOMIC SURVEY

The high mountain walls which surround the Iranian plateau on every side intercept the rain-bearing winds and

rob them of their moisture. For this reason the mountainous rim of Persia has a very heavy rain and snowfall, while the interior plateau suffers from drought, the central depressions being absolute desert. The only part of Persia possessing ample rainfall is the narrow coast-strip between the Caspian Sea and the Elburz Mountains. This region has an almost excessive rainfall. Its climate is hot and humid, its vegetation of almost tropical luxuriance.

Persian agriculture is therefore dependent mainly upon the rivers which flow down from the mountains till they finally lose themselves in the desert. The soil of Persia is generally rich, and wherever water exists, all sorts of agricultural products thrive. With a rational system of reservoirs and irrigation, the abundant precipitation upon the mountains might be made to fructify great areas of country, and Persia might become a flourishing agricultural region, with the exception of certain sand deserts and salt marshes in the central lowlands. Unfortunately, ages of neglect and bad government have rendered impossible the effective use of this water-supply, so that only the most naturally favored regions are to-day under cultivation.

Even as it is, however, Persia produces heavy cereal crops, notably wheat, barley, and rice. All sorts of fruits and vegetables of very high quality grow readily. Tobacco of a rather inferior kind is largely grown for home consumption, while opium is also raised both for local use and for export. Another of Persia's exports is cotton. Certain local specialties such as aromatic gums and vegetable dyes complete the list of Persia's agricultural products.

Persia is also an important grazing-country. Great numbers of sheep are raised, and Persian wool is of excellent quality, some of it being exported. Horses, mules, and asses, formerly bred on an extensive scale, have to-day greatly declined in numbers mainly on account of the high cost of fodder.

Persia is a land of enormous mineral wealth. The mountain-ranges are stored with almost every kind of mineral and metal. Rich deposits of copper and lead are found in nearly every part of the country, and huge deposits of iron ore exist in several localities. Coal is found near Teheran, and valuable seams outcrop in the southeastern provinces. One of the richest oil-fields in the world is found in southeast Persia, and a subsidiary field exists in the north. Besides these principal mineral resources, antimony, borax, cobalt, manganese, nickel, rock-salt, and tin are known to exist in paying quantities, while gold-bearing gravels have been prospected in certain localities. Unfortunately, the total lack of roads and railways, lack of capital, and general political insecurity prevent any rational exploitation of this abundant mineral wealth, which remains virtually unused.

These same factors keep Persia's industrial life at a low minimum. Of recent years some attempts to establish modern factorics have been made, but with little success. Such industry as exists concerns itself with certain Oriental specialties, notably carpet- and rug-weaving, silk-weaving, and leather-working. Some of these Persian products are of high artistic quality, but the methods are antiquated, and the output is small.

Persia is a land of important economic possibilities as yet untapped.

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THE FACTS ABOUT PERSIA

WHERE PERSIA IS LOCATED

Persia is the great Iran plateau, bounded on the north by Russian Transcaucasia, the Caspian Sea, and Russian Turkestan; on the east by Afghanistan and Baluchistan; on the south by the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf; and on the west by the Turkish provinces of Armenia and Mesopotamia. Persia has an area of 628,000 square miles, or a little larger than the Pacific coast States of Washington, Oregon, and California. Its population is about 9,500,000.

DIFFERENT RACES IN PERSIA

The *Persians* (Iranians) are found in the fertile regions and in the cities of the plateau. They form the bulk of the population. They are peasants and townsfolk. The intellectual and cultural élite of the country are exclusively Iranian.

The *Turkomans* constitute most of the population of northwest Persia and the desert regions generally. They are primarily nomads, although some are settled agriculturists, especially in the northwest. The Turkomans possess much political power by virtue of their superior fighting ability.

The *Armenians* are found in the northwest. They are peasants, traders, and artisans in the towns. They are Christians and under severe persecution.

The *Arabs* are found in the southwest coast districts along the Persian Gulf. Some are agriculturists, some nomads and fisherfolk.

The *Baluchis*, *Lurs*, etc., are scattered along the Afghan and Baluchi borders in the extreme east. They are primitive agriculturists and herdsmen, wild and lawless.

WHO CONTROLLED PERSIA BEFORE THE WAR

Persia in theory, although Russia and England controlled Persia in fact.

WHO HAS CONTROLLED OR OCCUPIED PERSIA SINCE THE
WAR BEGAN

Persia is in a very confused situation. The Persian Government has entirely broken down. Turkish troops entered Persia in the autumn of 1914, and Turco-German emissaries roused many sections of the country. Against this, Russian and British troops entered Persia, and desultory fighting has since been in progress.

RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN PERSIA ¹

Political. Possession of Persia would give Russia an outlet to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and would go far toward giving Russia the mastery of the entire Middle East.

Economic. Were Persia under Russian control and placed behind the Russian tariff wall, most of the profit of Persia's economic exploitation would accrue to Russia. Already Russia conducts a considerable trade with Persia, while many valuable mining and railroad concessions have been acquired by Russian interests.

Strategic. Persia's strategic value to Russia is very great. The Iran plateau is a natural fortress, dominating Mesopotamia on the west, menacing India to the east, and giving access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Were Russia possessed of Persia, she could throw her armies freely east or west, while England's sea communications with India and the Far East would be gravely compromised by Russian naval bases on the Persian coasts.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

¹ See foot-note on page 55.

ENGLAND'S INTERESTS IN PERSIA

Political. England has never wished to annex Persia, but until recent years she has been determined that Russia should not obtain any part of the country. Her 1909 agreement with Russia, dividing Persia into zones, of which Russia should control the northern, and England the southern, with a neutral strip between, was an unwilling compromise necessitated by England's need of Russian aid against Germany. England regards her control over southern Persia and the Persian Gulf as vital to her position in India and the Far East.

Economic. Until recently most of Persia's foreign trade was in British hands. Persia was a good customer for British goods, no others being able to compete in the Persian market. Of late years, however, this British trade monopoly has been impaired by German and Russian competition. Much English capital is invested in Persia, and British interests control many valuable concessions, notably the great oil-fields of southern Persia.

Strategic. England has always regarded Persia as the buffer state protecting India on the west, and she is resolved never to allow any European power to establish itself on the Persian Gulf.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None

Religious. None.

GERMANY'S INTERESTS IN PERSIA

Political. Ever since Germany began to gain a privileged position in Turkey (about twenty years ago) German imperialists have looked to Persia as a supplementary field for German enterprise which, once Turkey were under German control, could be used for pressure against England in India and against British sea-power.

Economic. It is only since the beginning of the twentieth

century that German economic interests in Persia have been noticeable. In those few years, however, German enterprise has made considerable headway. German goods have cut perceptibly into England's former monopoly, and some German capital has entered the country.

Strategic. The strategic value of Persia to Germany as a supplement to a German-controlled Turkey would be high. Germany could then threaten England in India, Russia in central Asia, and British sea-power from bases on the Persian Gulf.

Racial. None.

Cultural. None.

Religious. None.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY MEAN

1. *Status Quo Ante Bellum.*

That is, a veiled Anglo-Russian *condominium*, with English, Russian and neutral spheres. This arrangement has in it a few elements of permanence.

Geographically the Iran plateau is so much a unit that natural internal frontiers are not feasible. The fact of the neutral zone is good proof that England and Russia realized this fact. The present agreement has never fully satisfied either England or Russia.

The present English sphere has no natural frontier, protecting from Russian aggression either the Persian Gulf or the road to India, the great British political consideration in these regions; while the Russian sphere does not give Russia that access to the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf which is her ultimate objective in Persia.

Lastly, this arrangement is abhorrent to the strongly self-conscious Persian people, and leaves them sullen, revengeful, and ready for trouble.

2. *Formal Partition of Persia Between England and Russia.*

This solution is open to the same objections as the *status quo* solution, plus the fact that this would accentuate Persian discontent, since it would spell the death-warrant of their hopes of freedom and national independence.

3. *Annexation of All Persia to Russia.*

This would fulfil the Russian imperialists' dreams, and would give Russia her long-coveted access to the open ocean on the south. It would, however, be irreconcilably opposed by England, and would beget the irreconcilable opposition of the Persians, who dread Russian rule more than any other.

4. *German-Controlled Persia.*

This would occur only as a pendant to a German-controlled Turkey. It would be bitterly contested by both England and Russia as well as by the Persian people.

5. *Independent Persian State.*

This would be an ideal solution if the Persian people were capable of evolving a modern state sufficiently strong to maintain itself amid the clash of rival and covetous European imperialisms.

Persia's recent history shows that while a small élite, possessed of intelligence, patriotism, and ability to assimilate modern civilization, does exist, the mass of even the true Persians (Iranians) still lack developed political capacity, while the Turkoman elements, lawless and uncivilized, are so superior in fighting ability to the softer and less virile Persians (Iranians) that any attempt of the latter to bring the Turkomans under the restraints of modern governmental authority would be likely to provoke a Turkoman rising, which would plunge the country into anarchy.

Furthermore, this presupposes that the European great powers would grant such a Persian Government a fair field, whereas, the recent history of Persia shows this assumption to be unwarrantably optimistic.


6. *Internationalization of Persia.*

Persia offers another opportunity for an experiment in international control, the outlook and possible methods of which are discussed in the chapter on Constantinople and still more fully in the Appendix, which deals with the colonial problem.

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APPENDIX
THE COLONIAL PROBLEM



APPENDIX

THE COLONIES

The colonial questions which will arise for settlement at the close of the present war differ radically from the class of problems which have been treated in the body of this book. In those problems, while the material basis has been territory, the spiritual factors have been race and nationality. Those areas are all inhabited by self-conscious populations, mostly civilized, whose political aspirations form a vital part of any settlement proposed. This is not the case with the colonial areas which can reasonably be expected to come before the peace conference. With the partial exception of German Southwest Africa, none of these colonial areas contain a settled white population, while in all save Kiao-Chau the natives are savages or semi-savages, incapable of self-government and devoid of national consciousness.

In fact, with the exception of Kiao-Chau and the German possessions in the Pacific, the colonial problems which seem destined to come up for settlement are confined to central Africa. The main body of this chapter will therefore be devoted to the central African situation, with brief mention of the Kiao-Chau and German Pacific matters.

I. CENTRAL AFRICA

Central Africa is an enormous region extending roughly from the Zambezi River in the south to Guinea and the Sudan in the north, and bounded by the Indian Ocean on the east and the South Atlantic Ocean and the Guinea region on

the west. Its area is about 3,500,000 square miles, approximately the size of continental United States plus Alaska.

This vast region has a tropical climate and, with some small exceptions, is entirely unsuited for white settlement. Its value to its present European possessors is therefore not as a possible outlet for European emigration, but as a source of tropical products. Save for a few points along the coast it has been effectively occupied by Europeans only within the last forty years. For this reason its development is still only beginning, while colonial boundary-lines have not yet acquired the fixity which comes from long tenure and extensive vested interests.

The following is a survey of the various European holdings in Central Africa.

A. GERMANY'S HOLDINGS

(For the sake of simplicity the German colonies of Southwest Africa and Togo will be here considered, although geographically neither falls within the central African region; German Southwest Africa belonging to the South African and Togo to the Guinea area.)

1. *German East Africa.*

This is the largest and by far the most valuable of the German colonies. It is bounded on the north by British East Africa and the British Uganda protectorate, on the west by the Belgian Congo and Lake Tanganyika, on the south by the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and the Nyassaland protectorate and by Portuguese East Africa, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. Its area is 384,180 square miles, or about the size of Texas and New Mexico, and in 1913 its population was estimated to be 7,659,000. The total white population was 5336, of whom 4107 were Germans.

The land is generally fertile, much of it being covered by valuable forests. All tropical products grow well, and a

good start has been made in the cultivation of such products, especially rubber and coffee. German East Africa is also a good grazing-country. In 1912 the colony contained over 10,000,000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats. Its mineral wealth, though but little exploited, is considerable. Coal, iron, lead, copper, mica, and salt are known to exist.

Germany acquired the colony in 1890. The Government has been very active in opening up the country. An unusually fine system of roads exists, together with a thousand miles of railway, one line running clear across the colony from Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, on the seaboard, to Lake Tanganyika.

At the beginning of the present war the colony was attacked by British forces from the north and south and by Belgian forces from the west. Later, Portuguese troops joined in the assault. After a notable defense, the Germans were driven from the colony in December, 1917.

2. *Kamerun.*

Kamerun is a triangular block of territory, the northern apex resting on Lake Chad. Before 1911 the colony was bounded by French Congo to east and south, and by the Atlantic Ocean and British Nigeria on the west. Its area was then 191,130 square miles. In 1911, as part of the settlement of the Franco-German dispute over Morocco, France ceded to Germany a wide strip of territory on the eastern border of Kamerun, totaling 107,270 square miles, while Germany ceded to France portions of Kamerun territory aggregating 6450 square miles. The new area of Kamerun since 1911 has thus stood at 291,950 square miles, or about the size of Texas and Louisiana.

Kamerun is much less valuable than German East Africa. The climate is bad, and much of the country is swamp and impenetrable jungle, while the absence of navigable rivers makes the penetration of the hinterland a slow and costly under-

taking. The soil of the coast region is rich, and of late years considerable progress has been made in the cultivation of tropical staples, especially rubber and cocoa. The forests are rich in tropical hardwoods, particularly ebony. Gold and iron have been found.

At the beginning of the present war Kamerun was attacked by French and English troops, who finally conquered the colony in February, 1916.

3. *Togo.*

This relatively small colony on the Guinea coast is little more than a narrow enclave wedged in between the British colony of Gold Coast on the west and the French colony of Dahomey on the east. Its water-frontage on the Gulf of Guinea is insignificant. Togo's area is 33,700 square miles, or not quite so large as Indiana, with a population of 1,032,000, only 368 of whom were whites, mostly Germans.

Togo's small area, narrow shape, and extremely restricted seaboard, devoid of a good harbor, place natural barriers to its future possibilities. In addition, the climate is bad, while much of the interior is brush. Still, considerable fertile land exists, and the comparative ease of penetration encouraged the German government to devote much energy to its development. In 1914, plantations of palms, coffee, cocoa, and kola were being successfully operated, while a busy trade in palm-oil, palm kernels, and gum was being carried on.

At the beginning of the present war Togo was overrun by French and British troops after a rather perfunctory resistance by the small German constabulary. All resistance ended on August 7, 1914.

4. *German Southwest Africa.*

This large colony, geographically part of South rather than of Central Africa, is bounded on the south and east by British territory—Union of South Africa, Bechuanaland protectorate

and Rhodesia ; on the north by Portuguese Angola ; and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean. Midway down this seaboard is the British enclave of Walfisch Bay, a tiny territory of only 430 square miles, yet possessing considerable importance owing to the fact that the bay is the only good harbor on the entire coast. The area of German Southwest Africa is 322,450 square miles, the size of Texas and Oklahoma, with a population in 1913 of 95,000, of whom 14,816 were whites, 12,292 being Germans.

Southwest Africa occupies in several respects a unique position among Germany's overseas possessions. To begin with, it is the only German colony which can in any sense be termed a "white man's country." The climate, though hot, is not tropical, this being due to the colony's distance from the equator and its slight rainfall, which makes the country dry and healthful. Another factor rendering Southwest Africa an area of white settlement is the smallness of the native population. These number only 80,000 Hottentots and Bushmen, nomads of a very low type. In the second place, Southwest Africa is the first German colony, having been occupied in 1883. This fact, together with the considerable German resident population and the large amounts of money and energy devoted to its development, give the land a high sentimental value in German eyes.

Despite its large size, Southwest Africa can never become a colony of first-rank importance. Its insufficient rainfall condemns most of its surface to desert or arid pasture-land. Even with the most careful irrigation, its cultivable area must remain small, thus setting narrow bounds to the growth of its population. Its lack of good harbors is also a grave handicap. Southwest Africa may in time become an important stock-raising country. The German government has done much to encourage pastoral pursuits, and in 1913 Southwest Africa possessed 205,643 horned cattle, 472,585 sheep, 31,503 Angora goats, 485,401 other goats, 15,916 horses, and 13,618

mules and asses, besides some swine and camels. The colony also contains some mineral wealth. Valuable copper-mines are in operation, exporting 27,500 tons of copper, and diamonds were discovered a few years ago, the stones taken in 1913 being valued at \$5,000,000. Gold, asbestos, graphite, and marble are also known to exist.

The German government has spent large sums in roads, railways, and harbor improvements. In 1913 there were 1304 miles of railway open, with more under construction. The road system is excellent.

At the beginning of the present war German Southwest Africa was invaded by a mixed army of British imperial troops and South African Union forces, and the Germans, after a spirited resistance, capitulated on July 15, 1915.

B. ENGLAND'S HOLDINGS

1. *British East Africa.*

Including the administrative subdivision known as the Uganda protectorate, British East Africa is a large, irregularly shaped block of territory lying immediately to the north of German East Africa, and stretching northward to Abyssinia and the Egyptian Sudan. Including Uganda, its area is 335,941 square miles, with a population of about 7,000,000, including 30,000 Asiatics, mainly Hindus, and about 6000 Europeans, mostly British.

On the whole, British East Africa is much like German East Africa in soil and climate, though it does not appear to possess the latter's mineral resources. One peculiarity of the colony is the presence of an elevated district, the Nairobi highlands, which, though situated on the equator, lies so high that its climate renders it suitable for white settlement.

Much capital and energy have been invested in British East Africa of late years, and the colony is making rapid strides in stock-raising and agriculture. In 1914 the colony possessed 626 miles of railway.

2. *Zanzibar protectorate.*

The island of Zanzibar, together with the adjacent island of Pemba, lies off the coast of German East Africa. Their combined area is 1020 square miles. Their great source of natural wealth is the clove industry, these islands yielding the bulk of the world's supply. The estimated acreage of the clove plantations is 60,000. Coconut-growing ranks next in importance. Besides this, Zanzibar City is the natural commercial center for all the tropical east coast of Africa and conducts a brisk trade in spices, rubber, gum, ivory, and other products. In 1913 the exports were valued at over \$5,000,000.

3. *Nyassaland protectorate.*

Nyassaland is a narrow and rather irregular ribbon of territory wedged between Lake Nyassa on the east and the British colony of Rhodesia on the west. It stretches from German East Africa to the north down into Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) in the south, almost reaching the Indian Ocean, and thus nearly severing Mozambique in two. Its area is 39,315 square miles, being thus about the size of the German colony of Togo; but the inconveniences of its peculiar shape are obviated by the fact that it abuts on British territory to the west, thus assuring easy communication with the rest of the Empire. Its population is about 1,000,000, of whom 831 are Europeans, mostly British.

The soil of Nyassaland is rich, the principal crops being coffee and tobacco, with excellent prospects for cotton-growing. Lying on the southern edge of the tropics and fairly high, the climate is rather subtropical than tropical. Indeed, one district, the Blantyre highlands, is "white man's country," and here a rapidly increasing nucleus of whites is settled.

4. *Northern Rhodesia.*

Although administratively connected with the older territory known as Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, lying

as it does north of the Zambezi River, belongs geographically to the Central African rather than the South African zone.

Northern Rhodesia is bounded on the south by the Zambezi River and Portuguese East Africa, on the east by Nyassaland, on the north by German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, and on the west by the Portuguese colony of Angola (Portuguese West Africa). Its area is 290,000 square miles, or slightly larger than Texas, and its population in 1913 was about 870,000, of whom nearly 3000 were Europeans, mostly British.

The most important thing about Northern Rhodesia is its ability to support a large white population. Elsewhere in Central Africa, with the exception of the Nairobi highlands of British East Africa and the Blantyre highlands of Nyassaland, whites cannot thrive and breed. But Northern Rhodesia, consisting mostly of high plateau country, with an adequate rainfall and much good arable land, offers distinct opportunities for white immigration. This is proved by the fact that of the 2250 farmers and stock-raisers already on the land, over 500 are children. European cereals grow well, besides cotton and tobacco. There is plenty of timber of various kinds. Gold, copper, zinc, and lead are already worked, and coal has been discovered. Altogether Northern Rhodesia's prospects are excellent.

C. BELGIUM'S HOLDINGS

1. *Belgian Congo.*

Belgian Congo (formerly the Congo Free State) occupies the heart of Central Africa. Starting from the narrowest of sea-fronts, where the mighty Congo River empties into the Atlantic Ocean, Belgium's unique colonial possession spreads prodigiously landward till it covers almost the whole vast watershed drained by the Congo and its numberless affluents. Belgian Congo is thus surrounded by a ring of territories, French, British, Portuguese, and German. Its area is esti-

mated at 909,654 square miles, or nearly one third the size of continental United States, with a population conjectured to number some 15,000,000, though some estimates place it as low as 9,000,000. It has probably decreased during the last generation, owing to the policy of the European concessionaires, who have so harshly exploited the natives. In 1912 the European population numbered 5465, of whom 3307 were Belgians.

Belgian Congo is a thoroughly tropical country, with a rich soil, superabundant rainfall, and hot, moist climate. All tropical products grow luxuriantly, but little regular cultivation has as yet been attempted. In the days of the concessionaires the most obvious natural resources, especially wild rubber and ivory, were recklessly exploited. Since the Congo's annexation to Belgium in 1907 the Belgian Government has instituted a more rational and far-sighted system of development. Cattle-raising is impossible owing to the tse-tse fly. Belgian Congo contains considerable mineral wealth. Rich gold- and copper-mines are already being worked, while coal, iron, tin, and manganese are also known to exist.

D. FRANCE'S HOLDINGS

1. *French Congo.*

French Congo, otherwise known as French Equatorial Africa, is a vast, irregularly shaped band of territory lying immediately to the north of the Belgian Congo, the boundary being the Congo and Ubanghi rivers. Its western frontier is the German colony of Kamerun. To the northeast it abuts upon the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, while through the French Sudan to the north it connects with the main body of France's great North African empire. Before 1911 its area was 669,000 square miles, with a population estimated at 9,000,000, decreasing steadily owing to the ravages of sleeping sickness propagated by the deadly tse-tse fly. In 1911, as previously

stated, France ceded about one sixth of her Congo colony to Germany. French Congo in soil and climate closely resembles Kamerun and Belgian Congo. The colony has been very slightly developed. There are only 1275 Frenchmen in the country.

E. PORTUGAL'S HOLDINGS

1. *Portuguese East Africa. (Mozambique.)*

Portuguese East Africa is a long and most irregularly shaped band of territory stretching along the east coast of Africa from the colony of German East Africa on the north to the British colony of Natal on the south. Its western boundary is entirely inclosed by British territory. Its area is 476,712 square miles, with a population roughly estimated at about 3,000,000. The white population stands around 7000, the majority of whom are concentrated at the capital, Lourenço Marques.

Portuguese East Africa contains a great variety of natural resources, but the inefficient Portuguese government has done little to open up the country. Its chief importance at present arises from its chief port-town, Lourenço Marques, situated at the extreme south of the colony. This town is the natural outlet for the Transvaal and is connected with the interior by a railway. The transit trade from the Transvaal is the colony's main source of wealth.

Strictly speaking Lourenço Marques and all that portion of the colony lying south of the Zambezi River, which cuts Portuguese East Africa into two fairly equal halves, lies outside the Central African area and belongs to the South African zone.

2. *Portuguese West Africa. (Angola.)*

Portuguese West Africa, or Angola, is an immense, almost square block of territory on the west coast of Central Africa, lying opposite the other Portuguese colony of Mozambique, on the east coast. The two colonies are sundered by the

British colony of Rhodesia. Angola's other boundaries are the Belgian Congo on the north and German Southwest Africa on the south. Its area, 484,000 square miles, is almost exactly that of Mozambique. Its population is roughly estimated at 4,000,000, of whom a few thousand are Portuguese whites and near-whites.

Angola has great economic possibilities. Much of the soil is rich, and its mineral wealth is considerable; copper, iron, gold, malachite, petroleum, and salt being known to exist in paying quantities. An inefficient government has, however, done little to open up the country.

3. *São Thomé and Príncipe.*

São Thomé and Príncipe are two volcanic islands lying off the coast of French Congo. Their combined area is 360 square miles, with a population in 1900 of 42,000, of whom 1185 were whites.

The chief economic importance of the islands is the cultivation of cocoa, which is produced in large quantities, being raised by indentured labor from Angola. It was in regard to the labor conditions on these cocoa plantations that the noted scandals of a few years ago arose.

F. SPAIN'S HOLDINGS

1. *Fernando Po.*

Fernando Po is an island lying in the bight of the Gulf of Guinea, off the coast of the German colony of Kamerun. Its area is 1185 square miles. Its population is believed to be about 17,000, of whom some 300 are white (Spaniards).

Fernando Po has an exceedingly rich soil, but is little developed. Its geographical position in the bight of the Gulf of Guinea, thereby commanding both bends of the adjacent mainland coasts gives it some strategic importance.

2. *Rio Muni. (Spanish Guinea.)*

Rio Muni is a small enclave on the mainland, not far from

Fernando Po, wedged in between German Kamerun and French Congo. Its area is 9264 square miles. The population is roughly estimated at 90,000, of whom 130 are whites.

Rio Muni has a fertile soil and valuable forests, but its climate is very bad, and it is almost entirely undeveloped.

II. GERMAN COLONIES IN THE PACIFIC

The German colonial possessions in the Pacific are not of great importance. The only one with considerable possibilities is German New Guinea. The others are scattered groups of small islands. Considered in detail they are:

1. *German New Guinea, or Kaiser Wilhelm's Land.*

The German colony of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land occupies the northeastern corner of the large island of New Guinea, the rest of the island being occupied by the English and Dutch. Together with the adjacent island groups of the Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands, German New Guinea forms the territorial and administrative nucleus of Germany's holdings in the Pacific. It was the first of Germany's Pacific possessions, being occupied in 1884.

German New Guinea has an area of about 70,000 square miles, or the size of North Dakota, with a population estimated at 531,000, of these 200 being whites, mostly Germans. The country is of little present value. The climate is intensely hot and unhealthful, the natives savage, and economic exploitation has hardly begun. German New Guinea has, however, considerable possibilities as a grower of tropical products, especially rubber. Valuable forests of tropical woods exist, and gold has been discovered in the interior.

2. *Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands.*

These two island groups, which really form a single chain beginning off the north coast of German New Guinea and ex-

tending eastward toward the central Pacific, have a combined area of 24,200 square miles, with a population estimated at 70,000, about 900 of whom are whites, mostly Germans. The climate is similar to that of New Guinea, though not so unhealthful. This, together with greater ease of penetration, has rendered possible a slightly higher stage of economic development. The chief products of the Bismarck Archipelago are copra, cotton, coffee, and rubber. Those of the Solomon Islands are sandalwood and tortoise-shell.

3. *The Caroline, Pelew, Marianne, and Marshall Islands.*

These groups of small islands lie considerably to the northward of New Guinea. They cover a wide area, stretching from a point near the Philippine Island of Mindanao eastward into the central Pacific. They possess a certain geographical unity, the only non-German possession in this wide area being the American Island of Guam, the largest of the Marianne Group. The Marshall Islands have belonged to Germany since 1885. The other three groups were purchased from Spain in 1899.

These islands have a combined area of 1060 square miles, with a population of 70,000, of whom 400 are whites, mostly Germans. Of coral or volcanic formation, the soil is rich; but they are too small to possess any considerable economic possibilities.

4. *German Samoa.*

In 1899 the Anglo-American-German *condominium* over Samoa was dissolved, England renouncing her rights in favor of Germany and the United States, who divided the Samoan Islands between them. Germany got the larger part, including the two largest islands, Upolu and Savaii. The chief American island, Tutuila, however, contains the best harbor, Pago-Pago.

German Samoa has a combined area of 1060 square miles,

and a population of 35,000, of whom 600 are whites and 2000 Chinese. Considering its small size, the colony is highly valuable, the islands being exceptionally fertile. The natives are fairly civilized, and good roads and other improvements exist. Thriving cocoa and rubber plantations have been established, and these products, together with copra, form the colony's chief exports, which in 1912 amounted to over \$1,250,000.

Immediately after the beginning of the European War, Germany's Pacific colonies were captured by the British and Japanese after a perfunctory resistance. German New Guinea and the adjacent archipelagoes were occupied by Australian troops, German Samoa was captured by a New Zealand force, while Japan seized the Caroline, Pelew, Marianne, and Marshall Islands. At the present writing the German Pacific possessions are still held by their respective conquerors.

III. KIAO-CHAU

The broad, land-locked bay of Kiao-chau is situated at the southeastern base of the mountainous peninsula of Shan-tung, which juts out of the continental mass of China between the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pe-Chi-Li.

In November, 1897, a German naval squadron entered the bay of Kiao-chau and occupied its port, the city of Tsing-Tao, as a punitive measure for the murder of some German missionaries. In March, 1896, China leased the town of Tsing-Tao, the bay of Kiao-chau, and the shores thereof to Germany for a period of ninety-nine years, and in April the district was declared a protectorate of the German Empire.

The waters of the bay of Kiao-chau cover an area of about 200 square miles. The shores of the bay and the city of Tsing-Tao—in other words, the land area leased to Germany—comprise another 200 square miles. Furthermore, the actual

leased area was surrounded by a so-called "neutral zone" thirty miles wide, in which Germany obtained special privileges.

The land-area of the Kiao-chau concession contained, in 1913, a population of about 192,000. The white population, including the garrison, was 4470, mostly Germans.

At the time of its acquisition Germany had high hopes of Kiao-chau. That was the period when the partition of China among the great powers seemed inevitable, and since Kiao-chau was both a fine war-port and a good commercial harbor, Germany determined to make it the naval and commercial center of the empire in the far East. Immense sums were spent on its fortification and on the development of Tsing-Tao, which soon became a handsome European town.

Although the more sanguine prophets were disappointed, Kiao-chau attained a considerable commercial importance. The German-built railway into the Shan-tung hinterland tapped the economic resources of the province, and most of its foreign trade passed through the port of Tsing-Tao. In 1913 the export and import trade of the port of Tsing-Tao totaled nearly \$19,500,000, while 923 vessels of 1,298,000 tons entered at Kiao-chau. The German-owned railway from Tsing-Tao to Tsinang near the Hoang-Ho had a length of 252 miles.

A few days after the outbreak of the European War, Japan delivered an ultimatum to Germany, summoning her to deliver up the leased territory of Kiao-chau and, upon Germany's refusal, Japan declared war. A strong Japanese army invested Tsing-Tao, while a Japanese fleet blockaded the port by sea. After a spirited resistance, Tsing-Tao surrendered on November 7, 1914. Since then the leased territory has been occupied by Japan, who has assumed all Germany's rights in the Shan-tung hinterland as well.

SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AND WHAT THEY
MEAN

Among the numerous suggestions for a solution of the colonial problem, three types of solutions stand out as the most likely: (1) the old system of national control and agreed-upon spheres of influence; (2) the administration of the politically weak and unorganized territories of the world by a league of nations, if such an international organization is effected by the peace conference; (3) the administration of specific colonies by local centers of international control.

The larger implications of these three types of solutions may be set down as follows:

1. *National Control and Agreed-Upon Spheres of Influence.*

The obvious difficulty in this system is that it contains an inevitable threat to the peace of the world. When the investor class of a given nation runs into difficulty in one of the weak and unorganized territories, when the investing interests of one nation clash with the investing interests of another, the investor turns to his home government for help. And since the problem of guaranteeing investments is inextricably tangled with the problems of diplomatic prestige and national honor, it has been a very natural development that the foreign offices should become collection agencies and insurance companies for the foreign investor class. Colonial history teems with instances where the business conflict of rival nations in colonial territory has reacted upon the situation in Europe, now menacing, now upsetting, the peaceful relations of Europe.

Another difficulty involved in this solution is the latent threat that resides in the potential military power of the native populations, when the territory is in the hands of any of the great powers. A clear case of this is the extraordinary resistance displayed in this war by the native troops of German East Africa.

This solution, applied to Central Africa, regardless of any reshuffling of the spheres of influence, will leave in certain contest two dominant imperialist ideals; that is, the German desire for a Central African empire and the British desire for an all-red route from Cape to Cairo. The appetites of these two rival imperialisms would be whetted by the presence in the Central African area of Portugal's extensive possessions, because Portugal is a weak power, probably incapable of developing them, and thereby creating a political vacuum which would inevitably draw in other powers. Such an arrangement could not but leave the Portuguese colonial area the scene of foreign pressure and conflicting interests.

The Belgian Congo presents another difficulty, since it is in the possession of a state which, small at best, may be so wasted at the close of the war as to be unable to develop and maintain efficient political control of this area, again creating a weak spot which will constitute a temptation to the powers with greater political and financial abilities.

Since the Portuguese and Belgian possessions constitute roughly one half of the entire Central African area, it is clear that the old system of colonial administration will inevitably leave a very large area, the weakness of whose possessors will throw a constant temptation in the way of the stronger powers.

Under this solution, a conflict of interests is inevitable in the German colonial possessions in Oceanica. There exists, as regards these territories, the strong desire of Australasia and New Zealand to retain the German colonies that have been taken by them during the war. Also the ambition of Japanese imperialists enters here. The island groups to the north of the equator which have been taken by the Japanese, while not large enough for colonies of settlement, have marked strategic importance, which will inevitably figure in Japanese dreams of Pacific domination.

As regards Kiao-chau, while it may be a source of distinct

difficulty between Japan and China, it has probably fallen to the rank of a minor question as regards the former colonial ambitions of Germany. It may be doubted whether Germany has any special desire to get it back, for the reason that Kiao-chau is a relic of a played-out phase of world politics. When Germany acquired Kiao-chau, it looked as though China would be partitioned among the great powers; but since then China has become so self-conscious that the question of her partition is clearly adjourned, if not out of the question. And, in addition to this, the fact that Japan has become so much stronger, as a result of the weakening of the white world, makes it clear that an attempt at the partition of China would face the combined opposition of Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism. In the light of these facts, Germany's attempt to regain Kiao-chau would be a game not worth the candle.

2. *The Administration of Weak and Unorganized Areas of the World by a League of Nations.*

This solution would doubtless apply only to the colonies of exploitation, not to colonies of settlement with marked white populations. It would probably apply only to colonies climatically incapable of supporting a permanent white population; that is to say, the colonial areas where the chief interests of the great powers are in the opportunities they offer for the investment of capital, access to raw materials, or in the strategic importance of the areas. It would not apply to colonies which present a distinct racial problem either in the sense of the mother country's having a considerable population therein or in the sense of a real national consciousness among the natives. This solution, as proposed, is a promising method for giving stability to a league of nations if organized. The exponents of this solution invariably support their contention by reference to the way in which the ceding of the Western lands of the United States to the Government of the Confederation, and

the erection of these lands into a large public domain to be held and developed as a common property for the common welfare, bound the leagued States together by the tie of a common economic interest.

The success of such a proposal will depend very largely upon the outcome of the war, the extent to which international interests dominate national interests at the peace conference, and the degree to which the principles of freedom to trade and equality of economic opportunities in these territories are worked out.

3. The Administration of Specific Colonies by Local Centers of International Control.

This proposal has been advanced mainly by the type of political thinker who does not yet regard the proposal for an all-inclusive league of nations as in the field of practical possibilities. The proposal is that there should be created permanent international commissions to administer those areas where world crises are most liable to develop. The exponents of this proposal point out that such policies and arrangements as the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-American action, the Conference of Algeciras, and the London Conference after the Balkan Wars, have been called into existence by the fact that there did not exist any instrument of international control to deal with areas that held the threat of trouble; that these arrangements have been attempts to fill the vacuum caused by the fact that no international organization existed that had permanent executive as well as legislative or suggestive powers. The proposal is regarded by its best exponents as the beginning of a solution, the practically possible step on the road toward real international government. It is an attempt to elaborate and give permanence to such arrangements as the various European conferences that have from time to time dealt with such problems as Morocco. The weakness of these conferences in the past has been that they legislated inter-

nationally, but left the execution of their decrees to national governments.

This solution suggests the putting of the executive power into the hands of a series of permanent international commissions on the several problems involved in areas of exploitation.

This solution, granted a satisfactory conclusion of the war, may figure not only as a substitute for a general league of nations, but it might be an important supplement to a general league of nations; that is to say, the general league of nations, if created, may be restricted in its functions mainly to the negative matter of police duty, while the positive matters of removing the causes of war and administering the threatening areas may perhaps go into the hands of local centers of international control.

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THE END

